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5. Modernity without Restraint: The Political Religions; The New Science of Politics; and Science, Politics, and Gnosticism
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THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ERIC VOEGELIN

VOLUME 10

PUBLISHED ESSAYS
1940–1952

EDITED WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
ELLIS SANDOZ

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PUBLISHED ESSAYS, 1940–1952
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Editor’s Introduction

This volume contains some of Eric Voegelin’s most interesting essays. They include his first publications after arriving in the United States as a refugee from Adolf Hitler, and so contain eyewitness commentary on the character and significance of the rise of National Socialism from the last months before World War II onward. A major study entitled “The Growth of the Race Idea” provides a masterful summary of the two volumes on the subject Voegelin first published in 1933. It deepens the analysis given there in light of another decade of study and observation—including his own narrow escape by train from the Gestapo following the Anschluss and dismissal as a professor from the Faculty of Law of the University of Vienna.1 A related essay of wide interest is entitled “Nietzsche, the Crisis, and the War,” perhaps the fullest consideration of Friedrich Nietzsche in Voegelin’s entire oeuvres.2


In another vein, Voegelin’s elaborate study of the “Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245–1255,” fully presents for the first time and analytically sifts the meaning of the extensive diplomatic correspondence of the Western powers and the papacy with the invincible great khans. Conducted during the time of the breathtaking surge of the Mongol empire that for a time threatened to extinguish Western civilization itself, Voegelin shows the diplomatic documents attending this millennial clash to have permanently formed our understanding of political reality; and, at the level of power politics, Mongol imperialism resulted after Liegnitz in the nearly two-and-a-half-century domination over Russia known as the Tatar Yoke.1

Yet another major study is “The Origins of Scientism,” a luminous analysis of the grounds of much of modern thought, including all modern political ideologies. Among much else there is a survey of the state of political theory in the late 1940s, penetrating studies of utopian thought with essays on Thomas More4 and Goethe, and a concluding essay that explores the intricacies of “Gnostic

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4. For a consideration of Thomas More from a Voegelian perspective see Dietmar Herz, foreword, in Eric Voegelin, Die spielerische Grausamkeit der Humanisten, Studien zu Niccolo Machiavelli und Thomas Morus [Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1997], and Dietmar Herz, Thomas Morus zur Einführung [Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1999].
Politics”—a theme familiar from the famous contemporaneous publication, The New Science of Politics. This volume shows Eric Voegelin at his most approachable best.

There are certain problems, however, and these must be noticed at the outset. Readers will see from the contents that several signal essays are missing, and this is by reason of their publication elsewhere in Voegelin's books, e.g.: "Siger de Brabant,"5 "Bakunin's Confession,"6 "Plato's Egyptian Myth,"7 "The Philosophy of Existence: Plato's Gorgias,"8 "The Formation of the Marxist Revolutionary Idea,"9 and "Machiavelli’s Prince: Background and Formation."10 A further essay actually published in 1947 was excluded as belonging to the provenance of 1938–1939, so to be included in a prior volume (CW, vol. 9).11 Of the material published herein, "More's Utopia" was previously published in this series12 and most of "The Origins of Scientism" as well.13 The upshot is a deceptively slender volume with much of the writing of the period under consideration absorbed into the books that have made Voegelin's reputation—Order and History and Anamnesis—or integral to History of Political Ideas (all of it written during the

11. "Zu Sanders 'Allgemeiner Staatslehre,'" Österreichische Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht n.s. 1, nos. 1–2 [1947]: 106–35. This essay was in galley-proof at the same journal that eventually published it when Voegelin escaped Austria in 1938; the Nazis suppressed publication because of the author's identity.
period represented by the present volume, which itself now has been published.  

If we pause at the beginning of the period we are rightly to be reminded of the Voegelins' narrow escape from Austria and of the terror of the Nazi occupation. In a rare document dated July 1939, Voegelin speaks personally and directly of the atmosphere of Vienna and the horrific blight over Europe from which he had so luckily emerged. Since the emotional and intellectual center of much of his scientific writing was shaped through confrontation with the totalitarian experience, Voegelin's characterization is of importance for comprehension of his dispassionate technical analyses. Stressing that he was neither a Jew, a Marxist, or a Catholic (the "pet devils of Hitlerism"), Voegelin sought to give a glimpse of realities behind the dry facts of the situation. These facts, he said in an interview, gain their peculiar importance in the life of persons who live under Nazi rule because they form part of well organized and cleverly released waves of terror, calculated to encircle the individual closer and closer to the point of extinction—meaning thereby emigration or suicide. [This creates] an impasse situation for the classes of men who are destined for annihilation.

The "peculiar totalitarian climate of terror" eludes even careful reporting of the facts in the media, he continued. "The essential feature of the terror waves, however, is not the actual atrocities, but the state of mind produced in the men who are potentially exposed to them. A man may be lucky enough never to be touched by any act of persecution himself; but nevertheless after a short time, he will be a nervous wreck because he is living constantly

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15. The quotations here and in the following paragraphs are from Eric Voegelin, "In the Totalitarian Climate," Northwestern News Magazine, Friday, July 21, 1939 [Hoover Institution, Voegelin Archives, box 55, folder 39]. Professor Barry Cooper kindly drew my attention to this article and sent me a copy of it, one which he transcribed from a clipping in the Voegelin Library at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. Cf. Cooper, Voegelin and the Foundations of Modern Political Science, 23 n 36, and the related discussion. Cooper gives the most detailed and fully documented account of Voegelin's flight and first years in America, drawing on his comprehensive reading of the correspondence and contemporaneous writings of Voegelin, his associates, and correspondents. See esp. ibid., chap. 1: "Escape and Arrival." He also has provided helpful analyses of most of the essays included in the present volume, indicating their connections with Voegelin's other scholarship of the period down to 1952. See also Voegelin, Autobiographical Reflections, ed. Sandoz; also Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction, 2d ed. (1981; New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Pubs., 2000), esp. chaps. 2 and 3.
There is a story of a Dutchman who comes to Germany and is introduced by Nazis to the achievements of the regime: the abolition of unemployment, the aggrandizement of the Reich, the new autostradas, etc. Having duly admired everything he remarks that, after all, his country has some bright spots, too. And he tells the Nazi guide, “When the bell is ringing at my house in Amsterdam at seven o’clock in the morning, I know with absolute certainty it can’t be anybody but the milkman.” A German never can be sure that the ring at the door does not mean prison for life, or death.

After the Germans had invaded my country, in March 1938, I had to stay in Vienna for several months. I remember very well that every time the door bell sounded, I looked around my desk for mail which had come in the morning, for notes which I had taken, for an address which I had put down, in order to shove everything dangerous into the stove and burn it because the caller might be a Gestapo-man. Once it was a Gestapo-man who had come to search my home. I am perfectly healthy, but in these weeks I developed insomnia because of nervous heart attacks; they ceased as soon as I was in Switzerland.

Such an atmosphere and incidents of the kind “decompose the strongest personality” Voegelin continued, and he goes on to give examples of what he calls “impasse situations.”

You receive your permit to leave the country after you have paid your emigration-tax, of say forty percent of your property, if you have any. Take the typical case of an old Jewish lady who owned a house in Vienna. The house had been taken away by the Gestapo; she had been put in jail and released after three months under the condition that she would leave the country within six weeks. In order to leave she has to pay the emigration-tax on the property which already had been confiscated. The tax office did not care about the Gestapo and would not give a permit before the tax was paid. It was a nerve-wracking race with time to settle the dispute between Gestapo and tax office in order to get the permit, as the alternative was to go back to jail indefinitely. This type of conflict between government offices, which happened in thousands of cases, is not accidental, but organized.

A Jewish physician who knew that he would lose his job within a few weeks was lucky enough to find a position abroad. When he had secured it, he resigned his job in the hospital. As soon as he had resigned he was put in jail for sabotage. When he came out half a year later the position abroad was gone.

I have just picked out two or three of the hundreds of cases which are known to me personally. I could continue the series for some length with reports of well-to-do Jewish women who wanted to save a part
of their property abroad in order to have a bare subsistence and got it after they had slept with Gestapo officials; of Jewish lawyers who could not transfer their profession to another country and felt too old to start from the bottom and committed suicide; of aged people who were robbed of everything and after having got out of the country died of heart attack, etc.

But I do not want to relate individual cases. What I wish to stress is the typical character and the technique of terrorizing by creating the impasse situation. Behind the individual cases there is the state of mind which produces them. Millions of people are at its mercy. And this state of mind, it is my impression, is surprisingly little known, if it is known at all, outside the German Reich.\textsuperscript{16}

From the time of this interview at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, where Voegelin was teaching summer school, to the initial presentation of “Extended Strategy” (our essay 1), less than four months elapsed. But by that time the Voegelins had moved to the University of Alabama, and he found himself giving his first paper to the Southern Political Science Association at its annual meeting in Knoxville, Tennessee. The transition to political theory as Voegelin’s usual \textit{métier} is evident, and the essay takes its point of departure from the characterization of Hitler’s project as a nihilistic revolution being effected through a series of tactical “screens” successfully deployed so as to obscure behind ostensibly democratic verbiage the profoundly antidemocratic imperialist activities of the German despot. While not disagreeing with Rauschning’s attribution of \textit{nihilism}, Voegelin demonstrates its inadequacy and superficiality if the real situation is to be grasped. The unique connotations of propaganda symbols are explored, such as the untranslatable \textit{Lebensraum}. And the techniques utilized to destroy democracy through apparently democratic means are analyzed in a way that is illuminating for anyone interested in understanding how clever demagoguery can subvert a democratic regime before either the population of the country itself or its would-be friends in neighboring nations realize the enormity of the disaster being perpetrated. This is more than merely a tract for the times—if we are prepared to trust our eyes and to learn from history. Its chilling validity against the backdrop of the Holocaust (that no one understood while it unfolded and until it was too late) demonstrates how a constitutional regime can be subverted into a

\textsuperscript{16} Quotation from Voegelin, “In the Totalitarian Climate,” from typescript of article, MS pp. 1–4.
tyranny in very nearly a magical twinkling of an eye. “When the
voter is worked up to a state of hysterical frenzy by permanent
unmeasured calumniation of the opponent, by constant appeal to
and glorification of aggressiveness, by Jew baiting, etc., he is [no
longer] a democratic voter even if he casts his vote as a secret, free
vote.” Voegelin summarizes as follows:

National Socialism owes its existence in large part to certain screen
patterns. The use of such patterns and their screening functions is
made possible by the profound helplessness of the Western world and
its policy and opinion shaping agencies concerning German and par-
ticularly National Socialist problems. . . . National Socialist states-
men intentionally . . . use Western categories with a clear knowledge
that their misuse will be detected not at all, or too late. . . . The first
victims of these misunderstandings were the German democratic
parties, whose leaders proved intellectually and morally incapable of
coping with the problem. The next victims have been whole countries
like Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. And there is no sign yet
[November 1939] that the Western democracies have a better under-
standing of the situation.

Of course, . . . I have not been able to devote even one word to the
question of what the screen patterns actually screen.17

The German question is of direct concern in three other essays,
so that nearly half of the book bears on this and related issues.
“The Growth of the Race Idea” explores the texture of the Nazi
myth of race in a concise elaboration of Voegelin’s earlier work
on the subject. He had reminded readers of the Nazi “theory of
truth” as given by Alfred Rosenberg: “truth is what is useful to the
German people.”18 Voegelin’s main concern in this essay, written
during the deeply troubled spring of 1940, is to help Americans
more clearly grasp the meaning of events unfolding before their
eyes at the onset of World War II. The Nazi race doctrines ultimately
were dismissed as scientifically worthless. But despite this fact they
constituted the pivot of the ideology whose “second reality” [as
Robert Musil would call it] status powerfully galvanized a political
and military convulsion, one in the long run sufficient to cost
billions of dollars and millions of human lives. Dreams have to
be understood as subjective—and therefore effective—reality, too,
when one confronts derangement. “When we speak of the race idea
we have in mind chiefly the idea as it is used by modern creeds, of

17. Essay 1, herein, 26 and ad fin.
the type of National Socialism, in order to integrate a community spiritually and politically,” Voegelin writes.\textsuperscript{19} Such political ideas have nothing to do with observable reality but, rather, serve to create it. “A symbolic idea like the race idea is not a theory . . . because it is not the function of an idea to describe social reality, but to assist in its constitution. [Such an] idea is always ‘wrong’ in the epistemological sense, but this relation to reality is its very principle.”\textsuperscript{20} The background of the Nazi race idea is shown through an extremely important theoretical analysis, one that traces earlier “community” and “body” ideas from the ancient Greek, biblical, and medieval Christian conceptions, through earlier race doctrines, up to the combination in the late modern period that results in the closing of the community through secularization and particularization. The key move in the late process is the Enlightenment’s destruction of the spiritual essence of man: “The secularization of the community idea and the replacement of the Christian pneuma by the intramundane human reason as the bond of the community is an important step toward severing the transcendental ties,” thereby closing the human personality as a merely secular entity. This is true especially in Germany from the time of Goethe’s “demonic” personality that inaugurated the idea of the superman and the rise of Satanism.\textsuperscript{21} The conclusion of “The Growth of the Race Idea” gives a summary of the argument, which need not be repeated here, apart from emphasizing Voegelin’s insistence that the time factor is decisive in determining the character of whatever community ideas become formative of societies. Fortunately especially for England and America, the revolutions that established their political orders came early and substantially preserved the wisdom of classic-Christian traditions from Western civilization before it further atrophied—in direct contrast to the nihilistic biologism, scientism, gnosticism, and secularism formative of the German revolution of 1919–1933.\textsuperscript{22}

This theme is resumed in the exercise in \textit{Realpolitik} entitled “Some Problems of German Hegemony” [in essay 3, § 3], where the various national revolutions are compared and, among other factors, the time differential again is stressed.

\textsuperscript{19.} Herein, 27. \\
\textsuperscript{20.} Herein, 28. \\
\textsuperscript{21.} Herein, 48. \\
The democratic constitution of 1919 [of Weimar Germany] was adopted by a people which was far from having the historically settled democratic temper of the Western nations. The German national state was founded only in 1870 and the nation did not grow, therefore, politically within the dynastically established state structure, having the prestige of centuries, like the French and British. . . . It is important, moreover, to be aware of the time difference in the formation of political attitudes for the masses in Great Britain and France on the one hand and in Germany on the other. The English movements that created the liberal and democratic tradition were the revolution of the seventeenth and the Wesleyan reform of the eighteenth centuries, which imbued the masses of British and, for that matter, American lower middle classes and workers deeply with religiously based rules of democratic conduct. For the French a similar result was achieved through secularized personal and community ideas of 1789. The political formation of German masses is mainly due to the nineteenth century ideas which largely had lost contact with the Christian principles of respect for the individual and were predominantly collectivist. The working class was mainly formed by the Marxist class-ideas, the lower middle class by the collectivist nationalism of the late nineteenth century.

What of National Socialist hegemony proper? Voegelin here sees it as the rise to power of a “pre-medieval” [pagan Teutonic?] stratum of the population whose intent is to destroy Western civilization not only in Germany but wherever its power extends and to replace the traditional content with the fantasies of Nazi ideology. In contrast to the universalist dimension even of Stalinist Communism, Hitler’s despotism is radically nihilistic and destructive, taking German national superiority as its starting point and implementing destructiveness by a range of actions from “simple dismissal to detention in concentration camps, killing, and forced emigration. . . . [W]hether anything can be saved from the wreck is anybody’s guess.”

By 1944 Voegelin is moved to defend philosophy against wild accusations of complicity in Hitler’s atrocities, and publishes “Nietzsche, the Crisis, and the War.” This essay sets out from the genial premise that “philosophers are not much of a cause in history

24. Herein, 73.
insofar as any direct influence on specific actions is concerned, but . . . their work is effective, if at all, through the more subtle means of evocation, rationalizing support, or disenchantment. Nietzsche is no exception to this rule." 25 Much of the attack on Nietzsche is a combination of condemning the messenger for his forecast of the crisis of the West and its depth down to a century of warfare and out of German war-guilt antipathy: The transvaluation of values is Nietzsche’s phrase but not his fault. In fact just the opposite is the case, Voegelin here contends: The philosopher sought to “transcend the crisis and to find the firm ground for erection of a new and stable order of values . . . Nietzsche’s is, on principle, the Platonic position that an order of society can arise only out of a well-ordered soul.” 26 Nietzsche’s stance is wholly in contrast to National Socialism’s, whose “transvaluation” is despicable: “The National Socialist transvaluation . . . has reached a rock-bottom of despiritualized, chaotic animal force and has proved incapable of creating even a semblance of order.” 27 From these surface matters, the essay unfolds as a profound interpretive meditation that seeks the core of Nietzsche’s insights into the modern crisis with the help of several interpreters, but especially of George Santayana and Stefan George. Voegelin takes stock along the way and writes a brilliant summarizing page:

We have analyzed four positions which can be assumed toward the crisis and the challenge of Nietzsche: (1) The position of the Last Man who lives totally in the crisis and meets the challenge with derision; (2) the suppression of the consciousness of crisis through the projection of evil into the German character; (3) the recognition of the crisis and the undaunted faith in the survival value of the Liberal Tradition, and (4) the profound understanding of the Nietzschean problem and the resignation in spiritual solitude. The last of these positions, the position of Santayana, is ultimate in the sense that it reflects an immediate mystical experience beyond the crisis. It is not ultimate, however, in the sense that no other fundamental position is possible. Man has to die alone and the experiences of intellectual mysticisms have their truth in that they anticipate the last solitude of existence. But man has to live in society, and the spiritualization of the life in society has inevitably to grapple with the spirit of the institutions; in this condition of our finite existence originate the experiences which lead to the Platonic attitude. The Platonism of Nietzsche, however,

25. Herein, 126.
26. Herein, 133.
27. Herein, 134.
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION

was both broken and vitiated. It was broken by the despair to find the human substance for a spiritual order of society; and it was vitiated through the unique structure of Nietzsche’s spiritual life; his soul was closed to transcendental experiences and suffered in the vivid consciousness of this demonic limitation. If we formulate Nietzsche’s problem in this manner, the outline of a possible further development becomes visible; the Platonic attitude of Nietzsche can be resumed if a new hope should awaken that the human substance is present which would make possible an overcoming of the crisis “in society,” to use the formula of Santayana; and if the soul of the man who makes the attempt would not be his prison. That man appeared in the person of Stefan George. 28

The Nietzsche essay is a—perhaps the—high point of the volume before us, and in it one hears the authentic voice of the mature Voegelin speaking. The reader must savor it for himself, of course, and wrestle with the questions of the interpretative compatibility of this with Voegelin’s other considerations of Nietzsche, which may be seen to take their rise and various directions from the assessment given in the passage just quoted.

Each of the other essays included here makes distinctive intellectual claims. All of them need not be addressed in this introduction, which is intended to serve as a mere appetizer and invitation to read the volume, not presume to do more. Familiar and important problems arise in the balance of the book as glimpsed in what we already have noticed. Just as in the Race essay and the Nietzsche the cardinal question remains of the substance of the community to be organized politically, the Mongol essay shows a set of answers to this problem in a rival universalism that contrasts with Western Christian universalism. More disturbingly, among the desiderata of twentieth-century political theory, as Voegelin inventories these in his American Political Science Review article, it is precisely the theory of community substance that is most deficient. This is evidently because radical secularization has deformed and occluded scientific concern to the neglect of philosophical anthropology and the order of the soul; and this neglect has, in turn, obscured any understanding of the pneumatic dimension of social cohesion as symbolized historically by the Mystical Body of Christ.

If we dodge the question of the pneuma of Christ and of its function as the substance of the Christian community, nothing is left of Christian-ity but the reception of Stoic ethical and legal theory, a few remarks

28. Herein, 144.
concerning the recognition of temporal authority, and the hierarchy of functions. The substance has disappeared. As a consequence, the struggle between Christianity and the counter-religion of paganism in the late Roman Empire becomes quite as unintelligible as the community problems of the Middle Ages. It will not do to eliminate from the field of political theory the theory of the community within which the structural political problems arise by classifying them as religious. Precisely the so-called non-political ideas, as for instance the eschatological sentiments and ideas, are the great source of political fermentation and revolution throughout Western history to this day.  

On that tantalizing note, the reader is invited to turn for himself to the feast that awaits him.

Ellis Sandoz

29. Herein, 165.
PUBLISHED ESSAYS, 1940–1952
The term *extended strategy* has been employed by Hermann Rauschning in his book on the *Revolution of Nihilism*. He uses it to denote certain techniques employed by the National Socialist government in the process of expanding the German empire. The facts of this technique are by now fairly well known: They include such types of action as economic pressure, threats to use armed force, undeclared war, fomenting unrest in foreign countries up to the point of civil war, intervention to restore order, atrocity propaganda waves, dividing a major operation into minor steps, each of which meets with less resistance than would the whole, etc. These measures are not instruments of peace-time diplomacy but new strategical devices of warfare, and they culminate, when the ground is sufficiently prepared, in actual application of armed force in the final phase of the conquest of new territories and their populations.

While the factual side of these techniques is known, and while Rauschning has given us a convenient provisional term, there is lacking as yet an analysis of the background of this strategy and the peculiar historical situation that makes it an effective means of
empire building. This paper cannot presume to solve the task, but it may try at least to give a general outline of some of the problems involved. I have singled out for this purpose a few leading features of the situation, being fully aware that the picture needs correction through the consideration of other factors which space does not permit me to treat adequately now.

The first phase of the dynamic technique comprises the period of restoration of the internal sovereignty impaired by stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles. The chief aims were rearmament, general conscription, and remilitarization of the Rhineland. These first violations of treaty provisions were test cases; the measures were taken tentatively, always with an eye on the reaction of the Western powers; and, at least in the case of the Rhineland occupation, we know that the German government was ready to withdraw at the moment it should meet with serious resistance. There was no resistance beyond “intensified diplomatic activity.” One of the major reasons for nonresistance was a psychological atmosphere, which had grown up since the war, with the conviction that the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles inflicted undue hardship on the German people and were unjustified against a sovereign national state of the great-power class, one which was a member of the community of nations with the same right as every other member. The theory of the sovereign state, of the equality of status of members of the League of Nations, in short the state-pattern governing the international relations of the post-war period, stood psychologically in the way of effective resistance. When the state-pattern was accepted in good faith, the German measures procedurally still constituted violations of a treaty, but as to their actual purpose, namely, the restoration of full internal sovereignty, they were not outrageous. The great issue at stake was whether the German government accepted the state-pattern in good faith, or whether the use of the state-pattern was not a screen technique covering steps preparatory to action that would not come within the compass of acknowledged patterns of international relations. For anybody who had watched the history of National Socialism closely there was no doubt about the really dynamic character of the moves covered by the invocation of German sovereignty, national honor, the right to equal status, etc. The Western powers, however, were at the time inclined to give the German government the benefit of the doubt. The politically effective Western public
opinion insisted on interpreting the evidence of the documents of the National Socialist movement as being representative of a phase in a revolution that would be followed by a return to the Western standards of international relations as soon as certain wrongs of the Treaty of Versailles were righted.

Another effective pattern was used in the first expansions beyond the borders of the Reich, on the occasion of the annexation of Austria and the cession of the Sudeten-German area of Czechoslovakia. Both of these expansions could be covered reasonably well by applying the principle of national self-determination. The Austrians and the Sudeten Germans had tried to form a union after the dismemberment of the Austrian monarchy and had expressed a desire to join Germany; and up to the advent of the National Socialist government in the Reich, union sentiment had been very strong in Austria. They were prevented from taking any step toward effective union by the treaties of Paris. And while there was not much doubt that in 1938 a majority of Austrians did not favor a union with Germany and that a strong minority of Sudeten Germans was against it, the idea prevailed in the West that these groups were ethnically and culturally German and that, after all, their incorporation into the German Reich was an internal national affair of the German people. The procedure could not be acknowledged, at least in the Austrian case, as legitimate, but in substance again the expansion seemed to be in accord with the principles of national independence and self-determination as advocated by the Western powers. In addition, the steps were directed against the discredited treaties of Paris and acquired thereby an element of reasonableness.

The breaking point of the expansion program was reached by the establishment of Bohemia and Moravia as a German protectorate in March 1939. By no possible interpretation could this step be subsumed under the concept of national sovereignty or under the principle of national self-determination. The German declaration accompanying the step, therefore, did not even attempt to use the old screen pattern but employed instead the new category of the German Lebensraum, usually translated as “living space.” This new category certainly broke with the former screening technique; but, nevertheless, I think it is proper to speak of the new category as a screen pattern, because its use did not produce in the West an insight into the reality of National Socialism but effectively veiled again the real events. One might say that in the first two cases the
principles invoked were screens subjectively as well as objectively, while in the Lebensraum case the principle came nearer to revealing essential features of National Socialist reality, though not to Western understanding. The truth is, the word Lebensraum cannot be translated into a Western language. Its rendition as “living space” shows that the translator can use a dictionary, but that is all. The term living space is without meaning in English, and for reasons of the history of languages no combination of English words is able to convey adequately the biological, collectivist, geopolitical, and metaphysical connotations of the German term. The meaning of the word Lebensraum is accessible only to men who have a profound and intimate knowledge of German cultural history and of the history of the German language in the last two centuries. Its meaning could be unfolded only by explanations of considerable length. This fact alone makes an understanding of the implications of the new category in the West impossible for all but a very restricted number of specialists. The screen value of the new concept is, therefore, twofold. First, the new idea probably is still very far from revealing the core and the ultimate possibilities of National Socialist dynamics; and second, even what it reveals is not adequately understood by the Western nations.¹

From a survey of reactions in newspapers, weeklies, and monographs one receives the impression that the new step is supposed to mean that the German Reich is engaged in an enterprise of “power politics,” that its aims are “imperialistic.” In short, the step is supposed to indicate a new case of imperialism of the nineteenth-century brand. The interpretation is not altogether wrong, insofar as the expansion of the Reich involves—technically, of course—the extension of jurisdiction over new areas and men, extension of economic and political spheres of influence, etc. But it would be a gross mistake if these surface phenomena, which inevitably

¹. The argument of this paragraph may seem to dwell unduly on philological niceties. It should be understood, therefore, that the real problem back of the translation from one set of language symbols into another is the difference of cultural values as expressed in language. The German language, as an evolving instrument of German cultural processes, has developed since the second half of the eighteenth century a universe of neo-pagan meanings that is unparalleled in the West and, therefore, cannot be rendered adequately by any Western language whose vocabulary has retained its Christian connotations. The neo-pagan meanings of words like objektiver Geist, Geisteswissenschaft, Blut, Ehre, Führer, have no equivalents in French or English, just as Greek words like arete or nomos empsychos are untranslatable in these languages.
accompany every power expansion, should be supposed to exhaust
the problem, and if they should induce the belief that the present
events are a belated case of nineteenth-century imperialism.

One of the consequences of the Lebensraum and similar pat-
terns should be expressly noted. While the patterns of national
sovereignty and national self-determination were accepted in the
West as legitimate forms of exertion of power, the principle of
Lebensraum is supposed to be illegitimate. The government that
embarks on Lebensraum expansion comes into conflict with ideas
of the type embodied in the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928, and it is
liable to be stigmatized as an “aggressor.” We are faced, therefore,
with the curious situation that the step from screen pattern 2 to
screen pattern 3 has induced Great Britain and France to declare
war on the German Reich, but that the real reason for the war is
as yet only very dimly realized in the West, if at all. At the present
moment it seems likely that if this war should be drawn out over
a long period, there may be years ahead when the Western powers
will carry on war without understanding why they do so beyond the
feeling that they are for some enigmatic reason in mortal danger.

The patterns of national sovereignty, national self-determi-
ation, and Lebensraum cover only the general framework of the
expansion technique. In the detail work several screen devices have
been used, of which the most important and effective has been the
plebiscite. The plebiscite was used internally to procure popular
ratification of decisive political steps. The plebiscite is, by principle,
a democratic device, and by using a method which in its external
form is democratic, measures could be taken that in substance
have little to do with democracy. As in the cases of the first two
patterns, the plebiscite was used because it is a procedure accepted
as legitimate in the world of Western political ideas; and it was used
effectively insofar as, at least for a while and by certain segments
of Western public opinion, the view was taken that after all it was
up to the Germans if they liked the Nationalist Socialist régime to
the extent that election and plebiscite figures seemed to prove.

The effectiveness of the plebiscite screen on Western minds is
conditioned by the fact that in the prevailing public opinion the
idea of democracy has become formalized. According to the pop-
ular idea it is a form of government where the government does
what the people want; and the people secure a government, which
acts according to their interests, by participating in governmental
procedure through the election of legislative representatives and executive and judicial officers who depend for their reelection on the conduct of affairs while they hold office. This is a fairly correct description of the structural side of democracy, and the only trouble with it is that the structural side does not mean very much. We know—through the efforts of the leading scholars who have analyzed the problems of parliamentarism and popular representation in the last hundred years, through Hegel and Bagehot, through Grey and Renan, through Mosca, Pareto, LeBon, and Max Weber—that the essential problem of a working democracy is not the vote of the people but the type of the governing elite and its relation to the mass of the people. The election of men and the voting on issues is the last and relatively least important phase of the democratic process. The decisive question is, Who shapes the issues and who presents the men?

For the purpose of this study we may say roughly that the democratic quality of a government hinges on three points: (1) the type of the elite who shapes the issues, (2) the issues themselves, and (3) the state of mind in which a voter goes to the polls. The three problems are closely interwoven. The first condition of democracy is that the governing elite permit only issues to be shaped that do not stir up emotions too deeply and are not apt to produce an irreconcilable cleavage in the people. This requires, of course, an express or tacit gentlemen’s agreement between the party leaders to refrain from vote-getting by stirring up emotions beyond a definite limit. It requires a relation of mutual confidence between the leaders that none of them will take undue advantage of the others by using unfair means of rabble-rousing in his favor. When a situation exists like that in Germany, where the National Socialist party, even during the days of the Weimar Republic, persistently arrogated to itself the monopoly of fighting for national honor and resurrection and branded everybody else as a traitor to his country and a subhuman beast fit to be wiped out, democracy is gone, even though its forms are preserved and are used to gain power in a legal way.  

3. The analysis of the National Socialist technique as an abuse of a formalized democratic structure is not the belated insight of the interpreter. On the occasion of the Reichswehr trial at Ulm in 1930, Adolf Hitler testified in court concerning the legality of his movement: “The National Socialist movement will try to achieve its purpose in this state by constitutional means. The constitution limits our methods, not our purpose. We shall try to win by constitutional means the decisive majorities in the legislative bodies in order, as soon as we have got that far, to remodel the state...
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This brings us to the third point, the voter’s state of mind. When the voter is worked up to a state of hysterical frenzy by permanent unmeasured calumniation of the opponent, by constant appeal to and glorification of aggressiveness, by Jew baiting, etc., he is not a democratic voter even if he casts his vote as a secret, free vote. At least the classic democratic thinkers of the eighteenth century and the fathers of the constitution of this country would not have acknowledged him as such. And he is even less a democratic voter when he casts the vote against his will because he knows what will happen to him if he does not.

To summarize: The plebiscite is an effective screen pattern because the idea of democracy has become formalized, and because the opinion-shaping agencies such as newspapers, intellectual magazines, texts used in the educational organization, etc., seem not to be even aware that there is the problem of substantial, as distinguished from formal, democracy. The knowledge of the problem is reserved to types of men and literature who have no possibility of influencing opinion to a politically relevant degree.

I have dealt with democracy thus far only as a domestic problem. The game of destroying democracy by adhering to its letter and dissolving its substance can be played also in relation to foreign countries when conditions are favorable. And they are always favorable when the attacking country is powerful as compared with the country attacked. The Austrian case is perhaps the most instructive because the National Socialist party in Austria could not pose as the party of a suppressed national minority as it could in Czechoslovakia, but was a strictly Austrian party like any of the others. The game had to be played on the domestic issue alone without incurring the minority factor. The technique was the same as employed in internal German relations. The German government supported financially and by organizational help groups that were ready for an emotional, aggressive, antidemocratic attitude; it employed the technique of separating, by rabble-rousing propaganda, sections of the population from democratic leaders who were reluctant to resort to similar methods, and organizing them as a party within the democratic system. The weight of the group was out of proportion to their actual size, because they were backed by the freely

according to our ideas.” Cf. for the conscious misuse of the democratic pattern Ernst Rudolf Huber, Verfassung (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1937), 28 ff.
flowing, well-directed resources of a great power, while the other parties had to depend on their domestic resources. And they gained further strength because the German government put their home government under strong economic pressure in order to prevent it from taking serious measures against the National Socialist groups. Moreover, the Austrian government was further hampered because as soon as it took serious measures against the antidemocratic groups, loud howls rose to heaven that the sacred rights of liberty of speech, etc., were being violated.

The democratic government that desires to keep the country substantially democratic is at a disadvantage because the Western pattern of democracy has become formalized. Among the most exasperating experiences I had in the years 1933–1938 were occasional calls by Englishmen, nice liberal Laborites, who could not restrain their indignation at the vile, undemocratic methods used by the Austrian government against such charming innocents as Communists and National Socialists, who were not permitted to organize for the overthrow of the government and even were hampered in their propaganda for this perfectly legitimate undertaking. When the internal structure of a country is sufficiently weakened because the majority of the population who would prefer to be democratic see that the government is not able to defend them, and when a favorable international situation arises, the decisive blow is struck by the German government, as in March 1938.4

4. This paragraph, however, should not be understood as suggesting that the Austrian government under Dollfuss and Schuschnigg was particularly democratic. The problem is very complicated. Personally, I hold the opinion that at no time since 1918 was Austria a democracy, because it lacked the first requirement of a democracy, i.e., a demos—a people sufficiently unified and politicized to react as a unit under the guidance of a political elite. The Austrian political structure might perhaps be classified as a provisional federation of parties who were in agreement only on the one point that they would use the democratic structural façade for their particular ends, irrespective of the fate of the country as a whole. The reader will find a detailed analysis of the problems in my book on Der Authoritaere Staat [Vienna: J. Springer, 1936] [reissued in 1998, also published in English as The Authoritarian State: An Essay on the Problem of the Austrian State; trans. Ruth Hein, ed. with an intro. by Gilbert Weiss, historical commentary by Erika Weinzierl (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1999), vol. 4, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, hereinafter cited as CW, vol. 4, etc.], and in the essays in the Austrian Memoranda, nos. 1–3, submitted to the International Studies Conference on Peaceful Change [Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, League of Nations, 1937: “Political Ideas of the Hapsburg Monarchy” by Otto Brunner, “Political Ideas and Movements in Post-War Austria” by Gregor Sebba, and “Change in the Ideas on Government and Constitution in Austria since 1918” by Eric Voegelin [for the last see CW, vol. 4, ed. Weiss, appendix, 367–79]].
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Let me now refer to some of the more subtle elements in the situation that make for the success of National Socialist expansion. Just in passing I touch on the problem of economic motives: There are everywhere in the Western world frightened wealthy people who are in favor of anybody who says he fights Communism. No doubt the anti-bolshevik sentiment made many people favorably inclined toward Hitler as long as he had the glamor of the great anti-Communist. This attitude was strengthened by the clamor of the leftist intellectuals, in whose black-and-white pattern of the world anybody who fights Bolshevism must be a paid minion of “Satan” Capitalism. That the leftist intellectuals have been fighting Hitler on the issue of his being an agent of Capitalism has been one of his best assets and certainly has won him the favor of many people who would be scared as much by National Socialism as by Bolshevism if they had more correct information on its meaning. Important and effective as the anti-Bolshevist screen has proved to be, its working is fairly obvious, and I may go on to more delicate factors.

One of the leit-motifs of Hitler’s speeches explaining his expansion is always the wrong done to the German people by the Treaty of Versailles, a wrong that can be righted only by the successive steps he takes. The motif is clad recurrently in the promise that he will settle down peacefully if only just this last of his burning desires is quieted. This screen has proved successful again and again. The reason for the success, as far as it can be gathered from British speeches and editorials, letters to the editor of the *Times*, etc., seems to be a curious belief, current in the Anglo-Saxon world, in the psychology of frustration. The argument runs like this: The German people have been frustrated; they have become angry and aggressive as a consequence of frustration; if their frustrated wishes are satisfied they will settle down and become peaceful and pleasant neighbors again.

There are several flaws in this argument. First of all, frustration is a concept of individual psychology; for methodological reasons it cannot be transferred to collective behavior. The argument could be dismissed on this ground, but let us assume its validity for the moment in order to analyze its further qualities. From an experience of frustration anger and aggressiveness do not necessarily follow as a consequence: the reaction may as well be resignation. Whether the one or the other is the outcome depends on further qualities of character. Aggressiveness on the other hand need not be caused
by frustration: it may develop when a weak, persistently peaceful
object offers itself to aggression. Nonresistance or defenselessness
of the object provokes aggression in a man who inclines to it. Ap-
pearances like those of Ramsay Macdonald or Neville Chamberlain
might induce even a moderately aggressive man to try some threat-
ening and bluffing on them. Further, if aggression is caused by frus-
tration, it does not follow that it will subside when the suppressed
desires are satisfied; on the contrary, it is highly probable that with
satisfaction the desires will grow. And ultimately and most impor-
tant, there are quite a number of desires that should be frustrated
when the individual is not capable of sublimating them in such a
way as is compatible with the value system of the community in
which he lives. Our whole civilization is built on the frustration of
desires that would destroy it if satisfied. If a man cannot stand the
frustration of desires that our civilization imposes, we do not grant
him satisfaction, but we call him a criminal and put him in jail.
In spite of its obvious flimsiness, the frustration-aggression pattern
has worked excellently and has certainly contributed considerably
to the success of National Socialism.

The promises of Hitler that he would be finally satisfied when
just this last demand should be granted are highly interesting in
another aspect. After the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia British statesmen realized that something might be
wrong with Hitler's promises. They did not know exactly what,
and they do not seem to know yet, but at least they found a pattern
to cover it: Hitler lies, he lies habitually, pathologically. The case
is not as simple as that. A lie, we may say for the purpose of this
paper, is a statement known to be untrue by the man who utters it,
who nevertheless makes it with the intention to have it appear true.
Now, first, it is not quite certain that the statements and promises
made by Hitler and broken later were always lies subjectively when
made. He may have been at the time of making them in a state of
auto-suggestion which made him sincere. However, this is a minor
point for our present problem. The more interesting one is that
the National Socialist movement has developed a theory of truth,
most amply elaborated by Alfred Rosenberg, to the effect that truth
is what is useful to the German people. This principle is applied
in millions and millions of cases in everyday life by all German
governmental agencies in the sense that promises, agreements,
understandings, contracts, etc., are liable to be broken at any time
when a superior political interest seems to require it. It is even
incorrect to say that they are broken, for in any given promise is
implied the understanding that it is not supposed to be a stabilizing
factor of the social order but a passing point in a revolutionary
process. The same principle, of course, applies to statements made
by Hitler himself, or by any German official, in international rela-
tions. If spoken or written language of a National Socialist in official
capacity is understood by the partner to the discussion as a promise
or statement in the sense of Western stabilized, nonrevolutionary
society, this certainly is not the fault of National Socialism; for
the National Socialist point of view is elaborately expressed and
accessible to everybody who can read and cares to know it.

The unrealistic, nonobligatory use of language is, furthermore,
not altogether an invention of National Socialists. Even before the
war German lawyers advanced theories that came rather close to
the National Socialist idea, such as the theory of the \textit{Clausula
rebus sic stantibus} in Erich Kaufmann's famous book bearing this
title. And even more, the general trend of the German mind and
language in the direction of unreality and nonobligation, of which
the nonobligation of promises is a specialized outgrowth, has been
the great problem of German culture for more than half a century.
It has given rise to countermovements that tried to reestablish the
realistic character and obligatory force of the German language,
and to analytical efforts describing it in all detail. I am talking
of the movement initiated by Stefan George in the Nineties, and
of the more than thirty fat volumes, beginning in 1900, of the
periodical \textit{Die Fackel (The Torch)} issued and for the greater part
written by Karl Kraus, which contain practically nothing but a
thousandfold-instanced analysis of this problem. Hitler as a writer
is an outstanding representative of precisely this style of unre-
realistic, nonobligatory language. These style characteristics, being
peculiarly German and determined by the German revolutionary
process for at least sixty or seventy years, are untranslatable into
any other language. A translation of Hitler's \textit{Mein Kampf} is equiv-
alent to a destruction of its most essential characteristics.

If Western statesmen know about these facts and problems of
German cultural history, and nevertheless insist on treating Na-
tional Socialist use of language according to the Western pattern,
this certainly is their own fault. Anyway, it is utterly unrealistic to
think of National Socialist use of language in the promise-and-lie
frame of reference. These categories are just another screen pattern that prevents insight into the real revolutionary process which is under way.

Let me summarize. This paper has dealt with a series of phenomena that may be conveniently grouped under Rauschning’s concept of “extended strategy.” The treatment has been incomplete because every point made would need considerable elaboration in order to become intelligible in its implications; and the list is, of course, fragmentary. Omitting minor points, I have been unable even to touch on such major problems as the Jewish question, the have and have-not dichotomy, and Christian science as a factor in the situation. But it may be hoped, nevertheless, that the general trend of the argument has been made clear. National Socialism owes its success in large part to certain screen patterns. The use of such patterns and their screening function is made possible by the profound helplessness of the Western world and its policy- and opinion-shaping agencies concerning German and particularly National Socialist problems. This situation makes it possible for National Socialist statesmen intentionally to use Western categories with a clear knowledge that their misuse will be detected not at all, or too late; and even where no such intention and knowledge can be found, the gulf is so deep that misunderstandings are produced automatically—with the same agreeable effects for National Socialist politics. The first victims of these misunderstandings were the German democratic parties, whose leaders proved intellectually and morally incapable of coping with the problem. The next victims have been whole countries like Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. And there is no sign yet that the Western democracies have a better understanding of the situation.

Of course, in dealing with the technique of the new revolutionary politics and in explaining some screen patterns I have not been able to devote even one word to the question of what the screen patterns actually screen. This would have gone far beyond the present limits of space and the purpose of this paper.¹

The Growth of the Race Idea

I. The Problem of the Political Idea

The race problem is branching out today into so many fields that a preliminary understanding becomes necessary as to the special topic with which the present paper is concerned. Let us first make it clear negatively that the question of the classification of the human races does not come within the scope of this inquiry. The race idea should be distinguished from the race concept used in natural science. Furthermore, we are not concerned with the improvement of a given human population through eugenic measures. And finally, we do not intend to deal with the problem of political and social relations between the white and the colored races. When we speak of the race idea we have in mind chiefly the idea as it is used by modern creeds, of the type of National Socialism, in order to integrate a community spiritually and politically.

An adequate understanding of the problems involved in the functioning of the race idea, in the sense just outlined, still meets with certain difficulties. They have their origin in the readiness of many people to adopt a partisan stand on the race question. It is widely believed that the assertions of race theorists in the political field have to be either true or false; and we see on the one hand the convinced believers in the all-importance of racial differences, and on the other hand the equally convinced disbelievers, inclined to stigmatize the race idea as a mad illusion without solid foundation in fact.

As a matter of fact, the race idea with its implications is not a body of knowledge organized in systematic form but a political

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A political idea does not attempt to describe social reality as it is, but it sets up symbols, be they single language units or more elaborate dogmas, that have the function of creating the image of a group as a unit. The life of a social group in general, and of a political group in particular, when understood in behavioristic terms, dissolves itself into individuals, their actions, and the purposes and motives of such actions. The group as a unit is not found on this level of observation. What welds the diffuse mass of individual life into a group unit are the symbolic beliefs entertained by the members of a group. Every group has its symbols that serve to concentrate into an emotional and volitional substance that which, if viewed empirically, is a stream of human action, articulated by behavior patterns and purposes, of highly questionable unity. A symbolic idea like the race idea is not a theory in the strict sense of the word. And it is beside the mark to criticize a symbol, or a set of dogmas, because they are not empirically verifiable. While such criticism is correct, it is without meaning, because it is not the function of an idea to describe social reality, but to assist in its constitution. An idea is always “wrong” in the epistemological sense, but this relation to reality is its very principle, and there is no point in proving it for every single instance.¹

A political idea is not an instrument of cognition. But this does not mean that it has no relation to reality, or that any product of a fertile imagination can serve as a political symbol. History shows that social symbols, even when they move very far away from empirical reality, have at least their starting point in it, and that the link to reality cannot be broken without their function being destroyed. And history also shows that not just any part of reality will be used for the development of symbols but that certain basic universal experiences regularly tend to become the material starting point from which the transformation into a symbol begins. It is impossible here to enter upon a systematic survey of such basic experiences, and it is equally impossible to discuss in detail the process of creation of symbols. One example, leading up to

¹. This, however, should not be misunderstood as a relativistic attitude toward ideas. I fully recognize the differences of ethical and metaphysical values between ideas. But the ethical or metaphysical value of an idea does not depend upon its correctness as a picture of social reality.
the special problem of the race idea, will have to suffice for an illustration of the question involved.

Man belonging biologically to the animal realm, his procreative functions form a large reservoir of elemental data that may be transformed into unifying social symbols. The most obvious of the symbolic uses is the interpretation of a group as a biological unit by descent. The symbol of blood relation is so powerful that it is frequently forgotten that even when the symbol comes closest to reality, i.e., when it is applied to the family consisting of parents and children, even in this case the unit includes normally at least two persons who are not blood relatives—I mean the parents. This point will be sufficient both to make clear the discrepancy between the biological reality and the political nomenclature and to justify our reference to the latter as symbolic language destined to function as a unifying instrument of group life. As soon as the idea of the blood unit goes beyond one generation, including grandchildren and further descent, the function of the blood symbolism becomes more apparent because the departure from reality grows wider. The ancestors of any given individual go back in time indefinitely, increasing in number with every generation by powers of two. No simple principle of order can be derived from this pattern of reality. In order to organize this collective as a unit, simplifying symbolic lines are drawn, the most important of them being the father line and the mother line, concepts responsible respectively for the patriarchal and matriarchal symbolisms. There is no biological reason why the line going back to the father, the father’s father, etc., or to the mother, the mother’s mother, etc., should be distinguished from any zig-zag line drawn at random across the genealogical table. And there is no biological reason why any one of the 64 males in the seventh-ancestor generation, or any one of the 128 males in the eighth generation, etc., should be distinguished as the forefather from the rest. The father and the mother, as the immediate progenitors, are the simplest elements of biological reality to serve as the unifying group symbols.

These simple considerations show the nature of the relation between a symbol and reality. The symbol is based on an element of reality, but it does not describe reality. It uses the datum in order to represent by means of that single, comparatively simple element a diffuse field of reality as a unit. As a consequence, heated
argument is possible about the merits of any symbol. Those who belong to the social group and believe in its existence will always be able to point to the element of reality contained in their group symbols and to prove that their social group is really a unit. Those who are politically opposed to the group in question will always be able to point out the discrepancy between the symbol and the reality it represents. And, according to their temper and intellectual sophistication, they will stigmatize it as hypocritical, as an ideology, a myth, or an invention of a ruling class to deceive a guileless people. A scientific analysis has to keep clear of both of these fallacies and to describe realistically the growth and function of the symbol.

II. The Evolution of the Body Ideas

The race idea is one historical instance of the general class of body ideas. By a body idea we understand any symbol that integrates a group into a substantial whole through the assertion that its members are of common origin, and any symbol that has used in its evolution a body idea in the stricter sense, however far the transformation may have gone. While the historical instances of such body ideas are infinite in their variations, their description nevertheless need not exhaust itself in a register out of which examples may be picked at random. The field of such ideas has through the centuries of Western civilization a very clear historical structure, meaning thereby that one idea is not simply following another without reference to the preceding ones, but that there is a limited number of basic types in a continuum of evolution. Every new one, while having its original features, is definitely evolved out of the earlier ideas and presupposes for its full understanding a knowledge of the whole chain. The race idea, being a late development, is easily the most complicated one, and its structure cannot be made clear without at least a passing reference to the process in which the historical material has accumulated. The modern symbolisms are in part a sediment of the stream of history flowing from antiquity, through the Middle Ages, right up to our time. Although it is impossible to give in this context even a glimpse of the wealth and brilliance of this pageant, the purpose of the study may be served by reviewing briefly the main types in their historical connection. The types are three in number, the first being the body idea of the Greek polis,
the growth of the race idea

the second, the idea of the mystical body of Christ, and the third, the race idea itself.

(a) The Greek Polis

The body symbolism of the Greek polis, and especially of Athens, is very illuminating because it has passed the strictness of primitive institutions and offers a considerable variety of types that move farther and farther away from the empirical family relations until no doubt is left about the purely fictitious character of the symbols. Before the democratic reform of Cleisthenes the social organization of Athens rested mainly on four types of groups constituted by body symbols. The narrowest group of cognates is the anchisteia, comprising all relatives down to their own grandchildren, the grandchildren of the brothers and sisters, and the grandchildren of the uncles. This group is a unit under family law with inheritance rules, and it is a social group with obligations for funeral and death rites. Its limits are drawn by natural relations, as beyond the children of cousins the ties of family sentiment usually become feeble. These groups are continuously forming and dissolving with the process of procreation and death. While the limits of this legal unit are drawn arbitrarily from a biological point of view, and while the father symbolism determines the selection of its members, it is still comparatively close to its elemental reality, as it is a group of living cognates, not going beyond three generations. The gap between reality and symbols becomes more pronounced when the anchisteia develops into a genos. In historical times the gene are fully developed, but their origin is clearly discernible. Any anchisteia might develop into a genos under favorable social circumstances, such as long residence in a community, inherited wealth, social prestige for various reasons, or because of distinguished service for the community. Under such circumstances a family tradition may be found culminating in the cult of a common ancestor whose name the genos adopts. Each Athenian gene owned a place of worship, a meeting place, a priesthood and treasury. The genos was headed by an archon, who was probably determined every year by lot. With the extension of the group beyond the generations of the simultaneously living, the discrepancy between reality and the father symbolism becomes more pronounced, because of the arbitrariness of tracing a father
line, which we discussed in the preceding section. The realistic basis of the *genos* consists in a number of social elements, as wealth, prestige, etc., which do not lend themselves easily to the image of a group unit and become symbolized effectively by the institutional elaboration of the ancestor cult. The symbolic character perhaps becomes clearer when we remember that of course everybody has ancestors, but that only when the need for symbolization arises does this fact become the basis of genealogy and develop into aristocratic institutions and legal privileges for the symbolized groups.

The next higher symbolic group was the *phratría*, consisting of *anchisteiai*, *gene*, and other civil cult organizations, held together by the idea of having a common ancestor. All the members considered themselves therefore as brethren. Every *phratría* had its sacred community center, and besides various special cults everyone worshipped the Zeus Phratrios and the Athena Phratria. While it was difficult even in the *genos* to determine the real blood relationship between the living when the common ancestor was many generations removed, in the *phratría* the relationship is flattened out to the idea of brotherhood without any attempt to establish the real relationship. Furthermore, membership is possible by adoption, and the reception into one of the body symbol groups was the Athenian form of "naturalization." There was no citizenship except by membership in a family group. And finally, there existed still the old tribal *phylai*, which, however, in historical time had no considerable function in the social organization.

The most interesting evolution in Greek body symbolism, showing the full force of the gentilitian idea, was brought about by the reforms of Cleisthenes. The purpose of this reform was to break the aristocratic institutions based on the *gene* and to replace them by a system of government based on territorial districts. The old blood groups should be broken up and regional administrative units should form in the future the basis of the *polis* organization. In the second generation this attempt developed into a new type of symbolism by descent. Cleisthenes divided the *polis* into territorial *demes*, i.e., into districts uniting all residents irrespective of their former association. But the new territorial group transformed itself immediately into a genealogical one, because civic membership for the future was not determined by residence but by descent from the persons residing in each *demos* at the time of the reform. Anybody
changing his residence remained for himself and his children a member of the original demos. Beside the old aristocratic there developed a new commoner type of genealogy, every group held together by the common cult of the demotic saint, as formerly the genos by the ancestor. The demotai formed a social group of common descent just as had the earlier gene. It should be noted perhaps that the discrepancy between the symbol of common descent and the reality of common residence at a given point of time is more apparent than the discrepancy between the modern race symbolism and the underlying race reality.²

(b) The Mystical Body of Christ

The Greek institutions offer an insight into the force of social symbolism and the degree to which an idea may deviate from reality without reaching a breaking point. It will be helpful to bear this in mind when we now proceed to analyze the problem of the mystical body of Christ and the race idea. The idea of the mystical body did not spring up out of nothingness, but made use in its development of ideas already existing at the time. And while it is impossible to give a detailed account of the transitional stages, we have at least to mention the permanent elements. The first is the idea of homonoia, of likemindedness. Homonoia is at first the fraternal sentiment between the members of a symbolic group, and is extended in its meaning to ever larger groups until it is invoked by Alexander as the sentiment that has to create unity between Greeks and Barbarians in his world empire. By the first century A.D., when Saint Paul developed the theory of the mystical body, the idea of likemindedness could be applied to any type of community. The idea of the common ancestor had not disappeared altogether, however, and the early Christian community idea received a certain backing from the concept of Christ as the second Adam, the common ancestor of mankind in a spiritual sense, just as the first Adam was the bodily

father of mankind. These two ideas are not all of the heritage, but they were certainly among the more important to enter into the Pauline idea of the mystical body.

The idea of the mystical body is based on an interpretation of the persons of Christ and of man. Both consist of the body, the soma, and the mind, the pneuma. The union between the human community and Christ is granted through the double nature of Christ as man and God. Every person who has been received into the membership of the community, the ecclesia, participates in the pneuma of Christ. Now, while the pre-Christian demonology knows the possession of a single human being by one or more demons or pneumata, it is the distinctive feature of the Christology that the pneuma of Christ is able, because of its pleroma, its fullness, to live in an indefinite number of human persons at the same time. Christ living in the members of the community constitutes the spiritual bond between them.

This construction, however, has the grave danger of dissolving the personality of Christ into the multitude of men who compose the ecclesia. We find, therefore, as an alternative speculative construction the idea that the ecclesia is the mystical body, and Christ is its head, as in Col. 1:18 when Christ is called “the head of the body, the church.” It is this second construction that has been stressed mainly in the development of Catholic doctrine and has found its important expression in the Summa Theologica of Saint Thomas Aquinas. And the idea of the mystical body was extended so as to include not only the actual membership of the Christian community, but all mankind. The extension was made possible by the distinction between membership in actu and membership in potentia. In potentia all men are members of the mystical body, and Christ is, therefore, the head not only of the faithful, but of all men: He “is the Saviour of all men, specially of those that believe” (1 Tim. 4:10).

Both constructions were used by Saint Paul in describing the internal organization of the Christian community. The stricter body construction is evidenced in 1 Cor. 12:12: “For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many, are one body: so also is Christ.” But the same chapter

4. Ibid., Q. 8, art. 3.
interprets the different functions of the members also as due to the diversification of the one pneuma of Christ into the gifts of God, the charismata that determine the status and task of the member in the body. It is important to understand these two basic constructive possibilities because with the decay of Christianity the stricter body idea, which is most intimately dependent on the Christology, is referred to the background while the idea of the diversification of a spiritual unit into spiritual functions is transferred to spiritual substances other than the pneuma of Christ.

The doctrine of the charismata has become the organizational idea of the Christian community. It was adapted, as the situation required it, by including new functions, which were not originally envisaged in the teaching of Saint Paul, as e.g. kingship, in the ranks of the charismata, and thus has become the elastic instrument of interpreting the social hierarchy as the Christian organism.\(^5\)

\((c)\) The Modern Race Idea

In tracing now the way from the idea of the mystical body of Christ to the modern race idea we are faced with a problem similar in structure to the transformation of the family group symbols into the mystical body idea. Again, the race idea does not follow the Christian idea with an entirely new start, as if history were a string of beads, each unit set distinctly apart from the others, but it grows out of the earlier idea in a continuous process. In the first case we were able to observe the growing tension between the body symbol and the social reality it was supposed to cover, until the community had become spiritual in its symbolism and the fact of spiritualization was acknowledged by adding to the term body the adjective “mystical.”\(^6\) In the second case we have to analyze the


\(^6\) This analysis, however, should not be misunderstood as implying that the mystical body of Christ is not real, that it is fictitious. The present paper deals with symbols in their historical concatenation and with their structure. No inference can be drawn from the results of an inquiry of this kind as to the religious value of the symbols in question. The mystical body of Christ is, of course, religiously real in the doctrine of the Church.
process by which a new element of biological realism was injected into the spiritualized body unit.

We can point to a few factors that prepare decisively the situation for the influx of the race symbolism. First of all, the idea of the mystical body has never been uncontested in Western history. From the period of the Migration it had to struggle with the more realistic body symbolism of the Teutonic tradition. Under the doctrine of the *charisma* as determining the function of rulership, the political office should have acquired a purely sacramental character like any other office in the hierarchy. There should have been no difference between church and state. While the Carolingian empire came at times very close to this ideal type, the blood line and tribal ideas make a compromise necessary. The imperial rulership had its charismatic quality; but this resulted, not in a free competition for everybody to become emperor, but—with a certain margin of liberty due to the elective element—in the imperial crown's transmission in bloodlines, and the same holds true for the crowns of the rising national kingships. In the Eastern empire the charismatic principle had a stronger sway, with the result that the history of the Byzantine emperors is one of the bloodiest and cruelest in the world, because the moderating element of recognized dynastic sequence was rather weakly developed. The body symbolism of the gentilitian and dynastic type in the West was a competitive factor and did not blend with the idea of the mystical body. They were running side by side, the dynastic idea weakening the charismatic without transforming it.

The weakening effect of the dynastic idea, and the success of the national kingship in the creation of territorial, administrative, and political power units, is, however, an important contributing factor in the general process of secularization, which transforms the idea of the mystical body from within. The process of secularization in the Western world is drawn out over centuries and has reached various degrees in different countries and in different sections within these countries. Its main feature is, negatively, a slow fading out of the consciousness of the mystical body of Christ, thereby opening the gates to emotional and intellectual forces that replace the Christian substance without the members of the community even becoming aware of the fact. This transformation has become possible because the body idea was thinned out to the "mystical" idea; and I pointed out that the mystical body construction is one of
two alternatives, the other one being a purely pneumatic construction of the community. When the development accentuates more the pneumatic aspect, then the way is free for a reconstruction of the spiritual meaning of community along lines diverging from the Christian. By a slight change of accents the evolution of symbols may depart from the Christological interpretation of likemindedness to other spiritual assumptions. The change is gradual, but one may say that a decisive step is reached when the *pneuma hagiosynes* of Christ is replaced by reason as the substance that constitutes the unity of mankind. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century rationalism may still preserve deistic forms, and in that sense an element of transcendentalism; and it may try to avoid a rupture with the Church as a social institution, but the ideas of man and community have become essentially secularized. And even though the idea of reason still preserves the universalism inherent in Christianity, it is obvious that once the problem of community is reduced to the problem of finding a spiritual bond, new symbols may arise that do not cover all mankind but only particular groups, as in the case of the national spirit idea or the idea of the workers’ class. In this sense, the spiritualization of the body idea prepared the way for an era of spiritual symbols that have no connection with the more primitive type of family symbols, and prepares also the way for new body symbols that may arise independent from the earlier blood symbols.

The third important factor leading up to the recent development is the process of particularization of the Christian community. The main phases of this process are well known. Out of the field of feudal relationships rise the powers of national kingdoms, focusing the formerly diffuse field of relations, comprising the whole of the Western empire, around national centers of rulership. Symbolic theories such as those of every king being *imperator in regno suo*, and of royal sovereignty, complete the breaking up of the imperial structure. The church structure shows a similar tendency toward disintegration, with the attempt to make the political realm coextensive with a spiritual Christian realm, as in the case of the English established church. And similar to the idea of royal sovereignty in the political field, we find the development of symbolic theories instituting the king as the head of the church of his kingdom, and postulating the identity of the political and the religious unit, as in Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. The positive element in this process of
destruction is the rise of the national communities, with a parallel rise of a more or less systematized body of symbolic doctrine asserting the superior qualities of the several national spirits and their consequent particular mission in history.

The result of particularization and secularization is in the ideal case the growth of a community producing no longer a body symbolism of the Greek type, but a purely spiritual symbolism. This new symbolism is not an independent growth but presupposes the symbolism of the mystical body. The particular spiritual units arising out of the medieval unit are residuums; they are Christian units minus the Christological element; and in this sense they are products of the decay of the Christian community. Because of their essentially fragmentary character they are capable of evolving almost any new set of symbols out of elements that are offered by the civilizational situation of the moment. The residual symbol may become the core of a pagan nationalism as well as of an equally pagan internationalism; and it may integrate into a new symbolic system economic factors, as in the case of Communism, as well as biological factors, as in the case of racism.

III. The Material Basis of the Race Idea

The race idea had a history of more than two centuries before the problem of its combination with the inherited spiritual symbolism arose. The question of the race symbol differs in one important point from that of the earlier body symbols. The Greek type of symbolism is based on experiences of biological descent that are universal and implied in the nature of man. The race symbol presupposes the experience of different races that is dependent on ethnographical, geographic, and historical factors not present at all times. Nevertheless, we find the racial idea already entering as an occasional element in Greek political theory, when for example Plato characterizes the Greeks as a race in whose psychological composition the noetic element predominates, and the Scythians and Phoenicians as distinguished by the predominance of other forces of the soul. The Hellenistic science of races was preserved through the Middle Ages up to the Renaissance and reappeared in an important function in the political theory of Bodin. This heritage however, is for all practical purposes insignificant in the development of the modern race problem. The modern idea takes its
start from new experiences that are connected with two important events in the history of ideas, with the enlargement of, first, the geographical horizon and, second, the historical horizon.

With the age of discoveries the racial varieties of mankind became known gradually, and the travel accounts furnish an increasing wealth of information on the physical, institutional, and characterological differences of the races. By the beginning of the eighteenth century this type of literature has become a broad stream, and by the middle of the eighteenth century we are faced by the first great systematic survey of the material in Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle*. The chapter on the “Varieties of the Human Species” in volume 6 of the *History* quotes more than eighty titles of travel accounts and of collections of such reports. As to the amount of knowledge and the range of the classification the system of Buffon is essentially the same as we know it today. There has accumulated since an enormous amount of detail, and the methods of classification have been refined, but all the main races and their more important subdivisions were known to Buffon.

His treatment of the problem, however, is still in the style of the eighteenth century. The unity of mankind is the dominating idea. The white race is the normal type, and all the other races are exotic variations. The variety is due to climatic factors, cold and warmth being the most important causes of the changes of colors and the *mores*. He estimates the time necessary to produce a racial variation at eight to twelve generations. The idea of the historical function of races, which later becomes decisive, is still completely absent. And the correlation between racial differences and psychological or cultural traits is not yet due to a causation running from the body to the mind, but to the climatic differences, which cause both independently of one another. A race, of course, can change when it is transferred to another climate.

When speaking of mankind, Buffon used the word *species*; when speaking of the physical subdivisions, the word *variety*. The term *race* is used frequently but without definite meaning, signifying sometimes a variety, sometimes a group comprising several varieties. During the next half century the use of the term *race* increases, but with significant hesitations. The origin of the term is uncertain. The most probable hypothesis is that of its Arabic origin. The word *ras*, meaning in the Semitic languages “origin,” “beginning,” “head,” seems to have penetrated from the Arabic
south of Spain into Spanish and to have acquired the meaning of
“piece of cattle” and “race of cattle.” It appears about 1400 in
Spanish and Italian, penetrates into French by the beginning of the
sixteenth century, into English by the end of the same century,
and into German [taken from the French] in the beginning of the
eighteenth century. The word acquires in French and English such
meanings as “parentage,” “lineage,” “stock.” Ronsard speaks of
family property which is usually squandered by the third generation
[race] after its acquisition. Spenser dedicates his Ruins of Time
to the Countess of Pembroke, noting the noble “race” from which she
has sprung. Bacon has the usage “a military race of men.”

In the German usage there seems to be at first the hesitation just
mentioned. The term race is associated with the animal realm, and
when it is used with reference to man it has a distinctly disparaging
connotation. Herder expresses himself rather vehemently against
the talk of human races, as this would imply a debasement of
man to the level of a brute. But a change in the atmosphere of
meaning is indicated by the change of terminology from the first
to the later editions of Blumenbach’s De generis humani varietate
nativa. In the first edition [of 1776] of this classic treatise on races,
Blumenbach uses still exclusively the traditional term varietas.
In the third edition [of 1795] this term is not eliminated entirely,
but overshadowed quantitatively by the terms gens and gentilitius,
meaning in the scholarly Latin of the time race and racial. But
Blumenbach takes great pains to restrict the meaning of the term
to the physical characteristics of man and does not extend it to
psychological or characterological traits. While speaking of a facies
gentilitia he insists that he does not mean anything but the plastic
formation of a racial face type and that his language should not be
misunderstood as a physiognomical description. The face as a field

7. For the Arabic origin of the word race see Reinhard Pieter Anne Dozy [and W. H.
Engelmann], Glossaire des mots Espagnols et Portugais dérivés de l’Arabe, 2d ed.
[Paris: E. J. Brill, Maisoneuve, 1869], 329, and Gottfried Baist, Die Arabischen Laute
im Spanischen, in Romanische Forschungen [Erlangen: Deichert und Junge, 1891],
4:415. Two other derivations seem to find favor today with philologists: a) the deriva-
tion from the German raiza; cf. Ernst Gamillscheg, Etymologisches Wörterbuch
der französischen Sprache [Heidelberg: Winter, 1928], article “Race”; b) the deriva-
tion from the Latin generatio; cf. W. Meyer-Lübke, Romanisches etymologisches
Wörterbuch, 2d ed. [Heidelberg: Winter, 1925], article “3782. Generatio.” The deriva-
tion from the Arabic is noted by Meyer-Lübke as not acceptable in article “7069.
Rás.” English sources are more cautious and state simply the uncertainty of origin;
cf. Sir James Augustus Henry Murray’s A New English Dictionary on Historical
of psychic expression is signified by the term *vultus*. The change from a biological category to a concept including in its meaning the mental characteristics and historical functions presupposes—among other events—the enlargement of the historical horizon.

The decades from the last quarter of the eighteenth century to 1850 in which this event took place equal in importance the age of the great discoveries. Western civilization acquired in this period its historic consciousness, and the foundation was laid for the great philosophies of history of the nineteenth century as well as for the later historistic relativism and nihilism. Chinese history became known through De Mailla's great translation (13 volumes, 1777–1785). The Persian sources were published in the 1770s by Anquetil du Perron. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, 1798, opened the more accurate knowledge of the history of this country. The work of Gibbon and Niebuhr was the beginning of a critical understanding of Roman history. The realistic view of Greece started with Boeckh's treatise (in 1817) on the public finances of Athens.

The result of this outburst was a new view of history revealing the rise and fall of nations, the conquest of one people by another, the organization of a conquered society by its new rulers, the amalgamation of the conquerors and conquered, and the gradual rise of a political society. The main phenomenon that attracted attention was the period of the early migrations, Greek and Teutonic, and the foundation of political units by conquering peoples.

It was into this pattern of history that the idea of races entered. Conqueror and conquered in the drama of history were of different racial origin, and the history of migrations and conquests lent itself to interpretation in racial terms. By the middle of the nineteenth century we find, after minor precursory attempts, systems of a grandiose cast, comparable in their historical position to Buffon's *Histoire Naturelle* as the summary of the age of discoveries, explaining the course of history as a process of racial conquest and amalgamation. The two outstanding works are Klemm's *General Cultural History of Mankind* (10 vols., 1843–1852), and Gobineau's *Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races* (4 vols., 1853–1856). The axioms of these interpretations can be reduced to six theses: [1] All important cultures in history have as their basis a symbiosis of races. [2] There are distinct human types, called by Gobineau the strong and the weak, by Klemm the active and the passive. [3] The races migrate, or at least the active do. [4] On occasion of the
migration the passive, sedentary races are conquered by the active. (5) As a consequence of conquest the races enter into a symbiosis that, by mixture or extermination, ends with the dissolution of the active conquering race as a distinct group. (6) When the active race dissolves, the rulership tension disappears and an egalitarian form of society will be established.

From the context of the two authors it is clear not only that the facts of ancient history induced them to develop this set of theses but that the revolutionary events since 1789 with their egalitarian tendencies were decisive in forming the picture. The leveling down of the society of the ancien régime to a bourgeois type of society and the partial extermination of the French aristocracy during the terror period were the most important object lessons for designing a trend that leads from the conquest period of the fourth and fifth centuries through the symbiosis of the Middle Ages to the revolutionary amalgamation. The ethical and metaphysical evaluation of the process depended, therefore, entirely on the attitude of the scholars. There is no inevitable argument arising out of the facts. Hence, from the beginning of the race idea in historiography we are faced by flatly contradictory interpretations of the events. Klemm was a German liberal democrat. The destruction of the ancien régime was much to his liking, and the rise of egalitarian democracy appeared to him as the crowning peak of history. He interprets the racial division of mankind into active and passive races by analogy with the sex difference, the active races representing the male, the passive races the female type. Conquest and symbiosis are phenomena parallel to marriage. And perfection is achieved when the amalgamation process has resulted in the unified egalitarian society. The earlier body symbolism still furnishes the background of the racial speculation. For Gobineau, the French aristocrat who watches the downfall of his caste, the case looks different. There is no sex symbolism back of his racial idea. Races are simply strong or weak, and cultural values are secure as long as the strong, efficient races are able to retain their dominant position in the symbiosis, while they deteriorate when the culturally effective ruling race is exterminated or assimilated. The ideas of Gobineau are carried by a sentiment of profound pessimism. He enjoys grimly his prediction of the decline not only of Western civilization but of mankind in general when the inevitable process draws to an end. He makes very definite calculations with regard to the time still allowed to
mankind, and estimates it at another 3,000 or 4,000 years. His picture of the final stage of exhaustion and extinction resembles very much the later Spenglerian idea of a fellah civilization.

Through all the later phases the race idea has preserved this peculiar aporetic structure that we can discern in the widely divergent views of Klemm and Gobineau. The race speculation has oscillated since that time between the praise of racial mixture as the basis of a great civilization and the idea that wherever cultural achievements of a symbiotic population can be found they are due to the dominating conquering element and will cease with the assimilation or extinction of the productive race. On the one hand there is the gloomy view taken by Gobineau. We find it even in Feder’s comments on the National Socialist party program when he asserts that the German nation is racially bastardized to such a degree that not much good can be expected of her. This gloom, however, is relieved because the fatalism of Gobineau is incompatible with the dynamic activism of the new movement, which does not permit of accepting a situation as unchangeable. Salvation is still to be found by favoring the Nordic element and by securing to it again its predominant position. On the other hand, there are definite limits for the aristocratic racialism of Gobineau in a modern political society. The egalitarian revolution has had its effects and history cannot be turned back to the ancien régime. The democratic idea of the unified homogeneous society is at least one important element back of the dictatorial regime that justifies itself by identifying its actions with the will of the people. A consistent racial policy would destroy the national unit from within and create new alignments and loyalties. Furthermore, the radical racial idea would destroy the significance of the national units in the field of foreign policy, as the race lines cut across the national boundaries. A sincere racial theorist like Günther has advanced the idea of the “blonde international” and considered a war between nations that contain Nordic elements a racial calamity of the first order. Thought going off in this direction is obviously unbearable in the game of power politics and national aspirations and cannot be tolerated beyond a restricted sectarian sphere. The situation is so delicate that a searching analysis of the theoretical and philosophical aspects of the race problem is today firmly discouraged in the Third Reich. The aporetic qualities have to be checked in their explosiveness by keeping the dogmatic issues below the level of consciousness.
The racial element was not the only one that entered the new pattern of history in order to give it a specific color. We have to touch with a word on some of the other elements, because they combined with the racial view of history in a portentous way. Gumpelowicz combined in his sociology (1883) the theory of evolution with the racial interpretation. The difference of caste in the political societies is due to a difference of race; the effectiveness of a conquering race, however, is a function, not of its innate qualities, but of the point of time at which it has—for inscrutable reasons—embarked on its historic development. The conquering races have the older historic status, with a resulting superiority. Ratzel (1887) developed on the basis of the same historic material the theory that all firm political organization and higher civilization were due to the conquest of agricultural tribes by nomadic tribes, nomadism giving technical superiority. Ratzenhofer (1898) combined this theory of the different economic structures with the racial theory by asserting that the economic differences produced the racial differences of activeness and passiveness and resulted in the conquest of the sedentary by the roving races. Moreover, in the theories of Gumpelowicz and Ratzenhofer a Spencerian touch can be discerned clearly. Both are of the opinion that the normal development will go from a warlike period of tension between conquerors and conquered to an ultimately peaceful period of the modern democratic bourgeois society. And, finally, the influence of the Marxian interpretation makes itself felt. Oppenheimer’s theory of the origin of the state (1907) stresses the power relation between the ruling group and the ruled and asserts that its only purpose is the economic exploitation of the conquered. After the conquest the political unit passes through a phase of internal struggle and ends in good Spencerian fashion in a peaceful stage of “free citizenship”—a concept in which the ideas of liberalism blend with the Marxian idea of the free association of the free individuals. The racial component has practically disappeared.8

8. For the ideas dealt with in the text see Ludwig Gumpelowicz, Rasse und Staat: Eine Untersuchung uber das Gesetz der Staatenbildung (Wien: Manz, 1875); Gumpelowicz, Ueber das Naturgesetz der Staatenbildung (Wein: Manz, 1875); Gumpelowicz, Der Rassenkampf: Soziologische Untersuchungen, 1st ed. (Innsbruck: Wagner’sche Universitaetsbuchhandlung, 1883); Friedrich Ratzel, Voelkerkunde, 2 vols. (Leipzig and Wien: Bibliographisches Institut, 1887), vol. 1; Gustav Ratzenhofer, Die Soziologische Erkenntnis: Positive Philosophie des socialen Lebens (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1898); Franz Oppenheimer, Der Staat (Frankfurt a. M.: Ruetten &
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The opening of the geographical and historical horizons brought the mass of the new material that eventually could be used for the development of new political symbolisms. But it is important to realize that the material itself, while lending itself to racial symbolism, did not lead up to it inevitably. We noted the reluctance of the eighteenth-century thinkers to use the term *race* at all, with respect to human beings, because such use could detract from the then-accepted idea that the essential qualities of man had nothing to do with his animal nature and because it was felt that admitting the use of the term *race* would imply an ever-so-small weakening of the metaphysical attitude that placed the essence of man in reason. Buffon was very careful while noting parallel changes in physique and mores not to make the physical qualities the cause of psychological and spiritual traits. And the materials presented by the historians did not point in the direction of any definite symbolism. I have referred to a number of theorists other than Klemm and Gobineau in order to show that the knowledge of the foundation of societies by conquest could be fitted into widely differing social philosophies. The success of conquest could be explained by the different power values of agricultural and nomadic societies. Or, these different economic systems would be destined to produce psychological characteristics in the groups in question, making the one active and the other passive. Or, in a purely historical line of reasoning, the superiority of one racial group over the other could be explained by its greater historical age. Or, the accent could be laid on the power relation itself and the economic exploitation be made the issue. Every one of these aspects of the material could be used independently in the formation of social types, or they could be combined; and the racial factor, based on the knowledge that the conquerors of the great migrations were of different race from the conquered, was weaving in and out of the combination with other factors. Since the middle of the nineteenth century we have been faced by an open field of theories based on the historical materials, ranging from the Marxian economic interpretation, over Spencerian and Lassallian interpretations to the racial interpretation. Even the liberal interpretations can arrive at pleasant results by declaring

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the warlike phase as inevitably to be doomed to dissolve itself into the harmonious peaceful life of a community of equals.

We have to proceed to the analysis of further factors that narrow down this wide range of possibilities and favor the transformation of the racial elements of reality into community symbols.

IV. The Closing of the Community

The situation in which the racial factor develops its peculiar symbolic functions is brought about by a process on which we touched when we commented on the phenomena of secularization and particularization. As this process has not received as yet any adequate treatment, and as there exists no generally accepted term to signify it, I suggest that it be called for the purpose of this paper the process of “closing” of the essential substances, such as organism, person, society. A few words of explanation will be necessary to elucidate its meaning and its relevance for the present context.

In the Christian idea of the community the bond between the members is created—when we single out the pneumatic construction for the moment—through the participation of every person in the pneuma of Christ. The unifying force is the transcendental divine personality of Christ, and the community might be called “open” because it is not a closed mundane entity but an aggregate of persons finding its common center in a substance beyond the field of earthly experience. By “closing” of a substance I mean the process in the course of which the transcendental point of union is abolished and the community substance as an intramundane entity becomes self-centered. The formerly open group with spiritual threads running from every single member beyond the earthly reality into another ontological realm closes by the transfer of the center from the beyond into the very community itself. This process is practically completed when the unit of a group is believed to lie in a group mind, in a national spirit, in the character of a class as an agent of history, or when society is interpreted by analogy to a self-centered organism.

The process of transformation is drawn out over centuries. I select two or three points of special importance in connection with the rise of the race idea. The first step leading up to its full effectiveness is the closing of the organism. In the first half of the eighteenth century the word organism still had, in biological theory,
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The meaning we today associate with the term *mechanism*. The plant and animal life being a creation of God, the single organism appeared under the category of an artifice of the Creator, and it took decades of invention and slow transformation of terminology before the idea that the organism was a self-centered living entity became conceivable. The “inner form” and the “formative urge” were the first language symbols intended to create the image of a substance endowed with the faculties that resulted in the production of the known species and varieties of the living world. Much as in the late nineteenth century the analogy of the organism was used to illustrate human groups as closed, self-centered units, we find in the eighteenth century references to the force of gravitation in order to make comprehensible by this analogy the existence of organic forces that manifest themselves in the living forms. This part of the process is associated with the names of Leibniz, Caspar Friderich Wolff, Buffon, and Blumenbach.9

The next step is a special phase in the process of secularization to which we referred above, and concerns the interpretation of human personality. The idea of the essential spiritual qualities of man as being determined by his body cannot very well develop as long as the spiritual essence is understood as qualified by its relation to a transcendentental spiritual power, while the earthly body is doomed to dissolve as unessential and thereby to free the spirit.10


For a highly important point in the closure of the organism, on which I could not touch in the text, the connection between the new idea and the mathematical problem of the infinite, see Leibniz, letter to Bernoulli, July 29, 1698 [in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Saemtliche Schriften und Briefe* [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1986]]; Buffon, besides vol. 3 of the *Histoire Naturelle*, the preface to his translation of Newton, *Methode des fluxions et des suites in finies* [Paris: De Bure l’aime, 1740].

10. Lack of space makes it necessary to simplify the issue. The relation between body and soul is highly intricate; and the Christian attitude is not wholly negative with regard to the body. Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, Prima, Q. 84, and *Prima Secundae*, Q. 4: “Manifestum est autem quod ad beatitudinem huius vitae necessitate requiritur corpus.”
The secularization of the community idea and the replacement of the Christian pneuma by the intramundane human reason as the bond of the community is an important step toward severing the transcendental ties and prepares the closing of human personality as an intramundane entity. This further development, while noticeable everywhere in Western civilization, went further than anywhere else in the Germany of the first half of the nineteenth century. I single out for the purpose of illustration Goethe's idea of the "demonic" personality.

With the idea of the demon and the demonic personality we have a new language symbol with a distinctly post-Christian or neo-pagan connotation. Terms like soul or reason still wear the Christian color and show, even in their secularized form, the vestiges of their Christian origin. The word demon conjures the pagan elements. The sanctification of the soul and the ethical perfection of the person governed by reason fall back behind the quality of immense productivity. The demon is a superman, living without fatigue right out of the center of his productive nature. Napoleon is the prototype of a demon of activity, Shakespeare of a demon of poetic production. Peter the Great, Frederick the Great, Byron, and Mozart are frequently named as men of great productivity and activity, but ever present is the image of Napoleon ascending from victory to victory, like a demi-god. The idea of the demon, however, is not materialistic. Productivity is indicated, not by the quantity of product, but by the intensity that can be felt in all manifestations of the demonic personality and by the fascination emanating from him and sensed by everybody in his presence. The demon, in contrast with reason, is not a purely spiritual idea. The demonic personality has certain bodily qualifications, because a poor physique could not stand the strain of permanent and passionate activity. The bodily organization has to correspond to the demonic qualities, and Goethe believes even in the rejuvenating force of the demon on his organism and conceives the idea of a repeated puberty. Body and mind are not the separate entities that they appear in the Christian conception, but form a unit of personality to such a degree that even the attempt to separate them by language symbols does injustice to the reality of that self-centered closed demonic whole.

The theoretical elaboration of the new idea was completed by Carl Gustav Carus. In his essay on Goethe (1843) he describes the structure of the demonic personality, taking Goethe as the
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Prototype, as Goethe had developed his idea with Napoleon as the model. The basic quality of personality is to be expressed in terms of “perfect health,” this health being the consequence of descent from healthy stock. But health is not merely a state of the body; it is a state of the whole person, including its spiritual life and activity. In this sense Carus considers Goethe as the “well bred” man, physically and mentally an eugenese. Body and mind are drawn closely together by this new language, with the avowed tendency to abolish the separation altogether and to conceive of the human entity as an intramundane substance that should not be interpreted any more in the language of the Christian anthropoplogy, but of a new one, which for the sake of convenience may in this context be styled pagan. Just as health does not refer to a state of the body, so the concept of eugeneia refers not to a quality caused by physical inheritance, but to transmission of a substance, including spiritual qualities. And just as in the earlier phase the term organism had to acquire its meaning of the self-centered living unit by the coinage of terms like the formative urge, so Carus now uses the term energy in order to designate that force, biological and spiritual at the same time, that expresses itself in the activities of the “well bred” human being.

The theory brought to a conclusion a trend toward bridging the Christian gulf between the flesh and the spirit, and toward understanding man as an earthly unit. In 1849, as a memorandum for Goethe's 100th birthday, Carus published his essay on the unequal capability of the human races for a higher spiritual development, basing his description and analysis on the theoretical assumptions just outlined. The theoretical apparatus for the later racial interpretation of history and culture was in all major parts complete.

The third type of substance undergoing the closing process is the community. The problem has already been mentioned when we touched upon the breaking up of the medieval community.

into particular national societies. The bonds linking the community with the transcendental divine center are severed and, as the organism and the human person, society becomes intramundane and self-centered. The first step in this direction is taken with the idea of state sovereignty setting up every political unit as closed within itself, not recognizing a common transcendental power center, overshadowing them all, as did the power theory of Dante. A second step is the idea that the legally and politically closed unit should be closed economically, too, an idea worked out most elaborately in Fichte’s Closed Commercial State. And the third step is taken when the political unit is supposed to be also a spiritually closed unit having as its living force a national spirit, much as the organism has its “formative urge” (Blumenbach), or the personality its “demon” (Goethe), or “energy” (Carus).

V. The Problem of Satanism

The closure of the community is accompanied by a phenomenon of such far-reaching consequences that a few words of special comment are in place. In the Christian anthropology man is an essentially imperfect being, burdened with original sin, and leading his life under the categories of grace and repentance, damnation and salvation. Such evil as there is in the world is intimately connected with the status of man in general, and every single human being in particular. Nobody can escape his personal share of responsibility for the sinfulness of mankind and the resulting imperfection of society. In the course of secularization these Christian categories change their meaning, or are replaced by a new interpretation of man. Fundamental concepts like progress develop from the progress of the pilgrim toward the aim of salvation to the progress of the automobile industry toward faster and better cars. In transformations of this kind we see the first symptoms of a process that we may call the externalization of the evil. The idea of evil becomes dissociated from its Christian context of human imperfection and sin and is transferred from an internal problem of the soul to the external problem of an unsatisfactory state of things that may be overcome by intelligent and concerted action of man. While this attitude does not imply necessarily an open repudiation of the ideas of sin and salvation they certainly become rather pale, and the consciousness that there are evils that cannot be abolished but can only be made
more bearable by humble endeavor has become rather dim even in countries that consider themselves Christian.

The externalization of the evil enters upon a second phase when the process of secularization results in the breaking up of the Christian community into particular groups and in the closure of the groups. The empire of darkness, which in the spiritualized Christian idea signifies a region of the human soul and its forces, becomes transformed, parallel with the closure of a particular group, into the external empire of the forces that are supposed to threaten the existence of the particular group. In strict parallelism with the vision of new group orders arise the visions of the evil forces opposing the new order; and every modern political movement produces along with its positive idea the counter-idea of the realm of its particular devil. The first great theological treatise on the closed political unit which at the same time is a religious unit, Hobbes's *Leviathan*, is also the first treatise to develop the idea of the realm of darkness. The Christian realm of light is the sovereign state-church unit, and the realm of darkness is for him the Catholic Church. Since that time the stream of political ideas has been a stream of Satanistic ideas.

The great outburst of Satanism came with the French Revolution and the imperial expansion of Napoleon. Fichte's *Staatslehre* of 1813, based on the gospel of Saint John, brought for Germany the fusion of the spiritual Christian community with the spirit of the German nation. The realm of God was identified with the realm of the Germans, and the realization of the divine order was conceived as the peculiar mission of the German people. The opponent of this mission for Fichte was Napoleon, and the anti-Napoleonic war was interpreted as the struggle of God's chosen people against Satan. The idea of Napoleon as the Beast of the Apocalypse determined European politics for years after 1815; and in the conception of Alexander of Russia, Napoleon and the revolution were the great counter-idea to the policy pursued by the Holy Alliance. In the case of Napoleon the counter-idea could be concentrated in a definite person. The more frequent situation is the designation of a movement or a group as the devilish counter-idea. Since the period of the Enlightenment religion and metaphysics have been the devil of the positivists; and a whole period of history has been stigmatized as the "Dark Ages" up to this day by the believers in secularized rationalism. The bourgeois has been the devil of the proletarian
since Marx, fascism is the devil for the leftist intellectual; and, of course, the Jews are the devil for the believers in the race idea.

Anti-Semitism is a very complex phenomenon, and the Satanistic aspect is only one of many. But this aspect becomes increasingly important in the National Socialist movement and deserves more attention than it usually receives. The anti-Semitic literature, back to its beginnings in the period of Romanticism, shows a strain of argument that concentrates into a counter-idea everything that is in supposed or real conflict with the building of a closed German society. When the idea of the German closed community blends with the race idea, the counter-idea tends to take the form of the idea of a counter-race to the supposedly Nordic-determined German race. While the Jews as an ethnically distinguishable group were a good empirical target to be used as the representatives of the counter-race, it should be noted that from the beginning the idea of the Jewish race was never conceived on purely biological lines but was identified with a spiritual substance that may appear in persons who are not in any anthropological sense Jews—setting quite aside the question whether the Jews are a race at all in any reasonable meaning of the word.

H. S. Chamberlain was, as far as I can see, the first to develop the idea of the “inner Jew,” of a person who is not a Jew by descent but because he is penetrated by the “Jewish idea.” He explains at length that it is not necessary to have a Semitic nose in order to be a Jew, but that this word describes a peculiar way of thinking and feeling, that a man may become a Jew very quickly without being a Hebrew; and that it may be sufficient to have intercourse with Jews, to read newspapers, etc., in order to become a Jew spiritually and characterologically. Here are assembled practically all the theoretical elements that may develop into a full-fledged Satanistic idea. There is enough of a factual basis to provide a tangible devil, and there is enough elasticity in the idea to maneuver any opponent into the position of the Jewish Satan. As far as the Jews proper are concerned, the counter-idea has culminated in the concept of the Jews as the “anti-race” or the “counterrace,” a mere void, a negative focus to all positive ideals. And the idea of the “inner Jew” has been elaborated by the doctrine of “Jewification” (Verjudung) into an instrument of Satanistic subsumption, which makes it possible to classify as Jewish practically every person or political attitude that would conflict with the closed society. By
the nature of the closing process, obviously all attitudes come under this head that would operate against the closing. We, therefore, find classified as Jewish a wide range of phenomena, stretching from the universal claim of the Catholic Church, over eighteenth-century humanitarianism, to all modern movements that are willing to recognize a common denominator of humanity. The Jewish idea in its Satanistic form has become the center into which are projected all characterological and spiritual features, including the greater part of ten centuries of German tradition, which are in conflict with the revolutionary closing process now under way.\(^{12}\)

**VI. The Structure of Institutions and Ideas**

We have ascertained the empirical material that the race theorists use in the development of racial symbolisms; and we have traced the theoretical axioms that permit the race materials to become effective in the interpretation of man in society. Now we must answer the last question, why the racial symbolisms do not dominate social ideas everywhere in the Western world, but appear to be accepted more willingly in Germany, and to a lesser degree in Italy, than in the older democracies of France and England.

The answer is comparatively simple, but it requires a moment of methodological consideration. The type concepts usually employed by political scientists in the description of a political community, such as the national state, the Western democracy, the totalitarian state, the fascist state, etc., while having their value for the description of institutions, combine a number of characteristics in a two-dimensional picture. They neglect frequently the importance of the relative time position of the characteristics. A national democracy,

for example, France, may be described quite correctly as a nation on a fixed territory, with a centralized administration, a legislature based on general suffrage, and a government responsible to parliament. But this type omits the time structure of the several features involved and does not permit an estimate of their relative historical weight. For the understanding of the French national democracy it is essential that the political unit and the strong central administration over roughly the present territory were established by the medieval and Renaissance monarchy and practically completed by the middle of the seventeenth century, so that the state structure with its tradition and historical authority could be taken over as the most valuable asset for the political resistance and the staying power of the French state when the period of the bourgeois revolutions started in the eighteenth century. The democratization of France took place in the shadow of the administrative structure created by the monarchical centuries. It is, furthermore, essential that the period of democratic revolution started in the eighteenth century and imbued the French people down to the peasantry with the ideas of man, his rights and liberties, which prevailed in the age of reason. A country may correspond to the same two-dimensional type as France but have a perfectly different time structure, when the fixation of the territory and political independence follow the awakening of national consciousness of the bourgeois stratum of society, instead of preceding it, as in the case in Germany and Italy, and in the Central and Eastern European states. A national group that develops in the nineteenth century and acquires political independence in the twentieth has not the accumulated weight of centuries of statehood to grant it stability, even when its institutions should happen to copy faithfully those of the Western democracies. And when a national revolution occurs in the twentieth century, it will not advance the ideas of the eighteenth, but rather different ones. That Italy, Germany, and Russia represent, in this order, cases of increasingly complete totalitarian revolutions is strictly determined by the time structure of their democratic periods. Fascism is favored by the fact that the national unification followed its period of revolutionary liberal republicanism by decades, and it is hampered by the fact that this period was instrumental in producing the national unification. Totalitarianism in Germany is more complete than Fascism in Italy, because the national unification came as the consequence of the Prussian wars,
while the liberal-republican movement of the ’40s had practically no influence on this event. And the totalitarian revolution in Russia is probably the most complete one because the effective liberal revolution preceded the communistic only by a few months.

When we take account of the problem of time structure in the political types, we can understand why some countries offer a stronger resistance to the race idea than others, and why Germany has become the field of its outstanding success. The social symbolism of a revolution is not created out of nothing, but it is believed in by the persons and groups who fight for a revolutionary change of the social and political order. And in order to be successful the revolutionary symbolism, if not positively approved by the masses of the people, at least must be acceptable to them and not arouse the effective resistance of an established and authoritative system of other social symbols. Negatively speaking, the racial symbolism has comparatively little chance in a society that has gone through an eighteenth-century revolution, because the collective element of racialism is hardly compatible with the belief in the value of the sovereign person and the indestructible soul and its rights and liberties, and because the biological determinism is incompatible with the idea of reason as a spiritual substance independent of the qualities of the body that houses it. When, however, the broad masses of a people are not formed in their political attitudes by symbols of this kind having the prestige of historic authority, or when the symbols are known but not associated with decisive events in the national history that cannot be attacked without arousing widespread resentment and resistance—then the field is practically clear for any new symbolism which is not obviously absurd and out of accord with what is believed to be reality at the time. And whatever criticism can be launched rightly against the race symbolism under moral and religious aspects, as an interpretation of reality the idea that men are different, and that their differences may be due to differences in their biological structure, is not more unrealistic than the idea that all men are equal.

Roughly speaking, and omitting some qualifications, one might say that in a revolutionary situation, when there is no resistance through the authority of established symbols, the current type of social symbols will prevail. That means in practice that a twentieth-century revolution has little chance to be inspired by eighteenth-century ideals. This tendency of revolutions to adopt the most
recent set of symbols is favored by a factor which we have not mentioned as yet, and which may properly be called the *superstition of science*. Since the early nineteenth century we can observe the idea spreading until it becomes a belief of general popular acceptance that the social and political problems are scientific problems of the same type as those of the natural sciences. *Science* was understood as a system of knowledge based on sense data and quantitative analysis. The peculiar nature of the problems presented by social symbols, mainly theological and metaphysical, was disregarded. The knowledge of the methods that have to be employed in the treatment of these problems had disappeared to such a degree that it became the possession of a comparatively small number of scholars, and that the cooperative effort which is necessary through generations in order to advance any scientific problem practically did not exist. The understanding of the religious and metaphysical problems involved in symbolisms has become so low that terms like *metaphysical* or *speculation* have acquired in common parlance, and even in the use of scholars, a disparaging meaning. With this situation as a background we have to understand that the creators of the new symbols of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries insist most fervently that what they produce is not a new social symbol, expressive of religious experiences at all, but science. The main pride of Marxian socialists as against any other brand of socialists is the scientific character of Marxism; and Marx is famed as the creator of scientific socialism. The modern political race theorists insist that their judgments are scientific, even when they deviate quite obviously from the narrow path of science and indulge lustily in the invention of symbols and dogmas.

The superstitious link between symbols and science, while momentarily adding to the prestige of a recently invented set of such symbols because they are believed to be the latest word in the progress of science, endangers, however, their stability. When science "progresses" farther and new symbols evolve on the basis of new materials, the older ones cannot defend themselves by the authority of a religious belief of intrinsic value, but they are exposed to attack and dissolution on the level of their superstition. The history of symbols during the last century offers to a detached view the spectacle of a somewhat hectic sequence of scientific fads. In the first half of the nineteenth century, when economics was the
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fashion, symbols had to be based on economic materials, as in the system of Marx. The second half of the nineteenth century saw the rise of biology, and social problems had to be expressed in terms of evolution and genetics. In the period of 1890 to 1910 the race idea broke with a broad flood into the field of social science, and the literary output associated with the names of Vacher de Lapouge, Woltmann, H. S. Chamberlain, Schallmayer, Ammon, and Reibmayer, and later with Kretschmer's theory of the genius, became the basis for the outright symbolic literature on the race idea. And now the biological type of ideas is threatened by dissolution from within because the latest fashion of science, psychology, develops a symbolism of its own, interpreting the belief in the earlier economic and biological symbols as the satisfaction of certain psychological needs. Whoever wishes to be up to date in symbolisms has to be a psychologist today. The theory of the social myth has, since Sorel started it, penetrated even into the field of race symbolism, and one of the leading works of National Socialist racism styles itself significantly “The Myth of the Twentieth Century,” courteously setting a time limit for itself.

In the Western societies, where everybody is at liberty to attack a symbolism on the basis of a new science, the intellectual dissolution of the nineteenth-century type of scientific symbols is a matter of a few decades. When a society has based its revolution at a given point of time on the symbolic fad of the historic hour, stern measures have to be taken to defend the new dogma against this process. And it should be understood that such defense is absolutely essential, and not a matter of discretion. A Communist who would try to insist seriously in Russia that after all in the light of science the economic forces might not be the only ones determining the course of history, and that a few other problems might be more important than the class struggle, had better commit suicide in order to save the government the trouble of liquidating his evil substance. And an analysis of race symbolism in Germany, which might find a flaw in the scientific basis of the theory of the master race, is another thing not to be recommended.

The National Socialist symbolism is still developing and adapting itself to new political situations. Its elasticity is surprising and makes it possible, by the means of magic association, to shove practically every person and institution into the outer darkness where dwell Jews, Communists, Bankers, Christians and other despicable
fauna. And at present we see extending into the field of foreign policy a theory that hitherto had been employed only for domestic use, the theory of the White Jews. The British have appeared in recent denunciations under this head, ominously foreshadowing their outlaw status that will justify any measure destined to eliminate this nonhuman pestilence. The race symbolism as expressed in statements of this kind has moved a considerable distance from the material basis created by the historical period of the early, and the biological period of the late, nineteenth century. And it will be, if not morally pleasant, at least intellectually interesting to observe the further development of dogma as well as of the measures that will be necessary to defend it against the psychological dissolution.

VII. Conclusion

In speaking of the race idea, we have to distinguish carefully between scientific inquiries, biological and historical, into the race materials, and the symbolic uses to which the same materials can
be put. The science of races was beyond the scope of this article; we had to deal exclusively with the race idea as a symbol, and we had to refer to the material side only in order to show that there was, indeed, a material starting point for the creation of the race symbol. The symbol itself followed in its elaboration and evolution other laws than those of a scientific investigation.

The first point to be considered was the character of the race idea as a body idea. Body experiences are basic human experiences, and every symbol that can use them as a material starting point can be sure of a strong emotional hold over its believers.

The race idea, now, proved to be not a primitive idea but the last link in a historic chain of body ideas. It presupposes the early Mediterranean idea as well as the idea of the corpus mysticum, and should be understood properly as a new influx of body materials into the spiritual symbolism of a community that has gone through the Christian phase and entered upon the final stage of secularization.

The race idea, in order to become fully effective, presupposes furthermore a non-Christian anthropology. The Christian gulf between body and mind has to be bridged before the idea may become conceivable that bodily characteristics are the determining factors of personality. We had, therefore, to explain the process of the closure of the essential substances of organism and personality.

As the race idea has to function as the symbol of a new closed religious community it has to supply also the dogmatic explanation of the opposing evil. Parallel with the positive race idea we find the evolution of a counter-idea, the idea of a counterrace. The Satanistic idea of the Jews is a theologically essential part of the race symbol. At this point we can see perhaps most clearly that the elaboration of the symbol follows its own laws and has nothing to do with the reality of science.

And, finally, we had to explain why the race idea gained its peculiar ascendancy in Germany, and we attempted at least a partial answer to this question by outlining the problem of the time structure of a political community and of the scientific fads of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Bibliographical Note

The racial interpretation of history and civilization is for the American reader easily accessible through the works of Stoddard and


A few titles at random may serve to illustrate the expansion of the race idea into the field of social sciences since the 1890s:


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The National Socialist symbolic literature is considerable in amount. There are, however, a few titles that may be considered more authoritative than the others. Above all, there are recognized as the leading works on race in the National Socialist spirit the books of Hans F. K. Günther, see particularly his *Rassenkunde des deutschen Volkes* [Munich: J. F. Lehmann, 1934].


A popular interpretation of history from the National Socialist point of view is given by Johannes von Leers, *Geschichte auf rassischer Grundlage* [Leipzig: Reclam, 1934].

The most important contributions to the “Blood and Soil” idea are: Walter Darré. *Das Bauerntum als Lebensquell der nordischen Rasse*. Munich: J. F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1924.


For the development of the race symbol within the National Socialist party the most important sources are the weekly of the SS: *Das Schwarze Korps*; and the periodical published by Julius Streicher: *Der Stürmer.*
Some Problems of German Hegemony

To deal with the problems of German hegemony at the present moment is a rather delicate task. There is no doubt that the German government has been successful in transforming the larger part of non-Russian Europe into a powerful structure under its leadership, the legal forms varying from incorporation, as in the cases of Austria and the Sudeten German territory, to an alliance of formally equal partners, as in the case of Italy. The success has not been consolidated, however; and it is impossible, therefore, to give a definite account either of the new institutions or of the principles on which they are based. The well-known reasons are of an internal and an external nature. Internally, the German expansion is a phase of the National Socialist revolution, and the future developments of this revolution are not foreseeable. Externally, the result of the expansion is conditioned by the power struggle of the war, and the outcome of the war is again entirely unpredictable. All that a scholar can do responsibly at such a juncture is to outline and depict some of the essential features of the situation which will probably have a bearing on any future settlement, whatever the outcome of the armed struggle.

I

The first point that deserves a few words of comment concerns the general power structure of the Western world. By the term Western world we mean in this context the American and European world of power units west of Russia with their affiliated

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and dependent dominions and possessions. We are in the habit of considering this group of sovereign states (assuming the picture before 1938) as legally coordinated units, differing in their power rank, but otherwise qualitatively equal and thus potential members of an international organization with ultimately peaceful relations between them. This habitual outlook underlies more or less explicitly the programs for international organization, the projects for a reconstruction of the international order once the war is over, the classification of the states into some that are willing to cooperate and others that are styled aggressor nations, and the distinction between the peoples, which are essentially good, and their governments, which sometimes are bad and have to be abolished.

This static pattern of a world of fixed national state units, preferably organized internally on democratic lines, however, does not take into account the very dynamic historic structure of the Western world. The Western state units are not distributed as color splotches on a map, destined to stay where they are to the end of the world, but are arranged in layers as the sediments of the great Western imperial drive, which emanated from the European center and pierced to the American and Oceanic periphery. The German center of Europe is the old empire core, a residue, one might say, burdened with the imperial tradition that received its twist toward the national state development as recently as 1866. Around this empire core lies, then, the zone of the old national states that separated gradually from the empire (their relation to the emperor was still a topic of discussion for Bodin in 1576). Carrying on the original imperial drive they created empires of their own. The third zone is formed by the overseas extension of the European national states, by the former colonies, some of which have grown into the British dominion states, some into independent states of the Latin American type, and one, the United States, into a great power in her own right. And the United States, finally, has developed an imperial zone of its own in the West Indies, Alaska, and the Oceanic insular world.

The wars of this imperial expansion took place, in the nature of the case, in the national state zone, between Spain, France, Holland, and England, and ultimately in the colonial zone, the last being the American wars, the British-American, the Mexican-American, and the Spanish-American wars. The old European empire core was of comparatively little importance in this power settlement,
occupied as it was during the critical centuries with the gradual liquidation of the structure of the old empire and the consequences of the seventeenth-century catastrophe. But just when the imperial drive of the national states and the colonial zone began to settle down and the approximate spheres of interest became fixed, this old core happened to arrive, under the impact of the Prussian creation, at the national-state stage of development, and as a consequence of economic unification, industrialization, and population increase since 1870 became the most powerful continental state.

The new power found itself squeezed in on a limited territory between Russia and the zone of the national states that hold the European coastline, and began almost as soon as it was founded to embark upon the policy of national-state imperialism following the pattern of the border zone powers. There are two phases clearly to be distinguished in the new imperial drive emanating from the European center. The first, lasting to 1914, is characterized by the predominance of the sea-power idea, leading to the foundation of the motley colonial empire and the naval competition with Great Britain. The second, developing since the First World War, is governed by the idea of overland expansion; it was typically represented during the war by Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* book and the symbol of the Berlin-Bagdad axis, and since the world war it has expressed itself in the intensified economic relations with Southeastern Europe and in the National Socialist policy of the drive to the East (the *Drang nach Osten*). The profound resignation in the early ideas of Hitler on German foreign policy, in his frequently expressed desire to come to terms with Great Britain in exchange for a free hand in the east, is not always understood. It was the renunciation of the sea-power dream in emulation of the Western nations.

The new orientation toward a continental imperialism entailed the consequences that we associate with the problem of German hegemony and led up to the present war. Germany's central position in Europe, if accepted passively, meant, in power terms, its suffocation in comparison with the imperial expanse of the border states; if used as a basis for overland expansion, it involved German hegemony over all the lesser powers of Eastern Europe, and even if confined to the center and the east, it implied an immense political diminution for the Atlantic empires of France and Great Britain, because a power dominating Central and Southeastern Europe holds the inner strategic lines of the Western world. A Europe under
German hegemony would leave France as a third-rate power on the brink of the continent, in permanent danger of being squeezed out of existence if the German policy, however peaceful at the moment, should under another government take a different turn. In this case also Great Britain would be left in a precarious position on an island west of Europe, with a possibly hostile power dominating the Atlantic sea coast on the one side and menacing the eastern Mediterranean on the other. The problems involved in this power pattern are quite independent of the German inner-political structure.

Developments since 1938, and particularly the collapse of France, have made obvious the further potentialities of a Central European hegemonic power: If the drive penetrates the national state zone, it immediately touches the position of the outer colonial zone of the Western world. And if the British European position should become untenable, the Western Hemisphere would find itself between the European-African coast on the one side, and the Japanese-dominated Asiatic coast on the other side in an isolation that might not be to the liking of even the most ardent American isolationist.

The problem that emerges from this general historic structure of the Western world may be formulated as the necessity for finding a working settlement between the imperialism of a Central European hegemonic power and the border zone empires of the Western world. The settlement can obviously assume one of three forms: (1) a power compromise that would involve a serious change in the relative power status of the western empires; or (2) and (3) the permanent annihilation of either the Central European power or the European sea powers.

II

Let us now proceed to the power problems of that vast Eastern European region which is the potential field of a German hegemony.

It may be best to start with a restatement of the basic political fact that creates the problem under discussion, namely, the existence since 1870 of a German empire. That a Western nation-state with the material momentum of a great power, which is in addition the original home of the imperial idea of which the French, British, and American imperialisms are derivatives, will show in its foreign policy certain similarities to that of the other Western great powers.
is obvious to every student of politics. The assumption that a power of this type would behave as if it were a minor political unit like Norway or Switzerland is so farfetched that, as a scholar, I am ashamed to stress the point; and I would not do it if it were not for the vast number of persons who on every occasion break into word or print with their ideas about a streamlined peaceful world order and base their programs precisely on this assumption. The idea that anything but force can prevent a German hegemony over Europe east of France is just as unrealistic as would be the idea that anything but force could have prevented the expansion of the American colonies over the continent, or the French and British penetration of Africa and Asia.

The question of the German hegemony, now, has received an entirely new cast through the results of the First World War. The decisive factor was the dissolution of the Austrian empire and the creation of the succession-states on a national-state pattern. From the point of view of a German hegemony the existence of the Austrian empire meant that the nationalities of Central Europe had a definite organizational framework, and that the German military and economic hegemony could pursue its aims through agreements with the empire, leaving the nationality problem to Austrian domestic policy. The danger zone of conflicts with small national states was removed to the Balkans. It is impossible to dwell here upon the Austrian nationality policy; I merely wish to emphasize that it had its historic importance not only as an Austrian question, but as an instrument of the German hegemony.

It may be worthwhile, however, to touch on one point, to which I have to revert in a later context, namely, the nationality policy of the Social Democratic Party. The Austrian Social Democratic Party held a key position in the formulation of nationality policy because on the one hand it was by principle the international organization of the proletariat and on the other hand it had to grapple with the fact of nationalities in its own ranks. The most important contributions to the solutions of the Central European nationality problems came, therefore, from the labor leaders; the treatises of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer and the resolutions of the Party Congress in Brünn of 1899 are still the classic formulations and proposals regarding the delicate task of organizing a multinational region. The Social Democratic leaders were not Communist totalitarians, and they recognized, therefore, the necessity of national autonomy within
the supernational organization. (The permanent value of their proposals may be judged in the light of the fact that the highly nationalist Sudeten German organizations in Czechoslovakia could advance as their main demand autonomy on the basis of a national cadaster—the solution of Karl Renner in 1902.) This nationality policy of the Austrian Social Democrats became one of the main points of disagreement with the Russian Bolsheviks. The Russians were in favor of a totalitarian Communist solution. Stalin’s article in 1913 on “The National Question and Social Democracy” gives a masterly account of the relative positions; it should be re-read in the light of the German totalitarian development, for the National Socialist hegemony, if it should be established in Europe, will follow, not the Austrian Social Democratic proposals, but the totalitarian lines indicated by Stalin.

Inserted between the Austrian Social Democratic ideas and the new problems created by a totalitarian Germany is the postwar organization of Central and Eastern Europe. Assuming the hegemonic drive of the German great power as a datum, the arrangement could last unperturbed only as long as Germany was so weak that the drive could not be resumed. The world of the Eastern European minor powers was, politically speaking, a power vacuum that depended for its continued existence on a balance of the surrounding great powers. (There were several such dead power angles in Europe: the Scandinavian countries in the dead angle between Russia, Germany, and Great Britain; the Lowlands in the dead angle between Germany, France, and Great Britain; Switzerland in the dead angle between Germany, France, and Italy; the prewar Balkan states in the dead angle between Austria, Russia, and the Mediterranean powers.) With Austria dissolved as the mediating agency in Central Europe, Russia comparatively impotent, Italy diverted toward the African adventure, and France and Great Britain strategically far removed from the immediate danger zone, it was a foregone conclusion that the region would be politically reorganized under German leadership if Germany was ever economically and militarily strong enough to apply itself to the task. The existence of this power vacuum depended on the British-French power monopoly in Europe in the years following the First World War. From the point of view of peaceful relations and change, the situation was, however, considerably worse than before 1914, because the supernational Austrian organization had been destroyed. Unsatisfactory as this
organization was in many respects, it presented at least a preliminary solution that could be used as a starting point. Now the first step that had to be taken was to induce the sovereign minor powers to give up their sovereignty to the extent at least of a federation with a common economic and foreign policy, in short, to retrace the steps after the Austrian breakup. While this reorganization under peaceful German pressure might have been in the realm of possibility, after the generation of the national self-determination fanatics had disappeared from the scene, the totalitarian evolution in Germany introduced a new factor that made a peaceful solution improbable under any circumstances.

I wish to eliminate the totalitarian factor for the moment, however, and to consider one or two hypothetical alternatives to the present situation that might result from the present war. Let us suppose Germany suffers a crushing defeat that would incapacitate her as a great power; let us assume further a restored France and an Italy left in possession of its European territory. A number of interesting questions will then arise, such as: Who will prevent a crushed Germany from entering into a close relationship, or even a union, with Russia?; or, Who will prevent the expansion of Russia into Scandinavia, Slovakia, and the Balkans? Or let us make the other assumption of an inconclusive German defeat, as in 1918: Who will prevent the rise of a situation similar to the present? The purpose in formulating these hypothetical cases is to demonstrate the impasse character of the organization of 1919. The existence of a German great power in Central Europe means a German hegemony over the continent; the destruction of the German great power means that the sea powers have to organize the continental region on the basis of military occupation and defense themselves—unless they wish to surrender the continent to Russia. The coexistence of a nonhegemonic German great power with a power vacuum to the southeast, the daydream of Western statesmen, is impossible. There is one thing even a scientist can predict: The world of Central and Eastern European small powers as we knew it in 1938 will not rise again. There will be no Austria, Poland, or Czechoslovakia, no Baltic states and no Hungary and probably no Balkan states as sovereign states in a future Europe. All reconstruction ideas that imply such assumptions can be dismissed for good. A symptom that this situation is realized is seen in the fact that the British government is extremely careful not to commit itself on the question of war aims.
III

A new factor was introduced into the problems of German hegemony, as mentioned before, through the National Socialist revolution and the trend toward totalitarianism. This point requires some comment, because on its understanding depends the attitude one will take toward the problems of European reconstruction.

The National Socialist revolution is deeply rooted in the peculiar German sociopolitical structure, which is little understood in the West—if it had been better understood by so-called statesmen some of the mistakes of 1918 would not have been made. The democratic constitution of 1919 was adopted by a people who were far from having the historically settled democratic temper of the Western nations. The German national state was founded only in 1870 and the nation did not grow, therefore, politically within the dynastically established state structure, having the prestige of centuries, like the French and British. Consequently, the German state had not produced, in the transitional period from the feudal to the absolute monarchy, a ruling class comparable to the Western, nor did it have a people who had acquired their democratic liberties in a struggle with the ruling class on a nationwide scale. The three mainstays of Western democracy—the state authority of old standing, the political technique evolved by a ruling class, the tradition of political liberties established and confirmed through revolutions—were present only in the incipient and fragmentary forms of a recent national foundation, the Prussian tradition of government, the modest democratic experiences of the Southwest German countries, and the movement of 1848.

It is important, moreover, to be aware of the time difference in the formation of political attitudes for the masses in Great Britain and France on the one hand and in Germany on the other. The English movements that created the liberal and democratic tradition were the revolution of the seventeenth and the Wesleyan reform of the eighteenth centuries, which deeply imbued the masses of British and, for that matter, American lower middle classes and workers with religiously based rules of democratic conduct. For the French a similar result was achieved through the secularized personal and community ideas of 1789. The political formation of German masses is mainly due to the nineteenth-century ideas that largely had lost contact with the Christian principles of respect for
the individual and were predominantly collectivist. The working class was mainly formed by the Marxist class-ideas, the lower middle class by the collectivist nationalism of the late nineteenth century. The Christian principles and the ideas of 1848 were of secondary importance, though they were far from negligible as is proved by the role of the Centrist Party and of the personality of Chancellor Heinrich Brüning in the Weimar Republic, as well as by religious resistance to National Socialist rule. A thorough democratization would have been a difficult task requiring several generations in these circumstances. It could have been performed perhaps in the protective shelter of the monarchy and of the efficient progressive civil service after the belated constitutional reform of 1918, but such possibilities were cut short by the events following the military disaster. The constitutional reform need not have taken even the forms of amendments as it did in 1918. The Bismarck constitution could have been used without changes for a parliamentary form of government, if the Reichstag had cared to use it that way.

A full understanding of the effects of the breakdown of 1918 on Germany requires a radical change in the viewpoint to which we are accustomed, just as in the Austrian case. We are habituated to regard the fall of the Central European empires under the category of a progress toward national self-determination and democracy. For the Austrian case I have already suggested that the erection of the nationalities into sovereign nations was distinctly a retrogression from a state of supernational organization already achieved at the time. For Germany I now wish to make the same point. Such possibilities as there were for a democratic development have received a severe setback, if they have not been entirely destroyed, through the ill-considered introduction of formal democracy and the consequent rise of National Socialism. The first and most momentous event was the destruction of the monarchy with its standards of personal conduct. It seems to me highly improbable that a man with the personal behavior and characteristics of Hitler could ever have achieved any importance in a society whose standards of personal conduct were determined in the last instance by the Prussian court. The second destructive measure was the abolition of the German army and of general conscription. Armies are usually thought of as instruments of military power; they are, or let us say more cautiously, they can be, however, also the effective instrument of
national education and democratization if they are under proper guidance. A military training of two years for young men, if used skillfully, creates habits of conduct that determine decisively their future behavior pattern. I am inclined to attribute the particularly repulsive atrocities of the National Socialists to the fact that they were committed by civilians who had not gone through the school of the Prussian army. The third destructive factor was the introduction of the democratic constitution itself, which meant in practice the creation of the ideal instrument through which antidemocratic masses could gain a power position in the state by legal means, a position they otherwise could have gained only through methods which would have brought them into conflict with the law. And, finally, the conservative bourgeoisie who could have formed the nucleus of a future democratic development was ruined financially and socially by the inflation. The critical point of a coup d’état from the top or a revolution from the bottom was reached when the Communist and National Socialist Parties together held the majority in the Reichstag and, through the use of their so-called blocking majority, made impossible the working of the constitution.

What actually has happened through the advent of National Socialism is still a matter of dispute among the experts, and probably will be for a long time to come. All I can do is to point to a few of the obvious facts and outstanding interpretations. There should be mentioned first, perhaps, the long-range view that the revolution has brought to the top a stratum of German society which has never been touched by the German civilizational evolution through the centuries and which thus represents an almost pure medieval pre-Christian attitude. While I believe this view to be basically correct, I think it needs some qualification through reference to the 50 percent population increase between 1870 and 1910. This increase occurred for the most part in the social danger zone; and one might say that the new masses have added primarily to the section of the people not integrated sufficiently in the national community. The task of educating and democratizing these new masses would have been tremendous even if the old authorities had kept the lid down effectively; when the lid was removed in 1918 the danger of explosion became infinitely greater, particularly when the national disaster and the economic depression added to the instability of the social system. The result, however, is fairly clear, and unforgettable to anybody who has seen Germany before and after 1933 and Austria
before and after 1938: The revolution in Germany as well as in Austria had the characteristics of an invasion of the country by a foreign nation. Men of strange conduct, of strange standards of value, men with whom no personal contact was possible because there was no community of educational background and cultural tradition, invaded all institutions. While a judgment as to the extent of the phenomenon is impossible at present, its nature seems to be beyond doubt: There has occurred a severe break in the civilizational tradition, which possibly may go so far as to constitute a basic change in the identity of the German nation.

These comments are necessary as preliminary to the appreciation of important new factors in the problem of German hegemony. We can bring out the new characteristics best perhaps by a comparison with the approach of Stalin, mentioned before. The Stalinist formula for a supernational union is the preservation of a national form with, however, a socialist content. This means in practice that the member nations of the Soviet Union should consist of persons who speak their different languages, but have the status of workers in a completely industrialized and mechanized society and confess the Communist creed. The entire historical structure of the group, socially and spiritually, has to be wiped out as being “bourgeois.” In this respect the National Socialist hegemony has the same structure as the Russian: The historic national civilization has to be destroyed to the bottom, in Germany herself as well as in the territories of the conquered nations, and to be replaced by National Socialist content. There is, however, an important difference. The Communist policy, due to its Marxist origin, is essentially international and egalitarian; it purports to transform the backward nations into members in the uniformly industrialized society, and the constitution is based on the principle of regional national representation for all members of the Soviet Union. The National Socialist hegemony, on the other hand, takes the principle of German national superiority as its starting point and shows no tendency, ideologically or practically, toward a union of national regions with proportional representation in a supernational council.

With regard to the institutional features of the future hegemony, if it ever should materialize, we can distinguish as yet only the bare outlines. The technique of National Socialist destruction of nations is by now common knowledge and I need not dwell upon it. As soon as we go beyond the sphere of revolutionary technique it becomes,
however, increasingly difficult to distinguish between those features in the new organization that are destined to be permanent and others that are determined only by the exigencies of a situation at a given moment. Where the revolutionary and military expansion was successful, it resulted in a radical change of personnel in all governmental key positions, in an equally radical transformation of all instruments that have an influence on the formation of public opinion, and in the transformation of the institutions of higher learning. The measures employed are well known and range from simple dismissal to detention in concentration camps, killing, and forced emigration. How deep the destruction has gone, and whether anything of the old order will be saved from the wreck, is anybody’s guess.

The effect of the destruction on the non-German European nations is entirely incalculable. We must remember that the present transformations are not simply changes of governments or constitutions, but social and civilizational revolutions, whose effects will not become fully visible for another generation. One of the most important questions will be whether the establishment of new orders which are “National Socialist in content” will not produce a still more fanatical will to self-assertion on the part of the national groups, once the domestic accounts are settled and the new leaders have their hands free to get at one another’s throats. This question is worth some attention considering that even Stalin, with his backing of an internationalist ideology, had to raise a threatening finger repeatedly on party congresses and to speak menacingly of “bourgeois deviation” of anybody who might interpret the “national form” as permitting him a nationalist policy.

The question needs all the more careful consideration because the features of an incipient hegemonic organization that have become visible do not make for frictionless cooperative relations between Germany and the conquered Eastern European nations. Under varying titles we find a German political organization superimposed over the national institutions; with a governor, protector, or commissioner as the head with powers of advice and approval over the decisions of the national government, ultimate powers of approval of the acts of the national legislatures, and powers to issue executive orders in his own right; we find the institution of German courts with jurisdiction over whatever are classified as political offenses of the foreign nationals, and over cases involving Germans as parties; we find the German secret police operating freely in the national
territories; and we find ample German garrisons. In the economic field the conquered nations are organized into the German Four Year Plan with a tendency toward concentrating the industrial sector of the whole system in the German national territory and toward using the conquered nations as producers of raw materials at whatever prices the German government sees fit to fix. As far as we can discern at the moment there is in the making an increasingly chaotic situation, pregnant with revolutionary movements among the conquered nationalities and consequent bloody suppression, in the event of a National Socialist victory in the war; and equally pregnant with gigantic massacres among the Germans and sympathizers of Germans in event of a National Socialist defeat.

Let me summarize now the rather gloomy outlook for reconstruction on the basis of this analysis. There are two principal hypothetical cases about which we must be clear. The first is the assumption of a complete military defeat of Great Britain, which would actually bring the fighting to an end. In this case the German hegemony would extend over all of Europe including the British Isles; and it would extend also over all of Africa and the Near East. If this should be the result, the internal problems will arise which I have indicated as connected with the present idea of German superiority and the attempt at organizing the foreign nations as politically and economically inferior groups. It does not seem feasible to make any predictions concerning this possible development. And quite obviously we need not worry about reconstruction in this case because nobody will care what we think about it. If the German hegemony should be established to approximately the extent just suggested, this country will not be quite as great a power as it is now, and we shall be very busy reorganizing it along lines now beyond our wildest imagination in order to preserve it as an independent democratic power at all.

The second hypothetical case would be a complete German defeat. The problems that would arise in this event have been outlined above. In order to prevent a Russian expansion it would be necessary for the sea powers to occupy the continent and to organize the indescribable wreck themselves. Any conjecture as to this order is futile, if for no other reason than that we do not know what will be left to be organized.

Some would be inclined to propose a third case, the case of a stalemate. I do not consider this a possibility, because I frankly
cannot imagine the conditions of a stalemate. That either Great Britain or Germany will cease fighting as long as they have any striking power left seems to me improbable in the light of the present data. And the striking power will exist—barring the case of an abject military defeat—as long as the social organization of either power holds out. The alternative to a military defeat, then, would be a simultaneous social upheaval in both countries that would disorganize the war machinery. But this case is beyond discussion, because it would bring new factors into the situation that cannot even be surmised at present.
I. Preliminary Observations

There are a number of extant documents that have considerable value as source materials for our knowledge of the Mongol idea of political leadership and empire building. They all originate in the decade between 1245 and 1255. The documents are communications from the Mongol Great Khans and their high military commanders to the European powers, and particularly to the pope and to the king of France. They contain the principal ideas underlying Mongol constitutional law as well as the framework of Mongol political theory. They paint in clear and ruthless terms an excellent picture of the position of the supreme ruler as created by Genghis Khan and his successors. The fanatic fury and the strong belief in divine guidance that breathe in every sentence of these documents are the only surviving traces of the power that for one historic moment threatened the Western world with extinction.

The menace of Mongol penetration into Europe had caused the pope and the king of France to send several missions to the Mongol court at Karakorum in order to induce the Great Khans to desist from further invading, destroying, and terrorizing Christian nations. The letters and edicts of the khans are their answers brought back to Europe by the papal and French embassies.

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The Mongol empire expanded toward the West and into Europe by a series of dangerous attacks that came to an end abruptly each time a Great Khan died. The first massive incursion of 1221–1224 thrust into Russia, but before this victory could be exploited Genghis Khan died in 1227, and further expansion westward became impossible for some time. The second attack, of 1236–1242, penetrated as far as Silesia, Bohemia, and Austria but was broken off suddenly when the news of the death of Ogodai Khan (1241) reached the army, and the royal princes hurried back in order to participate in the election of his successor. The ensuing interregna and short reigns up to the accession of Mangu Khan (1251) made any far-reaching plans and expeditions to Europe impossible. From that time on the center of the empire gravitated toward the east to China, and the empire created by Genghis Khan already began to dissolve into the fragment empires of China, Persia, and Kipchak. Apart from a later short incursion that reached Hungary, the Mongols were not able to extend their rule beyond Russia to the West.

The attack of 1242 awakened the European powers to the terrible danger threatening them. In the years after the unexpected and, for the Westerners, inexplicable retreat of the Mongols, the European powers considered measures to stave off future attacks and, if possible, to avert them by way of negotiations. As a measure of this kind, Innocent IV made an attempt to come to an understanding with the Mongols. He dispatched several missions to the imperial court from Lyons in 1245 shortly before the council he had convoked went into session.

Two of the missions are important as bearers of Mongol answers that have been preserved. One of them was a mission of Franciscan monks to southern Russia under the leadership of Friar John of Pian de Carpin; the other, undertaken by Dominican monks under the leadership of the Lombard Friar Ascelin, the pope dispatched to the Mongol military commander of northeastern Persia.

The mission of Pian de Carpin set out in April 1245 and arrived a year later at the camp of Batu on the banks of the Volga. They were then ordered to proceed to the imperial court at Karakorum because, due to the importance of the papal letters brought by the mission, Batu felt not qualified to act on them on his own. The mission stayed at the imperial court from July 22 to November 13, 1246. The emissaries witnessed the ascension of Kuyuk Khan to the throne on August 24, and they arrived back at Lyons on All-Saints’ Day,
1247. They brought with them an imperial letter whose Persian original was discovered, apparently by accident, in the Vatican Library several years ago and was published by Paul Pelliot along with a translation.

The mission of Ascelin set out in 1245; the monks arrived at their destination, the camp of Baichu Noyon, on May 24, 1247. They stayed in his camp until July 25, 1247, and returned at the end of the summer of 1247, accompanied by two Mongol ambassadors. They brought with them a letter from Baichu Noyon along with a letter from Kuyuk Khan to Baichu.

The investigations of Mr. Pelliot revealed the possibility of a close relationship between the letters brought back by the two missions. Shortly before Friar Ascelin started on his return trip from the camp of Baichu Noyon, an envoy named Aldjigiddai arrived there, dispatched by the Great Khan, who probably carried instructions for the drafting of a letter, as well as a letter of the khan to Baichu, which the latter handed over to the pope's emissaries along with the khan's letter. The textual conformity of the letters taken back by the missions probably resulted from the instructions brought by Aldjigiddai.²

A second series of documents is connected with the missions sent and received by Louis IX of France. In 1244 the king had taken up the cross, and from 1245 onward a crusade was preached in France. On August 25, 1245, Louis embarked at Aigues-Mortes. On September 17 he landed on Cyprus and took up residence with Henri I de Lusignan at Nicosia. On December 14 Mongol emissaries arrived on Cyprus, on December 19 they came to Nicosia, and they were granted an audience by Louis the following day. They brought a letter from Aldjigiddai, who was then commander of Persia and Armenia. This letter differs from all the others dispatched by Mongol authorities in not being an order of submission. It contains a request addressed to King Louis suggesting he should launch a campaign against Egypt the following summer, while the Mongols would attack the Caliph of Bagdad. On the whole, the letter, accompanied by explanations and commentaries voiced by the envoys, attempts to create the impression that the Mongol court was largely Christianized and the Khan himself baptized, so that

a military entente and ensuing campaign could be considered as a crusade against a common enemy, namely against Islam. More than once the question has been raised whether the ambassadors were impostors and the letter forged. A new examination of this question by Pelliot yields convincing arguments why the document should be viewed as genuine.\textsuperscript{2} This offer is the first of a series of similar ones made at a later date by the Persian khans to the kings of France.

It is, however, unique in its time, and it was followed immediately afterward by orders of submission of the same type as those brought back to Innocent IV by the Franciscan and Dominican missions.

Whatever may be the definitive answer to the question of the Mongol ambassadors being impostors, Saint Louis thought the message important enough to answer it by a mission of his own. On January 25, 1249, the Mongols were granted a final audience and on January 27 they embarked on their return trip, accompanied by Louis’s ambassadors. The mission of several emissaries was headed by Andrew of Longjumeau. They arrived, probably between April and May 1249, in the camp of Aldjigiddai. In the meantime, however, the Great Khan Kuyuk had died. Faced by a changed political situation created by the death of the khan, the military commander apparently did not dare to deal personally with the French mission. He therefore sent them to the court of the Princess-Regent Ogul Gaimish, where they arrived at the beginning of 1250. It is not known exactly how long they stayed at court, but they did not start on their homeward journey until Mangu Khan was designated the future Great Khan. In April 1251, accompanied by Mongol ambassadors, they returned to King Louis in Caesarea. The result of the mission was not quite what the king had expected, for the Princess-Regent Ogul Gaimish had taken the embassy to be an act of submission and reacted accordingly. The letter she had entrusted to Andrew of Longjumeau was one of the well-known Mongol orders of submission that demanded the payment of tribute and warned of severe reprisals in case of noncompliance. Joinville, who relates the story of the mission, closes his report with the words: “And know ye that the King regretted very much ever having sent a mission.”

Louis, however, was not to be discouraged. New reports of a favorable situation of Christians under Mongol rule and, specifically, under a Christian Mongol prince named Sartach, the son

\textsuperscript{2} Pelliot, \textit{Revue de l’Orient Chrétien}, 3e série VIII (1931–1932).
of Batu, induced him to send a bit later a second mission under the leadership of the Franciscan William of Rubruquis in hopes of reaching a peaceful solution of the Mongol question. Only this time he proceeded more cautiously, forewarned by the results of Longjumeau’s mission; he enjoined his ambassadors not to reveal their identity and to pretend to be on a private mission whose sole purpose was to propagate the Gospel. After careful preparations, the mission left Constantinople on May 7, 1253, and arrived in due course at the camps of Sartach and Batu and, on December 27, 1253, at the camp of Mangu Khan. They followed Mangu to Karakorum, where they were granted an audience on April 5, 1254, and left Karakorum on August 13. One year later, in August of 1255, they were back in Asia Minor. The result was nothing but a new imperial edict demanding submission.

The letter of Mangu Khan is the last one preserved from this series of missions. A few years later the political situation underwent fundamental changes. In 1258 Hulagu, the founder of the Mongol dynasty of Persia, conquered Baghdad. In 1260 the Mongols suffered their first major defeat at the hands of the Mameluk Sultan of Egypt. In the same year, at the accession of Kublai Khan, the center of the empire was transferred from Karakorum to Peking. The disintegration of the empire founded by Genghis Khan into the fragment empires of China, Persia, and Kipchak began. The expansive energy of the Mongols became thereafter paralyzed.

The letters of the khans and their commanders played a curious role in the history of scholarly science. Although the reports of the missions that preserved the texts of the documents have been repeatedly published and have inspired a considerable number of monographs, the contents of the documents have attracted scant attention, and their importance for our knowledge of Mongol political and legal concepts has scarcely ever been brought up. Nobody has ever made an attempt to inquire into the juridical nature of the documents or to analyze the constitutional theory they set forth. They have attracted attention almost exclusively from historical, geographical, and philological points of view. They have in fact aroused so little interest that the original documents have not even been searched for. It was not until 1923 that Pelliot published one of them, which had apparently been found by accident. We know them otherwise only from the Latin texts passed down by the medieval authors of the mission reports, and even these
secondary sources were published belatedly and in a very imperfect manner.

The main features of the published materials and of the scientific studies examining them are the following:

A basic stock of texts has been incorporated by Vincent of Beauvais in his *Speculum Historiale* (*Historical Mirror*). Vincent produced a digest of Friar Pian de Carpini’s report on his mission, as well as the report of Simon de Saint-Quentin on the mission of Ascelin. The report of Pian de Carpini does not contain the letter of Kuyuk Khan. The report of Simon de Saint-Quentin does include the letters of Baichu Noyon to Innocent IV and the letter of Kuyuk Khan to Baichu Noyon. There are no other sources to back up the two documents, and all later editions had to fall back on Vincent’s manuscripts and printed texts.

The letter of Kuyuk Khan handed to the mission of Pian de Carpini was published for the first time in 1839 by d’Avezac in his excellent “Notice,” which precedes his edition of Carpini’s *Historia Mongolorum* (*The History of the Mongols*). The *Historia* and the “Notice” have been published by the Société de Géographie (Geographical Society) in its *Recueil de voyages et de mémoires* (*Collection of Travels and Memoirs*), vol. 4. A better and more complete Latin text, probably the most reliable one, is included in the *Chronica* (*Chronicle*) of Fra Salimbene. It was published in 1857 in the *Chronica Parmensia*, but the letter went unnoticed. In 1906 it was reprinted by P. Golubovich in the *Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa e dell’Oriente Francescano* (*The Biographical and Bibliographical Library of the Holy Land and the Franciscan Orient*), vol. 1. A better text of the letter was presented by Holder-Egger in his 1913 edition of Salimbene’s *Chronica* for the *Monumenta Germaniae* (*Monuments of Germany*). In a footnote Holder-Egger published another text of the letter, which is, however, inferior to the first one. In the same year Pullé published a third in his *Studi italiani di filologia indo-iranica* (*Italian Studies of Indo-Iranian Philology*). In 1923 Pelliot finally edited the Persian original found in the Vatican Library for the *Revue de l’Orient Chrétien* (*Review of the Christian Orient*). The publication dates of these studies show that the predominant interest in the subject tended to be geographical and philological and, furthermore, focused on the political history of Europe, i.e., on the history of Christianity in general, and on the history of religious orders in particular.
The editions of the letters of Mangu Khan brought back by Rubruquis have been prepared chiefly under the aegis of geographical interests.

The oldest edition of Rubruquis’s *Itinerarium* (*Itinerary/Journey*) is by Hakluyt, which he included in his *Principal Navigations* of 1598. Hakluyt’s text is incomplete and does not contain the letter. The next edition, the first complete one that does contain the letter, is by Purchas; it figures in the latter’s *Pilgrims* (1625). English travelogs make available further editions. The first French edition, by Bergeron, dates from 1634 and is based on Purchas’s work. It was republished in 1735 at the Hague and has remained for a long time the only one in use. The first tolerable Latin edition, by Francisque Michel and Thomas Wright in 1839, appeared in the *Recueil de la Société de Géographie* (*Compendium of the Geographical Society*), vol. 4. The first text not published by a geographer or an editor interested in travelogs is an emended Latin version by P. Anastasius Van den Wyngaert, in *Sinica Franciscana* (*Franciscan Reports on Chinese Affairs*), vol. 1, 1929.

The case of the Aldjigiddai letter is less complicated. It was incorporated into an epistle of the papal legate Odon de Châteauroux to Innocent IV. Starting with the *Spicilegium* (*Gleanings*) (1655–1677) of d’Achéry, all editions fall back on the only manuscript of the letter that has been preserved. Nevertheless medieval historians since Vincent of Beauvais were familiar with it.

We have neither an original nor a Latin translation of Ogul Gaimish’s letter, but only a condensed report, which seems to render the Mongol formulas rather faithfully. This report can be found in Joinville’s *History of Saint Louis*. It figures in all editions of this *History* since the middle of the sixteenth century.

This whole set of documents has been handled in a rather unsatisfactory way. The travelogs refer to the letters without any further commentary. The historians incorporate them into the context of the pragmatic history of the period and dwell only on the political results of the missions. Very rarely do we find a few observations going beyond the elucidation of purely historical points of interest. In 1758 Desguignes, for example, inserted the text of the letter of Baichu Noyon into his narration and states, “This letter fits in with the plans which the Great Khan had made up his mind to realize.”

In 1824 D’Ohsson, the most brilliant and important historian of the Mongols, presents the texts without a commentary. Howorth, a most voluminous author, remarks in 1876 in respect to Kuyuk’s letter, “it was not very conciliatory.” He has this to say about Baichu’s letter: “This correspondence is a good example of the intolerable arrogance of the Mongols.” He finds Mangu Khan’s letter couched “in very moderate terms.” A modern historian, René Grousset, shows a better understanding of the issue in question; his comment goes right to the heart of the matter: “This Mongol of the thirteenth century professed in regard to the question of world monarchy the same principles as later Charles V, for his seal bore the engraved dictum: ‘God in Heaven, and Kuyuk on Earth, Khan by the Power of God and Emperor of all Men.’”

The opinions of writers on the history of the missions and of religion are not much more illuminating. So for instance in P. Batton’s pamphlet we find the following sentence, which is meant to be a definitive judgment of Mangu Khan’s letter: “This letter, written in Oriental style, had a strong religious character and was again a particularly good testimony of the well-known arrogance of the Mongol rulers.” In a similar vein writes Risch: “The contents of all of these letters is testimony to the incredible arrogance of the Tartars; their form is rather bombastic and clumsy, and this sets them off sharply from the balance of the text into which they have been inserted, and this gives them the imprint of genuineness.”

Only three authors, each approximately one century apart from the other, dealt more thoroughly with the letters: Mosheim, in his Historia Tartarorum Ecclesiastica (Ecclesiastic History of the Tartars) of 1741; Abel-Rémusat, in his Mémoires sur les relations politiques des princes chrétiens, et particulièrement des rois de France, avec les empereurs Mongols (Memoirs on the Political Relations of Christian Princes and, in Particular, of the Kings of France, with Mongol Emperors) (1822–1824), and Pelliot in his papers on “Les Mongols et la Papauté” ("The Mongols and the Papacy") (1923–1932). Even these works, if one may judge by their titles, have

7. Friedrich Risch, Johann de Plano Carpini (Leipzig: E. Pfeiffer, 1930), 33.
not been primarily inspired by an interest in the significance of the documents in question for the Mongol idea of rulership. The context, however, induced the authors to collect the documents and to enter into a detailed analysis of their contents.

Mosheim’s *Historia*, in its central section, which covers the period since the emergence of Genghis Khan until the disintegration of the empire, deals with the history of the missions from the viewpoint of their results. The letters themselves are not discussed in detail, apart from the usual remarks about Mongol arrogance. However, in the appendix to his volume Mosheim assembles all the then-known Mongol letters and edicts as well as the letters of the pope. This appendix is the first collection of sources that could serve as a basis for a further enquiry into the subject.

The *Mémoires* of Abel-Rémusat go beyond the scope of a mere collection. They too provide a collection of Mongol documents, attached as an appendix to the second *Mémoire*, augmented by a few items from the period of the Persian khanate. But occasionally he makes observations on the legal concepts that underlie the text of the letters and compares them to Chinese ideas about the status of the emperor and empire. As for Baichu Noyon’s letter and Kuyuk’s [edict] he finds, as others have before and after him, the tone of contempt and arrogance to be a sign of genuineness. But he also notes that as the khan is speaking as the ruler of the world, he accordingly treats as rebels the princes who do not submit to his orders. In Abel-Rémusat’s opinion this construction has been adopted from Chinese public law.8 The letters of Ogul Gaimish and of Mangu Khan9 are analyzed in a similar fashion. Of some importance are also his analyses of the letter preambles of Arghun Khan to Philippe le Bel. We shall return to them in a later context. These few remarks are imbedded in a sweeping survey of the relations between the Mongols and the European powers with focus on the effects the contacts between East and West had on European civilization. The real motive underlying the enquiry comes to light when Abel-Rémusat reflects on the Chinese seal impressed on Arghun Khan’s letter. He muses: “A curious

peculiarity are these Chinese hieroglyphs, printed across the names of Egypt, Jerusalem, and France which have been transcribed into Tartar characters. This combination appeals to the imagination; it is a symbol of the new relations created by the crusades on the one hand and by the conquests of Genghis Khan on the other between the races at two opposite ends of the world."\(^{10}\) Abel-Rémusat is of the opinion that the contact with a mature Eastern civilization established by the Mongols spelled for Europe the end of the Middle Ages. He believes, furthermore, that the great number of inventions and discoveries made in Europe had as their immediate cause a cultural diffusion from China and that the terrible suffering visited by the Mongol conquest upon millions of men led to consequences of world-historical proportions, bringing about Europe's liberation from the spiritual and intellectual narrowness into which it had declined following the fall of the Roman empire.\(^{11}\)

Finally, Pelliot's articles served in his own words to clarify the situation of Christianity in Central Asia and the Far East in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.\(^{12}\) Their writing was prompted by a recent discovery of a number of documents in the Vatican Library; among them the original Persian letter of Kuyuk Khan to Innocent IV occupies a place of prominence. They also make possible a transcription and translation of the new text, a detailed analysis of the seal, and a comparison of the preamble of this newly found letter with the preambles already known. We do not concur, as will become evident from the pages that follow, on every point made by Pelliot's analysis and conclusions; but his approach to the preambles and his emphasis on their formal character has nevertheless been the model for our own analysis of the legal contents of these materials.

II. Texts

To make the following analysis intelligible to the reader the texts must be made available to him in their entirety. Two collections met this requirement in the past: Mosheim produced one in 1741 and Abel-Rémusat another one between 1822 and 1824. However, neither collection is acceptable at the present time, because they do

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 7:373.
\(^{11}\) Ibid., 7:414.
not contain documents that have become available since, and the
texts of the others are imperfectly edited. Pelliot’s articles present
to us excellent texts; however, some of them are fragmentary. The
following collection of texts pursues two aims: [1] To the best of my
knowledge it presents all the documents known at present; [2] the
edition of the texts given is the best available.

1. The Letter of Kuyuk to Innocent IV: French
translation of the Persian original. 13

Dans la force du Ciel éternel, [nous] le Khan océanique du grand
peuple tout entier; notre ordre.

Ceci est un ordre envoyé au grand pape pour qu’il le connaisse et le
comprenne.

Après en avoir tenu conseil dans les . . . des territoires du karal,
yous nous avez envoyé une requête de soumission, que nous avons
entendue de vos ambassadeurs.

Et si vous agissez selon vos propres paroles, toi qui est le grand pape,
avec les rois, venez ensemble en personne pour nous rendre hommage,
et nous vous ferons entendre à ce moment-là les ordres [résultant] du
yassa.

Autre [chose]. Vous avez dit que si je recevais le baptême, ce serait
bien; tu m’en as informé moi-même et tu m’as envoyé une requête.
Cette tienne requête, nous ne l’avons pas comprise.

Autre [chose]. Vous m’avez envoyé ces paroles: “Vous avez pris tous
les territoires des Majar et des kiristan; je m’en étonne. Dites-nous
quelle était la faute de ceux-là?” Ces tiennes paroles, nous ne les avons
pas comprises non plus. L’ordre de Dieu, Chingis-khan et le Qa’an
l’ont envoyé tous deux pour le faire entendre. Mais à l’ordre de Dieu
[c’est le] Dieu éternel qui les a tués et anéantis. Sauf par l’ordre de Dieu,
qu’ils n’ont pas cru. Ceux-là dont tu parles ont même tenu un
grand conseil [], ils se sont montrés arrogants et ont tué nos envoyés-
ambassadeurs. Dans ces territoires, les hommes [c’est le] Dieu éternel
qui les a tués et anéantis. Sauf par l’ordre de Dieu, quelqu’un, par sa
seule force, comment tuerait-il, comment prendrait-il?

Et si tu dis: “Je suis chrétien; j’adore Dieu; je méprise et . . . [les
autres].” comment sais-tu qui Dieu absout et en faveur de qui il octroie
la miséricorde, comment le sais-tu pour que tu prononces de telles
paroles?

Dans la force de Dieu, depuis le soleil levant jusqu’ à son occident,
tous les territoires nous ont été octroyés. Sauf par l’ordre de Dieu,
comment quelqu’un pourrait-il rien faire? A présent, vous devez dire
notre force.” Toi en personne, à la tête des rois, tous ensemble, sans

13. Ibid. The above text is Pelliot’s translation, ibid., 16. The Persian original
appears on p. 15. The photograph of the letter is attached.
exception, venez nous offrir service et hommage. A ce moment-là nous connaitrions votre soumission. Et si vous n’observez pas (?) l’ordre de Dieu et contrevenez à nos ordres, nous vous saurons [-] ennemis.

Voilà ce que nous vous faisons savoir. Si vous [y] contrevenez, en quoi en connaitrions-nous? Dieu en connaitra.

Dans les derniers jours de Jumada le second de l’année 644 [3–11 novembre 1246].

[English translation: By the power of eternal Heaven, {we}, the universal* Khan of the entire great people [this is] our order.

This is our order sent to the great pope that he know and understand it.

After having deliberated on it in the . . . territories of the karal* [i.e., our empire], you sent us a request of submission which we heard from your ambassadors.

And if you act in accordance with your own words, you, who are the great pope, together with the kings [will] come together personally to render homage to us, and we shall communicate to you at that point the orders resulting from the yasa* [sic; the khan’s edict].

Another [thing]. You have said that if I received baptism, this would be good; you have informed me of it yourself and you have sent me a request. This request of yours we have not understood.

Another [thing]. You have sent me these words: “You have taken all the territories of the Magyars and of the Christians; I find this astonishing. Tell us, what had been the fault of these?” These words of yours we have not understood them either. The command of God, both Ghengis Khan and the Qa an, have sent it that it be understood. Yet (these men) did not believe the order of God. These men of whom you speak even held a great council [?]. They showed themselves to be arrogant and killed our envoys-ambassadors. In these territories [it was] eternal God who had killed and annihilated them. Except by the Order of God, how could anyone by his own power kill, how could he take?

And if you say: “I am a Christian; I worship God; I despise and . . . (the others),” how do you know whom God absolves and to whom he grants mercy, how do you know this that you should speak such words?

By God’s might all realms [stretching] from sunrise to sunset were granted to us. Without the Order of God how could anyone do anything? At present, you ought to say from the bottom of your heart: “We shall be your subjects; we shall surrender [to you] our power.” You, in person, at the head of the kings, all of you together, without exception, come to offer us service and homage. At that time we shall recognize your submission. And if you do not observe (?) the order

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*a. océanique, “oceanic” in Pelliot’s French translation.—Trans.
b. karal, a Russian borrowing from the Tartar language, meaning military encampment or guard.—Trans.
of God and contravene our orders, we shall know you to be [our] enemies.

This is what we make known to you: If you contravene [this order], how will we know what [will happen]? God will know it.

In the last days of the *jumada* the second of the year 644 [3–11 November 1246].]

2. *The Letter of Kuyuk to Innocent IV: The Latin translation given by Friar Pian de Carpini*

The Latin translation of this letter was made from a Mongol original under the supervision of the Mongol Imperial Chancery. Friar Pian de Carpini gives all the necessary information on the process by which the translation has been obtained:

In die autem beati Martini iterum fuimus vocati, et venerunt ad nos Kadač, Chingay et Bala pluresque scriptores praedicti, et nobis litteram de verbo ad verbum interpretati fuerunt: et cum scripsisse-mus in latino faciebant sibi per singulas orationes interpretari, vo-lentes scire si nos in verbo aliquo erremus; et cum ambae litterae fuerunt scriptae, fecerunt nos legere semel et secundo ne forte mi-nus aliquod haberemus, et dicerunt nobis: “Videte quod omnia bene intelligatis, quia non expediret quod non intellegiferetis omnia, quia de-betis ad tam remotas provincias proficisci.” Et cum respondissemus: “Intelligimus omnia bene,” litteras in sarracenico rescripserunt, ut posset aliquis inveniri in partibus istis qui legeret eas si Dominus Papa vellet.

[English translation: On the day of blessed Martin we were called again, and we were visited by Kadač, Chingay, and Bala and by many aforementioned scribes, and they proceeded to interpret to us the letter, word for word: and while we wrote in Latin, they had us interpret for them each single statement, eager to know if we erred in some word or another: and when both letters have been written, they made us read (our translation) once and twice, lest we by chance omitted something, and they told us: “See to it that you understand everything well, so that you would not explain that you did not understand everything, because you have to proceed to such remote regions.” And when we answered: “We understand everything well,” they retranslated the letters [the Mongol original and the Latin translation] into Persian, c so that someone might be found in those parts capable of reading them, if the Lord Pope so ordained.]

The Latin text, therefore, is not a translation of the Persian original letter, as given under no. 1, which Pelliot has published, but of a

C. Literally, the Saracen language.—Trans.
Mongol original that has not been preserved. Pelliot thinks that, after the “rescriptio” of the letter in Persian, the Mongol copy was withdrawn and the embassy received only the Persian letter. The Latin letter is, therefore, an independent document. It has acquired weightier importance because, in deciphering the Persian document, Pelliot has followed, when in doubt, the meaning as conveyed by the Latin text. For these reasons I have thought it advisable to include the letter in the collection. The following text is taken from *Cronica Fratris Salimbene de Adam Ordinis Minorum* (Chronicle of Friar Salimbene de Adam of the Minor Orders), ed. O. Holder-Egger, M.G.H., SS., XXXII (Hannover-Leipzig, 1905–1913), 208.

Epistola domini Tattarorum ad Papam Innocentium IIII.

Dei fortitudo, omnium hominum imperator, magno pape litteras certissimas atque veras. Habito consilio pro pace habenda nobiscum, tu. papa et omnes Christiani nuntium tuum nobis transmisisti, sicut ab ipso audivimus, et in tuis litteris habebatur. Igitur si pacem nobiscum habere desideratis, tu papa et omnes reges et potentes, pro pace diffinienda ad me venire nullo modo postponatis, et tunc nostram audietis responsum pariter atque voluntatem.

[English translation: The Letter of the Lord and Master of the Tartars to Pope Innocent IV. By the might of God, we the Emperor of all men dispatched this to the great pope unequivocal and true letter. Having held council for the sake of living in peace with us, you pope and all the Christians sent us your emissary, as we heard it from him, and as it was contained in your letter. Accordingly, if you desire to live in peace with us, you, pope, and kings and potentates, unless you wish to breach the peace, in no way postpone coming to me to hear then and there our answer at the same time as our will.

A series of your letters contained a suggestion that we should have ourselves baptized and become Christians. To that we answer you briefly that we do not understand this, no more than why we should do this. In addition, what was also in your letters, i.e., that you are shocked by the slaughter of so many men, especially of Christians and, above all, of Poles, Moravians, and Hungarians, this is our answer to you, that this, too, we do not understand. Nevertheless, so that we do not see this entirely passed over in silence, this is our answer: Because they did not obey God’s message and the behest of Genghis-Khan and [the Qa]an and, having held a great council, they killed the emissaries, God therefore resolved to destroy them and to deliver them into our hands. For otherwise, unless God did it, what could man do to man? But you men of the West believe that you yourselves alone are Christians, and you despise all other men. But how can you know on whom God will deign to confer his grace? We, however, worshipping God, laid waste by virtue of God’s power the entire Earth from east to west. And if this were not by virtue of God’s power, what could men do? If you, however, decide on peace and are willing to become our vassals, you, pope, with the Christian potentates in no way delay coming to me for the sake of making peace; and at that time we shall know, whether you want to be at peace with us. If in truth you will not believe God and our letter, and will not listen to our counsel, and will not come to us, then we shall know for sure that you wish to be at war with us. What the future holds beyond that we do not know, only God knows it. Genghis-Khan, first Emperor. The second, Ogodai Khan. The third, Kuyuk Khan.]

3 and 4. The Letter of Baichu Noyon and the Edict of Kuyuk Khan

The following texts are reprints from Tertia Pars speculihystorialis fris vincencij (Third Part of the Historical Mirror of Friar Vincent), 1474 [Copinger, II, no. 6247], bk. 31, chaps. 51, 52. The text of this edition is better than that of all other Vincent’s printed texts, and it is better also than all later editions of the letter and the edict. The words in the edict that I have put in parentheses are probably errata; they do not figure in other editions.
In reference to the process of translation, Simon de Saint-Quentin maintains that the letter of the pope was translated from Latin into Persian, and from Persian into Mongol ([Vincent, bk. 31, chap. 47]). A process in a reverse order has probably been used in the translation of Mongol texts into Latin. We find a note to this effect in Matthew of Paris: “Charta autem eorum quam papae detulerunt, ter fuit de idiomate ignoto ad notius traslata, prout nuncij partibus occidentalisibus approinquaverunt” (“But their letter which was to be delivered to the pope was three times translated from an unknown language into a known one, just as the emissaries were approaching western regions”) ([Abel-Rémusat, Mémoires, 6:426]).

The Letter

Exemplum autem littere que a baiothnoy ad dominum papam missa est hoc est.

Disposizione divina ipsius chaam transmissum baiothnoy verbum Papa ita scias tui nuncij venerunt et tuas literas ad nos detulerunt. tui nuncij magna verba dixerunt. nescimus utrum injunxeris eis ita loqui / aut a semetipsis dixerunt. Et in literis taliter scripseras. homines multos occiditis. interimitis et perditis. Preceptum dei stabile et statutum eius qui totius faciem orbis continet ad nos sic est. Quicunque statutum audierit / super propriam terram aquam et patrimonium sedeat, et ei qui faciem totius orbis continet virtutem tradat. Quicunque autem preceptum et statutum non audierint sed aliter fecerint / illi deleantur et perdantur. Nunc super hoc istud statutum et preceptum ad vos transmittimus si vultis super terram vestram aquam et patrimonium. sedere / oportet ut tu papa ipse in propria persona ad nos venias. et ad eum qui faciem totius terre continet accedas. Et si tu preceptum dei stabile et illius qui faciem totius terre continet non audieris / illud nos nescimus. deus scit. Oportet ut antequam venias nuncios premittas. et nobis significas si venis / aut non. si velis nobiscum componere / aut inimicus esse. et responsionem precepti cito ad nos transmittas.

Istud preceptum per manus Aybeg et Sargis misimus mense iulio XX die lunacionis. in territorio sciisciens castris scripsimus.

The Edict

Hoc autem exemplum litterarum chaam ad baiothnoy quas ipsi Tartari vocant literas dei.

Per preceptum dei vivi chingiscam filius dei dulcis et venerabilis dicit. quia deus excelsus super omnia ipse deus immortalis. et super terram chingiscam solus dominus. Volumus istud ad audientiam omnium in omnem locum pervenire. provinciis nobis [audientibus et] oboedientibus et provinciis nobis rebellantibus. Oportet ergo te o baiothnoy ut excites eos et notifices eis. quia hoc est mandatum

[English translation: The Letter]

This then is the transcript sent by Baichu Noyon [baiotnoy] to the Lord Pope.

By divine disposition of the Khan himself, Baichu’s behest is transmitted. Pope, know this, your emissaries came and delivered to us your letter. Your emissaries pronounced weighty words. We do not know if you enjoined them to speak to us in these terms, or if they spoke thus of their own accord. And in your letter you wrote about many men having been killed, annihilated, and destroyed. God’s behest is enduring, and it is his decree, who encompasses the countenance of the entire world, which is our case. Whoever then shall listen to [this] behest and decree, shall possess his own land, water, and patrimony and shall become a vassal to him, who encompasses the countenance of the entire world. Yet whoever shall not listen to this behest and decree, but would act otherwise, let him be destroyed and annihilated. Now concerning this here⁴ decree and behest we are sending to you, if you want to possess your land, water, and patrimony, it behooves you, pope, to come to us in person and approach him, who encompasses the countenance of the entire Earth. And whether you shall not submit to the enduring behest of God and to that of him, who encompasses the countenance of the entire Earth, this we do not know, [but] God knows. It behooves you to send ahead emissaries prior to your coming, and to inform us, if you are coming or not, if you want to make peace with us, or to be our foe, and that you promptly transmit to us an answer to [our] behest.

This behest we are dispatching hand-carried by Aybeg and Sargis on the twentieth day of the month of July. We wrote it in [our] encampment while inspecting [our] territory.

d. The passage here reads “super hoc istud statutum”—“concerning this here decree,” but p. 122 below has “nunc superbum istud statutum”—“now this lofty decree.” I incline to the second reading.—Trans.
The Edict

This then is a transcript of a letter the Khan sent to Baichu Noyon [baiothnoy] which the Tartars themselves call the letter of God. By the behest of the living God, Genghis Khan, sweet and venerable son of God, states that God on high [is] over everything himself immortal God and over the earth Genghis Khan the only lord and master. We wish this [order] to reach the ears of everyone everywhere, in provinces which [have submitted] and are obedient to us, and in provinces in the state of rebellion against us. Thus it behooves you, oh, Baichu Noyon, that you rouse them up and apprise them that this is the mandate of the living and immortal God. Without cease shall you then communicate to them this your proclamation, and you shall communicate my decree in every place accessible to an emissary. And whoever should contradict you shall be hunted down and his land shall be laid waste. And I assure you that whoever shall not listen to [and see] this my decree shall be [made] deaf, and whoever shall see this my decree and shall not comply with it, shall be made blind. And whoever will [promise] compliance, being familiar with this my decision [mandating] peace and will not implement it, shall be made lame. This my ordinance shall be made known to everyone, ignorant and knowledgeable alike. Whoever therefore will hear [this] and will fail to comply, let him be destroyed, annihilated, and killed. Make this manifest, oh, Baichu Noyon. And whoever would wish to have the use of his house and might be persecuted showing willingness to serve us, shall be saved and honored. And whoever should refuse to listen to this, you shall endeavor, at your discretion, to seize them.

5. The Letter of Aldigiddai to Saint Louis

With the exception of Matthew of Paris, the editions are based on the letter of Odon de Châteauroux to Innocent IV. The original text was Persian written in Arabic characters. Saint Louis had it translated “in latinum de verbo in verbum” [into Latin word for word]; most of the work was done probably by Andrew of Longjumeau. The following is the text as restored by Pelliot [p. 161 ss.]. The brackets are Pelliot’s; they set apart the “formules de phraséologie orientale” [formulas of Oriental phraseology]; this makes the main structure of the letter stand out much more clearly. The brackets at the end of the introductory part of the letter are mine; I believe the bracketed passage contains polite formulas as well as those bracketed by Pelliot. Furthermore following d’Achéry’s reading, I prefixed a section to the words “Post hanc . . .,” because I believe that the main body of the letter begins with these words.
The Letter

Hoc est autem exemplar epistole sive litterarum quas misit erchaltay sive ercheltey princeps ille tartarorum ad regem Ludovicum. et iubente rege ipso translate sunt in latinum de verbo ad verbum.14

Per potentiam Dei excelsi, missi a rege terre chan, verba Erchelthay [sic]. Regi magno provinciarum multarum, propugnatori strenuo orbis, gladio christianitatis, victorie religionis baptismalis / corone gentis ecclesiastice / defensori legis evangelice, filio regi Francie [augeat deus dominium suum, et conservet ei regnum suum annis plurimis et impleat voluntates suas in lege et in mundo, nunc et in futurum, per veritatem divine conductricis hominum et omnium prophetarum et apostolorum, amen] centum milia salutum et benefactionum. Ex hoc rogo quod recipiat salutationes istas, ut sint grate apud ipsum. [Faciat autem Deus ut videam hunc regem magnificum qui applicuit. Creator autem excelsus causet accursum nostrum in caritate et facere faciat ut congregamur in unum].

Post hanc autem salutationem noverit quod in hac epistola non est intentio nostra nisi utilitas christianitatis, et corroboratio manus regum christianorum, Domino concedente. Et peto a Deo ut det victoriarum exercitus regum christianitatis, et triumphet eos de adversariis suis contentemntibus crucem. Ex parte autem regis sublimis [sublimet eum Deus], videlicet de praeasentia Kyocay [augeat Deus magnificentiam suam], venimus cum potestate et mandato ut omnes christiani sint liberis a servitute et tributo et angaria et pedaggiis et consimilibus et sint in honore et reverentia et nullus tangat possessiones eorum, et ecclesie destructe reedificantur, et pulsentur tabule, et non audieat aliquis prohibere ut oret corde quieto et libenti pro regno nostro. Ista autem hora venimus adhuc pro utilitate christianorum et custodia, dante Deo excels. Misimus autem hoc per nuntium fidelem nostrum virum venerabilem Sabaldin Mousfat David et per Marcum ut annuncient illos bonos rumores et que sunt circa nos dicant orae ad os. Filius autem recipiat verba eorum et credat eis. Et in literis suis rex terre [augeatur magnificentia sua] ita praecipit quod in lege Dei non sit differentia inter latinum et grecum et armenicum / et / nestorinum et iacobinum. Omnes enim sunt unum apud nos. Et sic petimus ut rex magnificus non dividat inter ipso, sed sit ejus pieitas et elemetion super omnes Christianos. Duret ejus pieitas et elemetion. Datum in finibus muharram. Et erit bonum, concedente Deo excelso.

[English translation: The Letter

This then is a transcript of a missive or a letter sent by Erchaltay or Ercheltey, a Tartar prince, to King Louis, and upon the king’s own order, it was translated word for word.

14. This opening passage quoted after Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum historiale [n.p., 1474], vol. XXXL.
15. Vincent has missa, instead of missi verba.
By the might of God on high, behests were sent by the king of the earth, Khan Elchelthay [sic]. To the great king of many provinces, the unerring protector of the world, to the sword of Christianity, to the victory of the baptismal religion, to the crown of churchmen, to the defender of the evangelical law, to the son of the King of France [may God increase his dominions and preserve his reign for many, many years, and fulfill his wishes in the law and the world, now and in the time to come, by the truth of the divine guide of men and all prophets and apostles, amen], a hundred thousand salutations and benedictions. Hence I wish him to receive these salutations that he find pleasure in them. [May God grant that I get to see this magnificent king who has landed. May the most exalted Creator allow that we come together [in the spirit] of love and arrange our meeting.]

After this salutation he shall know that this letter does not harbor any other intention of ours but [to promote] either the advantage of Christianity, or the strengthening of the hand of the Christians, if it please God. And I pray to God that he grant victory to the hosts of Christian kings and that they triumph over their adversaries who contemn the cross. On the part then of the exalted king [may God exalt him], i.e., from the presence of Kyocay [may God increase his magnificence], we come with power and mandate that all Christians be free from servitude and tribute and compulsory service and tolls and all such [burdens], and that they be honored and reverenced, and that no one touch their possessions, and that [their] destroyed churches be rebuilt, and let it go on record, and no one dare prohibit that [a Christian] pray with a glad, peaceful heart for our reign. We then come in this hour hither for the advantage and protection of Christians, if exalted God let it pass. We are sending this [letter] by our loyal emissary, the venerable Sabaldin Mousfat David and by Marcus, so that they make public those glad tidings which concern us and will convey [them] orally to you. Let the son then hear their words and believe them. And in his letter the king of the Earth [may his magnificence increase] has so decreed that in the law of God there be no difference between Latins and Greeks and Armenians and Nestorians and Jacobites, and all those that worship the cross. For all of them are as one to us. And this is what we require that the magnificent king not distinguish between them, but that his piety and clemency lord over all Christians. May his piety and clemency endure. Written at the end of muharam. And it shall go well, if it please exalted God.]

6. The Letter of Ogul Gaimish to Saint Louis

Bone chose est de pez; quar en terre de pez manguent cil qui vont a quatre piez, lerbe pesiblement; cil qui vont a deus, labourent la terre dont les biens viennent passiblement; et ceste chose te mandons nous pour toy aviser: car tu ne peux avoir pez se tu ne las a nous. . . . et tel roy et tel [et moult en nommoient] et tous les avons mis a lespee. Si te mandons que tu nous envoies tant de ton or et de ton argent chascun an, que tu nous retieignes nous avons fait ceulx que nous avons devant nommez. Et sachiez quil se repenti fort quant yl y envoia.

[English translation: A good thing is peace, for in a land in peace feed those who walk on all fours on grass peacefully; those who walk on two legs, till the earth, whose bounties come peacefully; and this is what we are sending to you that you may be advised, for you cannot have peace unless you have it with us. . . . And such and such king [and many of them were named] we have all put to the sword. We do decree that you send us so much of your gold and of your silver each year, if you hold it back from us, we [shall] do what we did to those whom we had named before. And ye should know that he [the French king] was very sorry that he had sent a mission.]

7 and 8. The Edict and the Letter of Mangu Khan to Saint Louis

The Latin text as related by Rubruquis was prepared at the court of Mangu Khan. In reference to this Friar William has the following to say: “Tandem completis litteris, quas mittit vobis, vocaverunt me et interpretati sunt eas. Quarum tenorem scripsi, prout potui eas comprehendere per interpretam, qui talis est” [“At last the letter having been completed which he sent to you, they called me, and it was interpreted. I wrote down its content to the extent I could understand it through the interpreter, who is [what he claims to be]”—and the body of the text follows.

I next present the text as restored by P. Anastasius Van den Wyngaert in Sinica Franciscana [Florence: Quaracchi, 1929], 1:307 ff. The sections and numbers introduced by Van den Wyngaert were omitted because they bear no relation to the meaning of the text. I have, however, divided the hitherto continuous text into the edict and the letter. More on this in the following section of this essay.

The Edict

Preceptum eterni Dei est. In celo non est nisi unus Deus eternus, super terram non sit nisi unus dominus Chingischan, filii Dei,

16. There is a gap in the text; Pelliot has “Car prestre Jehan se leva encontre nous” ["because Prester John rose against us"].
[Demugin Cingei, id est sonitus ferri. “Ipsi vocant Chingis sonitum ferri, quia faber fuit; et in superbiam elati, dicunt eum modo filium Dei”). Hoc est verbum quod vobis dictum est. Quicumque sumus Moal, quicumque Naiman, quicumque Merkit, quicumque Musteleman et ubicunque possunt aures audire, quocumque potest equus ambulare, ibi faciatis audire vel intelligi; ex quo audierint preceptum meum et intellexerint, et noluerint credere et voluerint facere exercitum contra nos, audietis et videbitis quod erunt habentes oculos, non videntes; et cum voluerint aliquid tenere, erunt sine manibus; et cum voluerint ambulare, erunt sine pedibus. Hoc est preceptum eterni Dei.

[English translation: The Edict. This is the Order of eternal God: In heaven there is none but one eternal God, over the Earth let there not be but one lord and master Genghis Khan, [the order] of the son of God [Demugin Cingei, that is, the sound of steel. “They call Genghis the sound of steel, because he was the maker, and, uplifted to the point of elation, they call him thus the son of God”). This is the behest directed to you. Whoever we may be, whether Moal, or Naiman, or Merkit, or Musteleman, and wherever ears can hear, and wherever a horse can walk, there you will make it heard and understood. Thus they shall hear my behest and shall understand it and [if they] will not believe it, and want to put up resistance against us, you shall hear it and you shall see it that they will have eyes and they will not see, and when they will want to hold something, they shall be without hands, and when they will want to walk, they will be without feet. This is the Order of eternal God.]

The Letter

Per virtutem eterni Dei per magnum mundum Moallorum, preceptum Manguchan sit domino Francorum Regi Lodovico et omnibus aliis dominis et sacerdotibus et magno seculo Francorum, ut intelligant verba nostra. Et preceptum Dei eterni factum a Chingischan, nec a Chingischan nec ab aliis post ipsum pervenit hoc preceptum ad vos. Vir quidam nomine David venit ad vos tamquam nuncius Moallorum sed mendax erat, et misistis cum illo nuncios vestros ad Keuchan [sic]. Postquam Keucham mortuus fuit, nuncii vestri pervenerunt ad curiam eius. Camus uxor eius misit vobis pannos nasic et litteras. Scire autem res bellicas et negotia pacis, magnum seculum quietare et bona facere videre ille mulier nequam, vilior quam canis, quo modo scire potuisse. . . . Illos duos monachos, qui a vobis venerunt ad Sartach, misit ipse Sartach ad Baatu; Baatu vero, quia Manguchan est maior super seculum Moallorum, misit eos ad nos. Nunc autem ut magnus mundus et sacerdotes et monachi sint omnes in pace et gaudeant in bonis suis, ut preceptum Dei audiretur apud eos, voluimus cum predictis sacerdotibus vestris nuncios Moal destinare. Ipsi vero respondunt quod inter nos et vos esset terra guerre, et multi mali homines et vie difficiles; unde timebant quod non possent nuncios
nuestos salvos perducere usque ad vos, sed si nos traderemus eis litteras nostras preceptum nostrum continent, Regi Ludovico ipsi eas deportarent. Hac de causa non misimus nuncios nostros cum istis; misimus vero vobis preceptum eterni Dei scriptum per dictos vestros sacerdotes. Preceptum Dei eterni est quod fecimus vos intelligere. Et cum vos audieritis et credideritis, si vultis nobis obedire, mittatis nuncios vestros ad nos, et sic certificabimur utrum volueritis habere nobiscum pacem vel bellum. Cum per virtutem eterni Dei ab ortu solis usque ad occasum totus mundus fuerit in unum in gaudio et in pace, tunc apparebit quid sumus facturi, preceptum eterni Dei cum audieritis et intellegetis et nolueritis intendere nec credere, dicentes “Terra nostra longe est, montes nostri fortes sunt, mare nostrum magnum est,” et hac confidentia feceritis exercitum contra nos—nos scire quid possumus—ille qui fecit quod difficile erat facile et quod longe erat prope, eternus Deus ipse novit.

[English translation: The Letter

By the power of eternal God over the great world of the Moalli [Mongols] [this is] the behest of Mangu Khan [to] be [sent] to the lord of the French King Louis and to all other lords and priests and to the great generation of the French, so that they understand our behests. [Although] God’s behest was carried out by Genghis Khan, it has not reached you sent by either Genghis Khan, or by those who succeeded him. Some man by the name of David came to you pretending to be an emissary of the Moalli, but he was a liar, and you dispatched with him your emissaries to Keuchan [sic]. After Keucham’s death, your emissaries proceeded to this assembly. Camus, his spouse, sent you garments nasic [... and a letter. This worthless woman, more vile than a dog, appeared to know things about warfare and peace negotiations, how to pacify [this] great age and do good works and somehow managed to know [all of this]. . . . Those two monks, who have come from you to Sartach, were sent by Sartach himself to Baatu. Baatu, in fact, since Mangucham is the older of the generation of the Moalli, sent them to us. Now then, so that the wide world and priests and monks all live in peace and enjoy their holdings, that God’s behest be heard by them, we wished, with the aforementioned clerics of yours, to appoint (and send) Moalli ambassadors. These [clerics] in fact answered that between us and you lie a war-torn land, evil people, and roads difficult to travel; because of this they feared that our ambassadors could not reach you safely, but if we delivered to them [i.e., to your emissaries] our letter containing our behest, they themselves could pass it on to King Louis. This is why we did not send our ambassadors along with yours; instead, we sent you the behest written by the eternal God with the aforementioned clerics of yours. It is [this] behest of the eternal God that we make you understand. And when you shall hear and believe [it], if you are willing to obey us, send your ambassadors to us, and thus we shall ascertain, if you are willing to be at peace with us, or at war. When by the decree of eternal God
the entire world will be as one (enjoying) happiness and peace from sunrise to sunset, then it will appear what we are to do, when you will have heard and understood the behest of the eternal God, and you will not intend to comply with it) nor believe it, saying: “Our country is a long way off, our mountains are a strong obstacle, our sea is wide and broad,” and, being thus confident you will raise an army against us—we (shall) know what we can—(while) he, who made the difficult easy and the far near, eternal God knows.

III. The Problem of the Preambles

Pelliot’s Approach

Nobody has ever offered a close interpretation of the documents we have been examining. Only recently a step has been taken in this direction by Pelliot in his articles written in conjunction with the publication of the Persian original of the letter in question. However, this distinguished editor stopped short of meeting with complete success, for he was hampered in a most unfortunate way by his predominantly philological interests. The disproportionate attention paid to philological aspects of the texts prevented him from taking into account the actual subject matter of the documents. His interpretations have also gone somewhat astray, although the method he employs is the only one that can be considered as sound.

At first sight the problem of interpretation seems rather puzzling. We have a number of documents, written with one single exception in medieval Latin, supposed to be translations of Mongol and Persian originals that have, again with one exception, not been preserved. Now, since ancient Mongol materials are comparatively scarce, it is very difficult to get an exact idea of what the content of the originals may have been and, consequently, of the degree to which the Latin versions render them adequately.

Faced with this difficulty, Pelliot used the recently discovered original Persian letter in a very interesting and effective way, thus breaking down the first barriers blocking a more intimate understanding of the documents. He starts with an attempt to establish the exact meaning of certain introductory words of the documents, which may constitute at first sight a formal preamble to the main body of the letter. The following are several formulas of this kind arranged in patterns revealing a parallel nature of their structure:
I. Dei fortitudo
omnium hominum imperator
magno pape
litteras
certissimas atque veras.

II. Per virtutem eternam Dei
per magnum mundum Moallorum
preceptum
Mangu Khan
sit domino Francorum regi Lodovico, etc.
ut intelligant verba nostra.

III. Dispositione divina
ipsius chaam transmissum
baiothnoy
verbum
Papa
ita scias.

IV. Per potentiam Dei excelsi
missi a rege terre chan
verba
Elchelthay
Regi magno etc.
Ex hoc rogo quod recipiat salutationes istas, ut sint grate apud ipsum.

[English translation:
I. God's might
emperor of all men
to the great pope
a letter
unequivocal and true.

II. By the power of eternal God
over the great world of the Moalli
a behest
Mangu Khan
[to be delivered] to the lord of the French King Louis
that they understand our behests.

III. By divine disposition
of the khan himself is transmitted
baiothnoy
the behest
oh, Pope
that you thus may know.
IV. By the might of God on high
sent by the king of the earth, the khan
the behests
Elcheltay
to the great King etc.
hence I wish him to receive these salutations that he find pleasure in
them.]

Formulas I and II have been excerpted from the khans’ letters, formulas III and IV from letters of the high military commanders. The formulas are apparently put together according to a certain plan, and when they are complete they probably contain the following elements:

a) An invocation of God
b) a reference to the ruler of the world
c) name of sender
d) name of addressee
e) a formula of order (Verbum, preceptum) ([the behest]: unequivocal and true]
f) a formula requiring acknowledgment by the addressee.

The sequence is not always the same in the Latin texts, and one or another of the elements may be garbled or altogether missing. Formula I, for example, does not mention the name of the khan who dispatched the letter; and there is missing as well in I the formula demanding acknowledgment from the addressee, unless the words “certissimas atque veras” (“most definite and true”) contain a garbled version of the formula. In preamble II the reference to the emperor is not very clear. Preamble IV stands out because of its exceptionally courteous tone demanding acknowledgment. In spite of such differences, however, preambles I through IV permit the reasonable assumption that they go back to the same or some rather similar Mongol texts.

The Original Persian Letter (coll. no. 1)

The solution of the problem may be considerably helped by an analysis of the original letter published by Pelliot. The preamble of this letter reads in the French version he has produced as follows:

Dans la force du ciel éternel,
[nous] le Khan océanique du grand peuple tout entier
This preamble is written in two languages. The first three lines are in Turkish. The fourth and fifth lines are written in Persian, the same as the main body of the letter. We have no idea what prompted this linguistic arrangement. Pelliot ventures a theory that sounds plausible: The Mongols did not want to use Persian in rendering a sacred formula, Persian being the language of the Mohammedans; the Mongol language was, on the other hand, entirely unknown in the West; besides, it is unlikely it has ever been written in Arabic characters. Turkish had the advantage of being related linguistically and culturally to the Mongol language and probably made frequent use of Arabic characters.

If we accept this theory, we shall have to conclude that the first three lines of the preamble may have had, because of their sacred character, a rather rigid form and that they were used without alterations as an introduction to documents of a similar nature. It follows, furthermore, that the formula, once the original text is established, may be used in the interpretation of the documents that are preserved in Latin only.

That the Turkish-Persian preamble may be trusted to render the original Mongol text adequately is corroborated by the text of the imperial seal, which was written in the Mongol language and has been affixed to the letter in two places. The text of the seal and the text of the preamble mutually support each other. In Pelliot's version the text of the seal reads:

Dans la force du ciel éternel
du khan océanique du peuple des grands Mongols,
 l'ordre.
S'il arrive à des peuples soumises et (des peuples) révoltés,
qu'ils le respectent et qu'ils craignent. 18

[English translation: By the power of eternal heaven

18. Ibid., 22, with an emendation on p. 127.
of the universal khan of the people of the great Mongols
the order
If it reaches subject peoples and (peoples) in revolt
that they respect and fear it.]

The Mongol text of the seal confirms the correctness of the three
Turkish lines of the preamble, and it confirms also the two Persian
lines as parts of the whole introductory formula. Hence Pelliot has
been justified in basing his interpretation of the Latin documents on
the Turkish-Persian preamble. Turning now to the preambles of the
Latin letters, we find some of them easy to analyze, others less so.

The Letter of Kuyuk Khan to Innocent IV (coll. no. 2)

No particular difficulties are encountered in analyzing the intro-
duction to the Latin letter of Kuyuk Khan to Innocent IV, which
had been entrusted to Pian de Carpini’s mission. The formula is
the first of the series of four listed above. The structure of the Latin
preamble corresponds, on the whole, to that of the Turkish-Persian
preamble. Precisely for this reason it is of some importance for
further analysis, because from the comparison of the Latin and the
Turkish-Persian texts we can get an idea of the degree to which
a Latin translation may deviate from the original Mongol text,
even if the process of translation was under close supervision of
the secretaries of the Mongol Imperial Chancery. We also get a
general impression of the limits within which it is safe to conjecture
as to the meaning of Mongol originals that form the basis of the
Latin translations. There is missing, e.g., in the first line of the
Latin preamble, the attribute “eterni” [“of the eternal”] in “Dei . . .
fortitudo” [“God’s . . . power”]. There were also apparent diffi-
culties in rendering the Mongol dalai, which Pelliot has translated
rather questionably as “océanique” [“oceanic”]. The “grand peu-
ple” [“great people”] has been translated, not very aptly, as “omnes
homines” [“all men”]; and the request for acknowledgment seems
to have been reduced to the somewhat obscure “certissimas atque
veras.” But even if we point out all the deficiencies of the Latin
text, it nevertheless conveys a generally correct idea of the original
formula and certainly does not so garble its meaning as to make
it unrecognizable. This fact should be kept in mind when we now
follow up Pelliot’s argument concerning other preambles, which
pose more difficult problems to the interpreter.
The first of the preambles Pelliot has attacked is the formula of document coll. no. 4 traceable to Kuyuk Khan and attached by Baichu Noyon to his letter to Innocent IV. The preamble reads as follows:

Per preceptum Dei vivi
Chingischan filius Dei dulcis et venerabilis
dicit quia
Deus excelsus super omnia, ipse Deus immortalis
et super terram Chingischem solus dominus.

[English translation: By the behest of the living God
Genghis Khan, sweet and venerable son of God,
states that
God on high is over everything, himself immortal God
and over the earth Genghis Khan the only lord and master.]

Pelliot assumes (erroneously, as I intend to show) that this document is a letter of the same kind as documents nos. 1 and 2; he is of the opinion that the first line “Per preceptum Dei vivi” corresponds to the first line of the Mongol original, which reads in his version “Dans la force du ciel éternel.” The line “dicit quia” corresponds to the Mongol word yarlik (edict), rendered in other Latin texts as “verbum,” “verba,” or “litterae.” Difficulties arise, however, in respect to the line “Chingischan filius Dei dulcis et venerabilis.” This line should correspond to the Mongol designation of the writer. But to attribute the letter to Genghis Khan would be absurd, as he died in 1227, and the letter was sent, without doubt, by Kuyuk Khan. Pelliot does not exclude the possibility that the name is an interpolation or a mistake of a copyist, but finds this explanation unsatisfactory for reasons we shall discuss in due course. Nor does he believe that the words “filius Dei” are a genuine part of the text; he assumes they must have crept in because the Mongol word kagan became confused with the similar-sounding Persian fay-fur, used to designate the emperor of China, which indeed means “Son of Heaven.” The remainder of the preamble he believes to be an awkward paraphrase of a Mongol formula found in later texts (after 1276) and meaning “dans l’appui de la protection de la grande Fortune” [“shielded by the protection of mighty Fortune”]. According to this emendation the text of the preamble should read:

Dans la force du ciel éternel,
dans l’appui de la protection de la grande Fortune,
le qagan [océanique]
notre ordre.
[English translation: By the power of eternal heaven
relying on the protection of great Fortune
the qagan [universal]
our order.]

The Rubruquis Document (coll. nos. 7 and 8)
As we have indicated above, Pelliot is not fully satisfied with the results of his interpretation. He is in particular dissatisfied with his argument that the designation of Genghis Khan as the writer of the letter is due to an interpolation or mistake of the copyist. There are manuscripts of the letter brought by Piano Carpini that show that a mistake of this kind is possible, but there is, on the other hand, the letter brought by Rubruquis from Mangu Khan to Saint Louis. This letter starts with a very similar formula, which reads as follows:

Preceptum eterni Dei est:
in celo non est nisi unus Deus eternus,
super terram non sit nisi unus dominus Chingischan.
Filii Dei hoc est verbum.
[English translation: It is the Order of eternal God:
in heaven there is none but one eternal God,
over the earth let there not be but one lord and master
Genghis Khan.
This is the behest of the son of God.]

Here it is quite possible that the translator intended to refer to Genghis Khan because Rubruquis slips in some commentary on the meaning of the name “Temujin Genghis.” Another explanation is therefore called for, and Pelliot admits reluctantly that the Mongol original must have contained some sort of reference to the name of Genghis Khan. He advances the theory that the original text may have contained the formula already mentioned: “dans l’appui de la protection de la grande Fortune”, and that “Fortune” referred to Genghis Khan’s fortune. In this case the formula does actually invoke Genghis Khan, and the translator had done nothing but render explicitly an implied meaning. Even this explanation does not entirely satisfy Pelliot, who presents it “with serious reservations.” He admits nevertheless that but for this interpretation the appearance of Genghis Khan’s name would be inexplicable.19

19. Ibid., 124.
I agree with Pelliot that the explanation is unsatisfactory—and for several reasons. First of all, it is the matter of the interpretative technique: Almost every fragment of the preamble calls for very complicated explanations and the assumption that various mistakes were made in order to produce the desired meaning. And when, after much effort, we have at last a workable text, its accuracy is threatened by a preamble that differs substantially from the formula used by the Turkish-Persian and Mongol originals. An explanation of this discrepancy might be found in the letter coll. no. 4: It would stand to reason that the khans, when writing to their military chiefs, used a different preamble from those they employed when writing to a foreign ruler. It seems to me very doubtful, however, that the letter of Mangu Khan to Saint Louis should have had a different preamble from that of Kuyuk’s letter to Innocent IV written only a few years earlier, if the preamble was considered so sacred that the Imperial Chancery dreaded to translate it into Persian in a letter written in that language.

I propose, therefore, another solution, which should immediately come to the mind of any careful reader of Mangu Khan’s letter to Saint Louis (nos. 7 and 8 of our collection). About one-third down the text as transmitted by Rubruquis we read:

\[ \text{Per virtum eterni Dei} \]
\[ \text{per magnum mundum Moallorum} \]
\[ \text{preceptum} \]
\[ \text{Mangu Kan} \]
\[ \text{sit domino Francorum Regi Lodovico etc.} \]
\[ \text{ut intelligant verba nostra.} \]

[English translation: By the power of eternal God over the great world of the Moalli \( \text{(Mongols)} \) the order of Mangu Khan \[ \text{[to] be [sent] to the Lord French King Louis, etc.} \]
\[ \text{that they understand our behests.} \]

Here we have a formula (I have presented it earlier in this section as formula II) that seems to be much closer to a preamble of the type of the Turkish-Persian letter than the introductory formula of the Rubruquis document. Not being an Orientalist, I cannot prove my point linguistically, but I wish to stress that only the second line of the preamble is obscure and does not let the Mongol formula shine through in a manner that would eliminate all doubt. But this is precisely the line which, in the Latin text of Piano Carpini,
produced under supervision of the Imperial Chancery, also leaves a great deal to be desired. In both cases a person of Latin origin evidently did not know what to make of the word *dalai* (*oceánique*).

For the rest, the line in Piano Carpini’s text contains the title of the khan, but garbles the “great people” (which is, as proved by the seal, the people of the Mongols) into “omnes homines,” while the text of Rubruquis does not contain the title of the khan but renders fairly well the “magnum mundum Moallorum.”

In view of these facts, I should think it reasonable to assume that the formal preamble of Mangu Khan’s letter to Saint Louis is to be sought, not at the beginning of the document as transmitted by Rubruquis, but in the middle of its text, beginning with the words “*Per virtutem aeterni Dei etc.*” Furthermore, as it is unlikely that a formal introduction to a letter would be found in the middle of its body, we are forced to conclude that the text of Rubruquis does not constitute one document as has been generally believed, but consists of two, i.e., the letter beginning with the preamble just analyzed, and another document that is not a letter of the type that seemed to be borne out by the Persian original.\(^{20}\)

Once we accept this theory, all difficulties vanish. We have a letter of the khan whose introductory words correspond to the original letter at least as closely as the Latin translations of the Carpini letter do to the Turkish-Persian original. And no artificial and unsatisfactory theories are needed in order to interpret the beginning of the Rubruquis text as a preamble, for the simple reason that the first document is not a letter in the form authenticated by the Persian original.

The nature of the first document contained in Rubruquis’s text we shall investigate later on. At this point, I only wish to reemphasize what Pelliot had recognized earlier: The introductory formula of the Rubruquis text is closely related to Kuyuk Khan’s imperial communication to Baichu Noyon (coll. no. 4). The document starts with the words: “*Per preceptum Dei vivi*” [“By the behest of the living God”]; the document of Mangu Khan (no. 7) begins with the words: “*Preceptum eterni Dei est*” [“This is the behest of the eternal God”]. The word *preceptum* corresponds,

\(^{20}\) Anticipating this conclusion, I have assigned in the collection of the texts two numbers (7 and 8) to the Rubruquis document. However, it should be understood that until now the entire text of the two documents has been considered to be one and has been printed and treated accordingly.
just as in the preamble of the letter, to the Mongol legal concept of *yarlik* (edict), and we shall therefore refer to these documents hereafter as “edicts,” in order to set them apart more clearly from the “letters.”

*The Preambles of Documents, coll. nos. 3 and 5.*

The preambles of the letters of the military commanders Baichu Noyon and Aldigiddai throw more light on the question. The first lines “[Dispositione] divina” and “[Per] potentiam Dei excelsi” [“By divine disposition” (and) “by the might of God on high”] apparently correspond in their general meaning to the first line in Kuyuk’s and Mangu’s letters. The second line, however, has caused considerable trouble to Pelliot, because he persisted in working on the assumption that all the documents were “letters,” and that all the “letters” ought to have the same introductory formula. The second lines read: “ipsius chaan transmissum” and “missi a rege terrechan” [“of the kahn himself transmitted” and “was sent by the king of the Earth khan [Elchelthay]”]. Pelliot tries to explain them as an analogy with certain later formulae, particularly with the preamble of a letter of 1289 from Arghun Khan to Philippe-le-Bel. This letter, whose Mongol original has been preserved, opens in Abel-Rémusat’s translation [7:336] with the words:

Par la force du ciel suprême  
Par la grâce du Khakan  
Paroles de moi Argoun.  

[English translation: By the might of supreme heaven  
By the grace of the Khakan  
Words from me Argoun.]

Abel-Rémusat had already drawn attention to what he supposed to be a parallel between this preamble and the earlier documents. He remarked that, in spite of the change in the general political situation, the Il-khans of Persia used the same formula as the simple military commander Baichu Noyon.21 Pelliot agrees with him; but in elaborating this point he encounters certain difficulties. When the preamble of Baichu Noyon’s letter [coll. no. 3] is treated as an analogy with the formula of the Arghun letter, Pelliot arrives at the following reconstruction:

Par la disposition divine du qagan lui-même
la parole de Baiju (est)
transmise.
Pape, sache ceci.

[English translation: By the divine disposition of the qagan himself
The word of Baichu (is)
transmitted.
Pope, know this.]

However, if thus reconstructed, the customary first line of the for-
mula would be missing. To get a complete formula that corresponds
to the introduction of the imperial letters, Pelliot gives us a choice
between two assumptions. Either we should have to assume that
the word *transmissum* is an erratum and has taken the place of
another word that had rendered more adequately the Mongol *su-
dur* (“dans la Fortune” or “par la grâce”), or, “dispositione divina”
is the translation of *su-dur* and the first line “Dans la force du ciel
éterne” has disappeared for some reason or another in the process
of translating or copying the letter.

Again, as in the previous case, Pelliot is not satisfied. In later
studies he remarks that the letter of Aldigiddai (coll. no. 5) has
the same introductory formula as the Baichu letter (coll. no. 3). In
this case, too, the Latin formula reads:

Per potentiam Dei excelsi
missi a rege terre chan
verba etc.

[English translation: By the might of God on high
sent by the king of the Earth Khan (Elchelthay)
behests etc.]

Pelliot believes he is justified in correcting the earlier formula in
the light of this one, he supposes that “transmissum” in the Baichu
letter is due to a scribe’s error and that “missi” is the better reading;
he believes that the word *missi* does not refer to “verbum” but
to “bairothnoy.” The assumption that the Latin preamble of the
Aldigiddai letter renders the Mongol original more accurately than
the preamble of the Baichu letter has the advantage of offering a
formula that corresponds, in its general structure at least, closer
to the formula of the Arghun letter. Pelliot proposes the following
reconstruction of the Aldigiddai letter’s preamble:

23. Ibid., 166.
Dans la force du Ciel éternel
dans la Fortune du qagan,
Aljigidai [sic],
notre parole,
au roi de France.
[English translation: By the force of eternal Heaven
by the Fortune of the qagan
Aljigidai [sic]
our word
to the King of France.]

Even this result, however, is not wholly satisfactory to Pelliot; he concludes his attempt at an acceptable interpretation as follows:

"'Missi a rege terre chan' est cependant un peu une paraphrase
pour déssigner le haut personnage Aljigidai [sic] que le qagan, 'roi
de la terre,' a envoyé agir en son nom et qui ne doit pas sa puissance
qu'à la 'Fortune' du qagan; nous aimerions à savoir ici les mots
mêmes de l'original persan pour en juger" ["'Sent by the king of
the earth the khan' is actually a little bit of a paraphrase referring
to the high personage of Aljigidai [sic] whom the khan, 'king of the
Earth,' has sent to act in his name, and who owes his power only
to the 'Fortune' of the khan; at this point, we would love to know
the exact words of the Persian original to be able to evaluate it"].

Again I share the misgivings and suspicions of Pelliot. I have
serious doubts whether the line "missi a rege terre chan" ["sent by
the king of the earth the khan"] can be understood as a paraphrase of
"qagan-u-su-dur" ["by grace of the khan"]. This conjecture seems
to me all the more doubtful, since a letter is extant only in its
Latin version written by Arghun Khan to Honorius IV. In the
second line of the preamble to this Latin letter we read the words:
"gratia magni Chan" ["by the grace of the Great Khan"]. Now, if the
translator of the Arghun letter to Honorius was able to render the
words "qagan-u-su-dur" quite correctly by "gratia magni Chan," it
would seem rather curious that both translators of the Baichu letter
and of the Aldjigiddai letter should have rendered imperfectly the
same line and, not knowing each other, should have committed
the same mistake. As long as we do not possess the originals of
the letters, it seems right to assume that the letters of Baichu and
Aldjigiddai both had the same preamble, which, however, differed

24. Ibid.
from the later preamble to the Arghun letter. This assumption does not seem to me an unsatisfactory expedient serving as a way out of an insurmountable philological difficulty, but rather an imputation of what is to be expected under the circumstances. It would not be entirely impossible, but highly improbable, that the generals of the khan who were his inferiors in the military hierarchy would make use of the same formal preamble as the Il-khans of Persia, whose vassalage relationship to the Great Khans in Peking was quite different. As long as the original texts are missing the assumption is more plausible that the line “missi a rege terre chan” corresponds to a Mongol text that designates the military commander as a missus regius [royal emissary]. For the rest, we agree with Pelliot’s conjecture that the Aldjigiddai letter’s formula is to be preferred and that transmissum is an erratum for missi.

Summary
To sum up, it is fair to say that Pelliot’s choice of the Mongol preamble as a point of departure for the interpretation of the documents under investigation is an excellent one, even if his own efforts have led invariably to an impasse. Using the preambles as a point of reference helps to identify and, at least provisionally, classify the documents. This method succeeded in separating the body of the text of the Rubruquis letter, which he had presented as a single document, into two clearly different documents. Therefore, setting aside for the moment the letter of Ogul Gaimish, which has been preserved only as a summary, we have identified for further analysis six documents; to wit:

I. Two Imperial Letters:  
1) The letter of Kuyuk Khan to Innocent IV, preserved in a Persian original and in a Latin text [coll. nos. 1 and 2].  
2) The letter of Mangu Khan to Saint Louis preserved in Rubruquis’s text, which begins with the words “per virtutem eterni Dei” [coll. no. 8].

II. Two Imperial Edicts:  
3) The edict of Kuyuk Khan, forwarded by Baichu Noyon to Innocent IV [coll. no. 4].  
4) The edict of Mangu Khan which is the first part of the Rubruquis text [coll. no. 7].
III. Two Letters of Military Commanders:

5) The letter of Baichu Noyon to Innocent IV (coll. no. 3).

6) The letter of Aldijigiddai to Saint Louis (coll. no. 5).

The three groups of documents are clearly identified by their formal introductions.

IV. The Legal Contents of the Documents

Having established the formal characteristics of these documents we can now proceed to an analysis of their meaning. In my opinion they are not mere “letters” but legal instruments revealing the essential features of Mongol public law and political ideas. Their importance becomes evident when we realize that they are our only authentic sources of information about the Mongol legal culture in the period when the Mongol empire reached its zenith. The so-called “letters” are in part orders of submission issued by the khans to the European powers; they are in strict compliance with the Mongol view of a due process of law; in part they are formal instruments of information and commentaries on the fundamental provisions of the constitutional law of the empire, attached to the orders of submission to prevent the addressees from pleading ignorance of Mongol law when not in compliance with the orders received. The juridical structure of the instruments is surprisingly clear. The legal provisions are organized and classified in an admirably logical manner into general substantive law, general rules fixing penalties for noncompliance, individual orders, legal instructions, and procedural law.

The Order of God

The law governing the legal acts in question is at the same time the general basis of Mongol constitutional law. It is designated in the Latin texts as the “Litterae Dei,” the “Order of God,” and it declares, as stated in the edict of Kuyuk Khan:

Deus excelsus super omnia ipse Deus immortalis
et super terram chingischam solus dominus.

[English translation: God on high [is] over everything himself immortal God
and over the earth Genghis Khan the only lord and master.]
In the edict of Mangu Khan the same law is spelled out as follows:

In celo non est nisi unus Deus eternus
super terram non sit nisi unus dominus Chingischan.
[English translation: In heaven there is none but one eternal God,
over the earth let there not be but one lord and master Genghis Khan.]

The formulas come out differently in translation, but the original meaning comes through clearly:

In Heaven there is God, the One, Eternal, Immortal, Most High,
On Earth Genghis Khan is the only and supreme Lord.

The “Order of God” is a curious combination of a legal principle of far-reaching consequences with an argument addressing its metaphysical foundation. One intention of the Order is obviously to draw a parallel between the monarchical constitutions of Heaven and Earth. However, while the first term of the parallel is derived from a theological dogma, the second term is both dogmatic and pragmatic. The thesis that Genghis Khan is the supreme and only Lord of the Earth may be considered as a part of a dogmatic system explaining the true nature of government in the cosmos and may, therefore, be qualified as passing judgment on an ontological subject. But since the cosmos, or at least the earthly part of it, is a World-in-the-Making, the formula turns out to be Genghis Khan’s claim to rulership demanding submission of all other earthly powers. The true essence of world government is not yet actual but only potential, and it is bound to materialize in the course of history by turning the real world of political facts into a true picture of the ideal and essential state as envisioned by the Order of God. To bring the revealed essence down to earth, to incorporate this essence into history, is the long-range comprehensive intention of the Order. It is brimming with dynamic energy and pregnant with visions of fanatical acts born of the desire to transform the world of man into a likeness of God’s rule in Heaven.

*Imperium mundi in statu nascendi*

A follow-up of the consequences of the Order and its application reveals the birth of a legal order out of a metaphysical vision. There is an abyss between the world order as envisaged by the Mongol formula and the actual political situation at the time of its issuance. The Order of God views the world governed by Genghis
Khan, while the actual world presents the picture of an expanding empire embracing numerous and mighty states geographically and politically so widely scattered that the empire and these foreign powers have only a dim picture of one another. Out of the tension between the essential and the historical order arises a set of legal assumptions and constructions that are hard to interpret because our idea and vocabulary of international relations differs in some respects from that of the Mongols. Our concepts of international law presuppose the existence of more or less independent sovereign states and a community of international law granting to these states the status of legal subjects. The Mongol empire is, according to its own self-interpretation, not a state among states in this world but an imperium mundi in statu nascendi, a World Empire in the Making. Territories, rulers, and peoples may be de facto beyond the sphere of influence of the Mongol military and tax administration, but they are de jure and potentially members of the Empire in the Making. When the power of the empire spreads de facto, the de jure potential membership of foreign powers is transformed into a de jure actual membership in the empire.

I have introduced the terms of “de jure potential” and “de jure actual membership” in the empire as technical terms for the designation of certain legal situations that the documents in question address. Without the introduction of these terms the precise juridical meaning of the Mongol orders of submission would be incomprehensible. The European powers to whom the orders of submission were addressed (the pope, the king of France, and other princes) cannot, according to the Mongol imperial conception, be legal subjects of the same rank and dignity as the khans. The position of a world emperor is unique. When the power of the khan happens to come face to face, at any point, on any occasion, for the first time with the power of another prince, there can ensue neither a state of peace de jure, including mutual recognition of territories and power, nor a de jure state of war. On the occasion of its first contact with the Mongol empire, a foreign power has to enter into a relation of submission to, and dependence on, the Mongols. If it does observe this status of a vassal, it will become an actual member of the empire. If it does not obey, it becomes a rebel. The state of violent action that takes place in the case of noncompliance is not war but in legal terms a punitive expedition aimed at the enforcement of the Order of God.
When the world empire comes face to face with another power and the problem of transition from potential to actual membership in the empire becomes acute, this sets a formal process of law into motion. The khan bases his claim to world domination on a divine order to which he is subject himself. He has not only a right derived from the Order of God, but he acts in accordance with his duty. It has fallen to him to establish rulership that encompasses the entire world and he is God's instrument to implement it. The building of the empire ultimately has recourse to an act of revelation by which God has issued his order for the empire's foundation. This act of revelation has first become known only to Genghis Khan and the Mongols, and it is their duty to communicate what they have learned to the peoples and powers of the entire world. The building of the empire is not simply a warlike expansion of Mongol dominance over the world, but a process by which the essential empire, existing only potentially, is actualized into a historic empire. The Mongols, therefore, cannot simply make war on foreign powers, since they have no legal right to do so. The proper way for the imperial government to go about its God-given mission is to send duly constituted embassies to the world powers, informing them of all the necessary principles of the law underlying the Mongol world empire and announcing that the moment of their passing from potential to actual membership has come, detailing what steps must be taken to achieve this goal in compliance with the legal provisions that govern the entire process.

The European reaction to these Mongol commands was not uniform. Some princes, who had had previously an occasion to watch the striking force of the Mongol military machine more closely, arrived quickly at an excellent understanding of the revelation. They submitted to all ordinances of the Mongol imperial government and preserved a more or less tolerable status within the empire. Others, unfortunately lacking the requisite capacity for understanding it, viewed the Mongol embassies and their demands to be signs of unfounded arrogance and a glaring disregard for their right to independent existence. Occasionally such ill-advised princes went to the extreme of killing the Mongol ambassadors. Others again, like the emperor of China and the German emperor, in spite of having been notified of the Order of God, stuck to their mistaken and heretical belief that they were emperors in their own right and refused to take the commands seriously. Frederick II, who had an
inherent inclination for frivolous jesting about things sacred to his contemporaries, one strengthened by his frequenting the company of Saracens, made a joke about the order of submission that might have had fatal consequences in case of a real confrontation. The king of France quipped that since the Tatars came from the Tartarus they should be called Tartars, and the name stuck. In cases like these in which the recipients of the commands showed a regrettable lack of understanding for the perfectly peaceful and law-abiding intentions of the Mongol imperial government and consequently did not submit to the Order of God, they became targets of Mongol punitive expeditions—one of these being the 1241 invasion of Eastern and Central Europe, which had been the proximate cause for the papal mission of 1245.

These remarks should adequately outline the legal and political conceptions underpinning the Mongol imperial idea. We may now turn to a survey of the body of legal maxims found in the documents under scrutiny, which interpret and develop the Order of God proper.

**General Rules**

I have pointed out that the Order of God was the basic constitutional norm of an Empire in the Making. Hence a further articulation of the Order’s legal content into detailed formulas concerns the process of the coming-into-being of the empire and its transformation from a potential construct into an actual empire. The letter of Baichu Noyon to Innocent IV contains the following formula:

Quicunque statutum audierit
super propriam terram aquam et patrimonium sedeat
et ei qui faciem totius orbis continet virtutem tradat.

Quicunque autem preceptum et statutum non audierint sed aliter fecerint
Illi deleantur et perdantur.

[English translation: Whoever will listen to [this] behest and decree shall possess his own land, water, and patrimony and shall become a vassal to him who encompasses the countenance of the entire world.

Yet whoever will not listen to [this] behest and decree but would act otherwise, let them be destroyed and annihilated.]
The formula contains general rules concerning the alternative cases of obedience and disobedience of the Order of God; i.e.:

(1) Whoever submits to the Order shall sit in peace on his land [this is an administrative order addressed to administrative authorities and allows the rulers who have submitted the right to petition for help, if they had not been left in peace by military commanders and other authorities];

(2) Whosoever submits shall enter into a relation of vassalage (viritatem tradere), a rule addressed to the powers about to become actual members of the empire;

(3) Whosoever does not submit shall be destroyed [a sanctioning rule, addressed to military executive organs].

The same set of rules may be repeatedly found, complete or fragmentary, cast in the same or slightly different formulas, in the documents under scrutiny. A quite similar formula, with the alternative choices reversed, may be found, e.g., in the edict of Kuyuk Khan to the military commander of Southern Russia [coll. no. 4]:

Quicunque ergo audierit et observare neglexerit
destructur perdetur et morietur

Et quicunque voluerit utilitatem domus suae, et prosecutus istud fuerit.
et voluerit nobis servire
salvabitur et honorabitur.
[English translation: Whoever therefore will hear [this] and will fail to comply
let him be destroyed and annihilated and killed

and whoever would wish to have the use of his house
and might be persecuted showing willingness to serve us,
shall be saved and honored.]

The same edict repeats the sanctioning formula on three other occasions, with an additional order to the commander to apply the sanctions at his discretion:

Et quicunque istud audire contradixerit
secundum voluntatem tuam faciens eos corripere studeas;
[and:]
Quicunque contradixerit tibi
venabitur et terra ipsius vastabitur.
[English translation: And whoever should refuse to listen to this, you shall endeavor, at your discretion, to seize them; [. . . ]
[and]
Whoever should contradict you let him be hunted down and his land laid waste.]

The set of the sanctioning rules seems, furthermore, to belong to certain curselike formulas, for we find very several similar ones in both edicts. In the edict of Mangu Khan the curse reads:

Ex quo audierint preceptum meum et intellexerint et noluerint credere et voluerint facere exercitum contra nos, [audietis et videbitis] quod erunt habentes oculos, non videntes, et cum voluerint aliquid tenere, erunt sine manibus, et cum voluerint ambulare, erunt sine pedibus.

[English translation: e And those who have heard my order and understood it and do not want to believe it and want to put up resistance against us (you shall hear it and you shall see it), they will have eyes and they will not see, and when they will try to hold something, they shall be without hands, and when they will try to walk, they shall be without feet.
This is the order of the eternal God.]

Individual Orders

Individual orders of submission and individual threats of sanctions that intend to carry out the general rules are a logical and legal consequence of this set of general formulas and rules.

An individual order reads in the Persian original letter (coll. no. 1) as follows:

Toi en personne, à la tête des rois, tous ensemble, sans exception, venez nous offrir service et hommage.
A ce moment là nous connaîtrons votre soumission.
Et si vous n’observez pas l’ordre de Dieu et contrevenez à nos ordres, nous vous saurons [nos] ennemis.
Voilà ce que nous vous faisons savoir.
Si vous [y] contrevenez, en quoi en connaîtrions-nous?
Dieu en connaîtra.

e. This is Voegelin’s own German translation rendered in English.—Trans.
[English translation: previously given in § II. Texts, doc. 1, para. 8, above, beginning “At present . . .” and ending “God will know it.”]

Salimbene’s Latin text (coll. no. 2) contains the same formulas; in Baichu Noyon’s letter the individual order is a bit shorter. The letter of Mangu Khan elaborates it more broadly:

Preceptum Dei eterni est quod fecimus vos intelligere.
Et cum vos audieritis et credideritis, si vultis nobis obedire,
mittatis nuncios vestros ad nos
et sic certificabimur utrum volueritis habere nobiscum pacem vel
bellum.
Cum per virtutem eterni Dei ab ortu solis usque ad occasum totus
mundus fuerit in unum in gaudio et in pace
tunc apparebit quid sumus facturi.

Preceptum eterni Dei cum audieritis et intellexeritis et nolueritis
intendere nec credere,
dicentes: “Terra nostra longe est, montes nostri fortes sunt, mare
nostrum magnum est,”
et hac confidencia feceritis exercitum contra nos,
nos scire [? nescimus] quid possimus—
ille qui fecit quod difficile erat facile, et quod longe erat prope, eternus
Deus ipse novit.
[English translation: previously given in § II. Texts, docs. 7 and 8, ad fin, above, beginning “It is [this] behest . . .” and ending “eternal God knows.”]

Law-giving Authorities—God and Man

The orders and the formulas of submission list, besides the general rules and individual commandments set forth above, some juridical materials regarding the problems of legislative authorities, the addressees apprized of the rules and commands, and the technique of promulgation.

We have seen throughout this analysis that the basic constitutional maxim [One God in Heaven, One Lord on Earth] was called the “Order of God.” This term is applied to the basic maxim in all of the preserved documents. The original Persian letter (coll. no. 1) refers four times to the “ordre de Dieu” [however without revealing its contents]; the Latin text (coll. no. 2) reads in the corresponding passages “litterae Dei.” The edicts spell out the maxim itself and bracket its wording between solemn opening and closing formulas with a reference to the author of the order. The edict of Kuyuk Khan (coll. no. 4) introduces the Order as follows:

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The edict of Mangu Khan reads:

Preceptum eterni Dei est: . . . [This is the order of the eternal God: . . . ]

and the Order is followed by the words:

Filii Dei, Demugin Cingei, hoc est verbum quod vobis dictum est. [Of the son of God, Demugin Cingei, this is the behest directed to you.]

Other formulas read: “praecptum Dei stabile . . . mandatum Dei vivi et immortalis,” “praecptum eterni Dei,” etc. [“Enduring behest of God . . . the mandate of the living and immortal God,” “The behest of the eternal God,” etc.] Hence the fundamental maxim is either termed simply the Order of God, or expanded to read the Order of the Son of God Temujin Genghis.

From the Divine summit emanates the sacred substance spreading over the pyramid of the Order of God, the general maxims, and the individual commandments down to the last executive act. The Empire in the Making thus is in all of its phases a divine revelation, starting with the Order of God. The title of “Son of God” seems to have been associated only with Genghis Khan, but his successors pattern their own repetitions and confirmations on this basic maxim, as well as their rules of enforcement and sanctions. Their versions are such close approximations of the Order of God that a definite borderline between commands of divine origin and statutes issued by secular authorities is hard to establish. The wording of the formulas gives the general impression that the successors of Genghis Khan considered themselves to be executors of a divine mandate, and their pronouncements and acts as portions of a comprehensive revelation of God’s will. Hence they did not strictly differentiate between acts emanating from God and acts emanating from themselves as mortal beings, e.g., the edict of Kuyuk Khan, whose opening words call the basic maxim an Order of God and of the Son of God; the body of the text of the edict then continues to mention it as “this my [i.e., Kuyuk Khan’s] order.” The letter of Baichu Noyon speaks of the “immutable order
of God and the statute of him who reigns over the face of the whole world.” The text does not make it clear whether this “order” refers only to the basic principle, which would include, aside from the Order of God, also the khan’s, or also to the subsequent formula of submission and sanction mentioned earlier. If the latter were true, the order would not originate from the khan alone, but also from God. The corresponding formula of Mangu Khan’s edict concludes with the words: “This is the Order of the eternal God”; this would indicate that the “order” does not emanate from the khan at all, but from God alone.

Promulgation

The sacred character of the process of building a world empire becomes clearly visible in the formulas of promulgation. The edicts and letters of the khans stay the course set by the original divine revelation. The “Order of God” must be transmitted as the “Word of God” to those peoples who were hapless enough never to have heard of it. The building of the empire is not an enterprise in the realm of power politics intent on securing for the Mongols a military and economic domination of the world but the execution of God’s will. As we indicated above, the Mongol khans do not engage in a relationship involving sovereigns of an equal rank, but fancy themselves as God’s messengers enlightening the ignorant. Hence the orders of submission always make sure that each order as such is linked with an explanation of its reasons and its legal basis, and this explanation always conveys the announcement of the Word of God. Kuyuk Khan’s edict follows up the Order of God with an order to proclaim it:

Volumus istud ad audientiam omnium in omnem locum pervenire provinciis nobis obedientibus et provinciis nobis rebellantibus Oportet ergo te, o baiothnoy, ut excites eos et notifices eis quia hoc est mandatum dei vivi et immortalis. Incessanter quoque innotescas eis super hoc petitionem tuam et innotescas in omni loco hoc meum mandatum ubicumque nuncius poterit devenire.

[English translation: We wish this order to reach the ears of everyone everywhere, in the provinces which have submitted and are obedient to us and in provinces in the state of rebellion against us. Thus it behooves you, oh, Baichu Nyon (baiothnoy), that you rouse them up and apprise them]
that this is the mandate of the living and immortal God.
Without cease you shall then communicate to them this your proclamation
And you shall communicate my decree in every place accessible to an emissary.]

The order to make this proclamation known is repeated twice in the same edict. Instructions to this effect take up more than one-third of the text of the edict. Mangu Khan’s edict even mentions God’s command to communicate the Order’s basic principles to the addressees—though the text is unclear at this point:

Quicumque sumus Moal,
quicumque Naiman,
quicumque Merkit,
quicumque Musteleman,
et ubicumque possent aures audire,
quocumque potest equus ambulare,
ibi faciatis audiri vel intelligi.
[English translation: Whoever we may be, whether Moal, or Naiman, or Merkit, or Musteleman, and wherever ears can hear, and wherever a horse can walk, there you will make it heard and understood.]

The general order to communicate God’s command to the potential (or actual) subjects of the Mongol empire is reflected also in individual commands. The letter of Baichu Noyon (coll. no. 3) stresses this point:

Nunc superbum istud statutum et preceptum ad vos transmittimus
[English translation: Now this lofty decree and behest we are sending to you]

and then spells out the consequences of noncompliance. The letter of Mangu Khan to Saint Louis deals with this question in detail. First it reminds the addressees that the Order of God “nec a Chingis-chan nec ab aliis post ipsum parvenit ad vos” (“has reached you neither sent by Ginghis Khan nor by others after that one”). Then it explains very carefully that the Order of God was brought to Saint Louis by his ambassadors (referring to the edict preceding the letter in the Rubruquis document). It furthermore details the

f. See above, note d of this document, p. 92.—Trans.
reason why this mode of proclamation had been chosen rather
than the customary fashion of transmitting information, such as having
Mongol ambassadors delivering the edict.

The letter of Kuyuk Khan (coll. nos. 1 and 2) does not quote
the Order of God, but several passages indicate that it has been
communicated to the Western powers and that the pope must be
familiar with it. In this letter, as well as in the others, the order of
submission is based on the assumption that the pope is aware of
the principles of the Order of God.

Finally the acts intended to enforce compliance with the Order
are defined as manifestations of divine will. The letter of Kuyuk
Khan (coll. nos. 1 and 2) is very explicit about this point. The
expression of the pope’s dismay over the Mongols’ cruel slaughter
of Christians the khan counters with the declaration that the due
process of law—proclamation of the Word of God and the Order
of submission—had been observed by the Mongols, but that the
peoples in question had persisted in their unbelief, shown them-
selves arrogant, organized resistance, and killed the Mongol am-
bassadors. The natural consequence of these misdeeds had been
the divine judgment and punishment: “Dans ces territoires, les
hommes [c’est le] Dieu éternel qui les a tués et anéantis. Sauf par
l’ordre de Dieu, quelqu’un, par sa seule force, comment tuerait-il,
comment prendrait-il?” [“In these territories (it was) eternal God
who had killed and annihilated those men. Except by the Order
of God, how could anyone by his own power kill, how could he
take?”] The letter drives this point home so that the pope may
understand that the Mongols acted in the past in accordance with
divine law. The khan continues to explain to the pope the princi-
ple underlying the Mongol point of view: “Dans la force de Dieu,
depuis le soleil levant jusqu’à son occident, tous les territoires
nous ont été octroyés. Sauf par l’ordre de Dieu, comment quelqu’un
pourrait-il rien faire?” [“By God’s might, all realms stretching from
the sunrise to sunset were granted to us. Without the order of
God, how could anyone do anything?”] At the end the khan puts
the blame for all sanctions that might follow on the pope’s dis-
obedience to the Order of God, leaving their execution at God’s
discretion:

Si vous [y] contrevenez,
en quoi en connaitrion-nous?
Dieu en connaitra.
[English translation: If you contravene (this command), how would we know what (will) happen? God will know it.]

The individual threat of sanction was apparently always couched in these terms, for we find the same formula in several other documents. The letter of Baichu Noyon (coll. no. 3) reads: “illud nos nescimus . . . Deus scit [“this we do not know, but God knows”], and the remnants of the same formula can be identified in the corrupted text at the end of Mangu Khan’s letter.

V. Conclusion

We have brought under scrutiny all of the typical legal contents of the documents. We have demonstrated that they are not primitive texts, but well-thought-through legal acts attesting to a remarkable juridical technique. The legal conception of an imperium mundi in statu nascendi—a World Empire in the Making—may seem strange to us and certainly has no affinity with the traditional concepts of Western international relations. But it is not obscure, and its rational contents can be presented adequately by means of technical terms like “potential and actual empire” and de jure potential and de jure actual membership in the empire. The logical organization of the legal material such as a basic principle, a set of general rules, individual orders, and acts of enforcement in substantive and procedural law is readily detectable. The sacral character of the idea of a growing world empire is emphasized throughout the system that stretches in a descending order from the Order of God through all phases of enactment down to sanction and enforcement. I think we can recognize criteria of a clearly conscious and rational technique of constitutional law. The documents, therefore, cannot be assessed as primitive and awkward, or arrogant, as held by the prevailing opinion. They are, on the contrary, an expression of a clear fundamental idea, the arguments they put forth are quite perceptive, and above all, they are constructed with utmost care in terms of juristic accuracy.

The high degree of legal formalism seems to call for the repetition of single formulas in the same document, but introduces hardly a word from outside the established legal language. This limpidity of construction makes it possible to discuss, by way of conclusion, the probable juridical relationship between these documents. That
not all of the documents are “letters” has become evident through
the analysis of the problem of the preambles. Two of them we
 provisionally termed “edicts.” Now certain sections of the “let-
ers” clearly belong to the category of correspondence in the strict
sense, since they are answers to letters addressed to the khans and
engage in arguments found in these letters. However, as far as the
main body of the texts is concerned, they are only “letters” in the
vague sense that they have been sent by an individual sender to
an individual addressee. I believe the preceding analysis makes it
possible to describe more accurately the nature of these documents.
The documents are more than letters, they are acts of law. Modern
terminology would classify them as executive orders addressed to
individual persons. They are neither private letters nor [diplomatic]
“notes” in terms of international law, as they are governed by the
idea of an Empire in the Making, they are formal steps in a procedure
destined to transform potential members of the empire into actual
members. They are issued as individual orders based on the author-
ity of general rules and contain in accordance with the provisions
of the law (1) a demand the Order of God be complied with by the
potential members of the empire applying for membership in the
empire in due form and (2) information on the legal consequences
of either compliance or noncompliance.

The dispatching of the order of submission may be combined
with the delivery of a legal instrument (the so-called edicts), which
are not individual orders but supplement the order by precise in-
formation about the contents of the general rules governing the
order. The reference to God and to the Son of God Genghis Khan
as the authorities who have issued the basic constitutional maxim
appears to support the conjecture that the Order of God and the
general formula outlining the consequences of either compliance or
noncompliance are portions of Genghis Khan’s yassa. The original
Persian letter [coll. no. 1] seems also to support that assumption,
because it urges those aspiring to become in the future actual
members of the empire to come to Karakorum to receive further
commands based on the yassa.

If these assumptions are correct, the so-called edicts would be
instructions about individual articles of the yassa necessary for the
juristic interpretation of the orders of submission, and the so-called
letters would be [with the exception of the Aldijiddai letter] orders
of submission based on the yassa.
Nietzsche has the distinction of being the only philosopher who ever has been considered the major cause of a world war.\footnote{H. L. Stewart, \textit{Nietzsche and the Ideas of Modern Germany} [London: E. Arnold, 1915].} The following study proposes to analyze the motives and reasons that lead to attributing to Nietzsche a massive influence on the course of events, as well as to draw in outline Nietzsche’s own interpretation of the crisis of the age and of the wars.

\section*{I}

As a fixed point for the orientation in this field of problems it is necessary to state the rule that political philosophers are not much of a cause in history insofar as any direct influence on specific actions is concerned, but that their work is effective, if at all, through the more subtle means of evocation, rationalizing support, or disenchantment. Nietzsche is no exception to this rule, though his case shows certain peculiarities of which the quantitative dimensions are a symptom; more copies of his works have been sold than of those of any other philosopher who ever has seen print, and the opprobrium attaching to his name in the more popular opinion is hardly matched even by that of Machiavelli. A first thought would suggest a relation between the success of an author and his influence, but a few second thoughts will show presently that the case is not as simple as its quantitative aspects seem to indicate. We can start our analysis best with some reflections on the very popular magical belief, of which Nietzsche like many other political
thinkers has been a victim, that the political analyst who predicts an event is the cause of the event.

A philosopher who is sensitive to symptoms of decay in the spiritual situation of his age will be able to chart the course of social disintegration for a considerable time ahead. Nietzsche had this sensitiveness in the highest degree; in the preface to his analysis of *European Nihilism* he says: “What I have to tell is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, and what can but be coming in this way: the advent of Nihilism. This history can be told today, for necessity itself is here at work.” This statement can be correct or incorrect. If it is substantially correct, the description of nihilism, which includes a critique of nineteenth-century Christian morality, of pessimism and romanticism, of liberal democratic and socialist ideas, cannot have been the cause of nihilism. If it is incorrect, the attribution of causation to Nietzsche would imply the fantastic assumption that a healthy Western world began to show symptoms of nihilism and began drifting toward the predicted catastrophe because a philosopher chose to publish a false analysis of the situation.

Once the alternatives are stated in these terms, it appears as highly improbable that the attribution of an extraordinary “influence” to the philosopher can have its source in such elementary mistakes of reasoning. We must penetrate to the deeper source in the sentiments that are strong enough to disrupt the consistency of the intellectual argument. Assuming Nietzsche’s description to be correct, the phenomenon that is apt to arouse political sentiments is the transformation of a latently critical into a consciously critical situation through the creation of symbols that purport to describe the crisis. Resistance to this transforming operation is to be expected because “naming” is the fundamental magical operation by which “things” are called into existence or destroyed. Calling attention to a crisis by inventing the terminological apparatus for its description has the effect of a “challenge” to “overcome” it (*überwinden* is one of the fundamental ideas of Nietzsche), and accepting the challenge means the adoption of an attitude which inevitably will be “destructive” of the attitudes and beliefs that constitute the crisis. The acceptance of the challenge, however,

is impossible except for a very few persons; if it were possible on a mass scale, there would be no crisis; for the crisis consists precisely in the absence of remedial powers that could counteract the spiritual dissolution of the age. Hence, the challenge, if it cannot be accepted, will have to be evaded by the denial of its validity.

The refusal of the challenge can assume various forms which, in part, are determined by the time position of the evading person. A first form has been characterized by Nietzsche himself in the symbol of the “Last Man.” Zarathustra preaches the gospel of the superman to the people, and the people are silent. He then tries to arouse them by an appeal to their pride and draws the picture of the most contemptible, of the Last Man, whom they will be unless they overcome their present state. The Last Man is the man without creative love, without creative imagination, without a desire for anything that is more than himself. “What is a star?” asks the last man, and he is satisfied with his little pleasures and the comforts of his existence.1 What he wants is: some warmth, some neighborliness, not too much work, protection against disease, a sufficient measure of drugs to create pleasant dreams (liquor, movies, radio), no poverty but not too much wealth. He wants to know what is going on and to thrash it out; all want the same and want to be equal; he who feels different goes voluntarily into the insane asylum; “formerly all the world was insane”—say the most subtle and leer; one has a pleasure for the day and a pleasure for the night—but with restraint, for the last man is concerned about health and wants a long life. “‘We have invented happiness’—say the last men and leer.” At this point of the speech the audience breaks out in enthusiasm: “Oh, give us this last man—make us these last men. You can have then your superman!” and they laughed. “But there is ice in their laughter,” adds Nietzsche, having diagnosed correctly the schizophrenic touch of the man who is last because he is lost spiritually.4

The evasion of the challenge through derision and through acceptance of the despiritualized existence is, however, a short-lived possibility. When the organizing power of the spirit becomes weak, the result is not a peaceably happy despiritualized society, but a

1. And Nietzsche was not yet acquainted with the meaning that the word star has acquired in our days as a social category.
4. Also Sprach Zarathustra, Werke, 6:20 ff.
chaos of instincts and values. Despiritualized happiness is the twin brother of despiritualized brutality; once the spiritual order of the soul is dissolved in happiness, it is only a question of time and circumstance when and from which quarter the attack on an order without dignity will begin. “Our whole European civilization is moving with a torture of tension, which increases from decade to decade, toward a catastrophe,” wrote Nietzsche in the 1880s. The new period is characterized “Externally: as an age of immense wars, revolutions, explosions”; “Internally: by the ever greater weakness of men, the events as excitants.” “There will be wars, as there never have been wars on earth.” This prediction is to be understood, not as hyperbole, but as a statement on the level of empirical description. The wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were dynastic and national wars with limited political purposes. The wars predicted by Nietzsche are “immense” because the framework of political ordinates—the dynasties, the nations—which determined the purpose, and with the purpose the limits of war, is breaking down. The impending wars are the expression of a pneumato-pathological situation; they express the struggle of instincts, of blind preservation of a status quo, and of attacks on the status quo by unfettered force; but while they have motives they have no orientation toward purposes. “Nihilism is a pathological interlude” between the expiration of an old and the birth of a new spiritual order. Politics in the traditional sense of statesmanlike action within an accepted order of purposes comes to an end during the interlude; in the formulation of Nietzsche, “Politics is dissolved entirely in a war of the spirits.”

II

The period of the Great Wars has begun as predicted; but in spite of Nietzsche’s foresighted analysis, the nature of these wars is not yet understood, except by isolated thinkers. The issue has been obscured by the peculiarities of German history. During the Great War of 1914–1918 and for some years afterward, it was possible to attribute the violent disturbance to a specific German war-guilt.

5. Wille zur Macht, Werke, 15:137.
6. Ibid., pp. 235 ff.
8. Wille zur Macht, Werke, 15:152.
German war-guilt was the symbol created by the Western world as a defense against the consciousness of the crisis. If the war was due to a specific disturbing factor, it became unnecessary to take an alarming view of the general situation. The symbol was badly shattered, however, when the sources of prewar diplomatic history were published and studied, for no evidence supporting a specific German responsibility could be found.\(^\text{10}\) The state of the Western world proved so chaotic that a general war could erupt without a clear political purpose on the part of any of the participating great powers. The terrible implications of the discovery were never made conscious on a larger scale, though they had profound emotional influences, at least in certain quarters; the materials at our disposition even today seem sufficient to justify the judgment that the realization of the mistake of creating the war-guilt symbol was an important contributing factor to the hesitant attitude of the British government toward the rise of the National Socialist movement. The eruption of 1914 can be characterized from our present vantage point as a phenomenon in which the two component factors, the paralysis of preventive action and the fatalistic acceptance of violence without a purpose, had not yet been dissociated. The history of the years following 1918 is the history of the dissociation into paralysis of action on the one side, calculated action with unlimited aims on the other. The two phenomena determine each other insofar as, without paralysis on one side, the action on the other would have had no chance of success and, therefore, in all probability would have never been undertaken. It seems to be understood by now that the violent events on the international scene since 1939, which are classified as a war in the traditional meaning of the term, are in direct continuity with the preceding domestic events, particularly in Germany, which are classified as a revolution in the traditional sense; and it is furthermore understood that the second Great War, with its traditionally determined official beginning in 1939, is a continuation of the National Socialist policy of disintegrating foreign countries in the years preceding 1939. The

\(^{10}\) George P. Goobh, Germany (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1938), 110, says: “No evidence has appeared to indicate that the German Government or the German people had desired and plotted a world-war.” Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York, 1928), 1:14, says: “On the basis of this new documentary evidence, no serious historians accept any longer the dictum of the Allied victors of 1919 that Germany and her allies were solely responsible. They are all agreed that the responsibility is a divided one.”
“War” in the traditional technical sense has merged into the general process of the crisis.\textsuperscript{11}

The interpretation of Nietzsche, on the political level, has followed the lines marked by the war-guilt symbol. Nietzsche is a German philosopher; his critique of Western civilization ought perhaps to be ignored because his ideas, if not directly causative of German political attitudes, are at least expressive of a specifically German view of politics. The earlier mentioned study by H. L. Stewart found in Nietzsche one of the causes of the German state of mind that was responsible for the first Great War. The thesis has hardly been repeated in the same primitive manner, but we still find in English literature, in desperate defense against the evils of the time, occasionally a remark that “the poisonous fallacies of maniacs such as Nietzsche and Treitschke” are responsible for the German menace.\textsuperscript{12} More representative of the present state of interpretation on this level, however, is a treatise like Mr. Butler’s \textit{Roots of National Socialism}.\textsuperscript{13} The scholarly intention of the book is sound. There can be no doubt that the Western crisis has reached particularly grave forms in Germany, and an inquiry into the peculiarities of German intellectual history would be, for that reason alone, of the first importance. The sound intention is diverted, however, into dubious channels through the repression of the consciousness of a general crisis and the projection of the evil into the German problem. The result is a selection of ideas from the tradition of German historism and a collection of quotations calculated to shock the democrat. That the processes leading to the stigmatized ideas present a problem requiring explanation, or that some of the ideas most shocking to the democratic creed might contain some element of truth, particularly under German conditions, does not seem to have occurred to the author. In the gallery of nefarious figures from Herder to Hitler, Nietzsche finds his due place.\textsuperscript{14} In his presentation


\textsuperscript{12} F. J. C. Hearnshaw, \textit{Germany the Aggressor Throughout the Ages} (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1941), 235, 272.

\textsuperscript{13} Rohan D’O. Butler, \textit{The Roots of National Socialism, 1783–1933} (London: Faber and Faber, 1941), 154–67.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
of Nietzsche, Mr. Butler has succeeded in drawing a caricature to which, indeed, applies most appropriately his judgment: “the crudities of that immature philosopher.” As a presentation of Nietzsche, these pages are of little value; they have their importance in this context as an example of the attempts to overcome the consciousness of crisis by the magical method of caricaturing the diagnostician. The political purpose of the author is revealed in his description of the “real design” of the National Socialists, “which was nothing less than the Nietzschean transvaluation of values; the education of Germans in Germanity, the nihilistic revolution which would not stop at smashing countries, but would wreck the very hearts of men, utterly destroying the civilization of the West.”

The category by which Nietzsche is linked to National Socialism in Mr. Butler’s treatise, the transvaluation of values, deserves attention. The transvaluation of values has been a permanent process in Western civilization since the Middle Ages; the various transvaluations became socially stabilized by the succession of revolutionary events. The Reformation of the sixteenth century transvalued the values of institutionalizing religious experiences in the sacerdotal and sacramental organization of the Church; the English Revolution of the seventeenth century transvalued the values of representative kingship and royal administration; the French Revolution of the eighteenth century transvalued the values of rulership and their institutionalization in a ruling aristocracy; the socialist movements of the nineteenth century transvalued the values of the bourgeois property society; the religious radicalization since Kierkegaard has transvalued the values of middle-class liberal Christianity; the National Socialist movement of the twentieth century is a summary of these transvaluations and has added the transvaluation of the Age of Reason. The formula was coined by Nietzsche, but he did not create the all-pervasive phenomenon. Insofar as these various transvaluations did not produce new orders of values that could have maintained a society stable for long, but had rather the character of successive waves by which the integral system of values of Western society was leveled down, the result would have been, under all

15. Ibid., 167. It should be noted that the presentation as well as the bibliography betray that Mr. Butler is unacquainted with the more important literature on Nietzsche of the last twenty-five years.
16. Ibid., 295.
circumstances, an unstable, fragmentary structure of values, tending toward critical disintegration. The instability was aggravated by the fact that the successive waves of transvaluation did not sweep over the West uniformly, but originated in definite areas and were stabilized in the several national areas at different levels, due to differences in the internal structure of the countries as well as to external circumstances. Stabilization was not even uniform within individual countries; the model is France, where one part of the nation had accepted the transvaluation of the Revolution, while the other part preserved tenaciously in its sentiments the pre-revolutionary values. The differences of the levels at which the transvaluations were stabilized in the various countries, and in the various strata of society within the countries, are one of the main factors in determining the alignments in the present “war of the spirits.”

Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values does not have its place in the series of transvaluations just outlined; on the contrary, it is a conscious attempt to transcend the crisis and to find the firm ground for the erection of a new and stable order of values. This ground cannot be found by developing one more utopia of a new society, but only by creating in one’s own personality—with the means at hand, and with precarious chances of success—a new order beyond the crisis. Nietzsche’s is, on principle, the Platonic position that an order of society can arise only out of a well-ordered soul. In the preface to his analysis of European Nihilism, Nietzsche explains his withdrawal from the world, his instinctive hermitage, and his intellectual experimentation as the ascetic means calculated to bring him to the point where he can describe the phenomenon of nihilism in historic retrospect: “He looks back when he tells what will come”; and he can perform this feat because “he is the first perfect European nihilist,—but a nihilist who has lived nihilism to its end within himself,—who has it behind himself, under himself, outside of himself.”

It is, of course, a question very much open to debate to what extent Nietzsche has succeeded in his experiment—personally, I think he has been remarkably successful—but whatever the decision on this point will be, it is impossible to identify Nietzsche’s attempt at a transcending transvaluation with any of the transvaluations immanent in the crisis—and, least of all, with the National

Socialist transvaluation, which has reached a rock-bottom of de-spiritualized, chaotic animal force and has proved incapable of creating even a semblance of order. The formula of transvaluation “expresses a counter-movement with regard to principle as well as to the task; a movement which, at some future date, will be the successor to this perfect nihilism.”\textsuperscript{18} Mr. Butler’s identification of Nietzsche’s transvaluation with the very nihilism it expressly tends to “overcome” is a symptom of the strong resistance to a realization of the nature of the crisis, for such realization would confront him, as everybody who realizes it, with the unpleasant task of contributing to its solution through self-critique and ultimately the metanoia of his person. Nietzsche’s transvaluation does not go in the direction of Christian values, but it presupposes a “change of heart” which, as a process in the personality, is the equivalent of the Christian metanoia. The transvaluation does not simply propose a new system of ethics, but calls for a radical reform of personality.

III

To utilize the alignment of great powers for localizing the source of the crisis in one of them is, perhaps, the most effective, but certainly the most primitive, method of externalizing the internal Western problem. The preceding reflections on the phenomenon of transvaluation open the understanding to a greatly superior method of interpretation. It is possible to accept as absolute one of the levels, at which a transvaluation has become stabilized in the past, and to interpret the crisis in terms of a conflict between the values on the accepted level and all other orders of values. An interpretation of this type would still take a position immanent in the crisis; it could not penetrate to the transcendent position attempted by Nietzsche; but it would at least bring the dimensions of the crisis into view. As an outstanding realization of this possibility we select Professor McGovern’s \textit{From Luther to Hitler}.\textsuperscript{19}

Professor McGovern defines his level of values as the “Liberal Tradition,” consisting of the two component ideas of democracy and individualism. A consciousness of crisis is aroused in the realm

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 138.
of this tradition because “the peaceful progress and spread of democratic ideals” throughout the world received a rude shock in the Great War of 1914–1918; this first trauma was overcome by the conception of the Great War as a crusade against the last bulwarks of “absolutism, tyranny, and divine right of kingship”; the postwar period brought further disillusionment through the spread of totalitarian governments; and in 1933 came the “staggering blow” of the National Socialist victory in Germany. The events compel us to recognize that there is no unhampered worldwide trend toward liberalism, but that another trend, the fascist movement, crosses it; liberalism is on the defensive and has to fight for its preservation. This fascist movement is not ephemeral, but it also has its tradition, consisting of the authoritarian and etatistic ideas and reaching back in direct continuity to the period of the Reformation; the preservation of liberalism will depend largely on a careful understanding of the tradition opposing it.\textsuperscript{20} If the crisis is referred to this system of ordinates, the Lutheran submission to state authority, Bodin and Hobbes, Fichte and Hegel, German historism and American-French pragmatism, Darwinism and racial creeds melt together in the fascist tradition, which now comprises all transvaluations with the exception of the “liberal.” Nietzsche finds his place, together with Schopenhauer, William James, and Bergson, as an irrationalist and pragmatist.\textsuperscript{21}

The consciousness of crisis is strongly present in Professor McGovern’s treatment; the historical range of the phenomenon is properly extended to include the first great institutional disruption in the Reformation; and no attempt is made at nationalistic simplifications. Still, Professor McGovern is not willing to acknowledge the problem of the crisis with Nietzsche’s radicalism, and he can refuse acknowledgment because he is “dominated by a firm and zealous political faith”\textsuperscript{22} to the degree that the crisis does not exist in him personally. His faith is unshaken that the combination of consent by the people and individual rights will always be the institutional vessel for the right spirit. In spite of the fact that evil spirits have grown lustily in these vessels in several instances and ultimately broken them, as in the case of the Weimar Republic, the problem of the spirit has not been dissociated in his faith from

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., “The Liberal and the Fascist Traditions.”
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 409–15.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 9.
the problem of the institutions. Against such faith there is no argument; we can but hope that ultimately it will be justified by history.

Our respect for the faith, however, should not prevent us from analyzing the assumptions on which it rests. The faith can be perhaps best characterized as a secularized Calvinism. Liberalism, the realm of God, is on the march, though temporarily it may be on the defense against the iniquities of the fascist tradition. As it is the realm of God, the harmony between institutions and the spirit is prestabilized. Plato and Aristotle considered the possibility that a form of government might be used rightly or wrongly. Democracy, as well as any other form of government, could be good or bad according to the spirit that prevailed. Consent of the people might be given to bad laws, and the bad laws would not be experienced as an infringement of individual rights because the individuals themselves could possibly be dubious figures who liked bad laws. Saint Thomas conditioned his ideal of constitutional government very carefully by the assumption of the people as a multitude of mature, Christian individuals. No such considerations appear in the argument of Professor McGovern. Milton, in his Areopagitica, was very outspoken that the freedom of the press was meant as an instrument for the expression of the English national and Protestant spirit—and for none other, Professor McGovern seems to assume that the “freedom of thought, of speech and of writing” will lead to the expression of the right spirit without further precautions. We may advance the realm of the liberal tradition by zealous propaganda geographically, and we may experience reverses if the enemy is more zealous in the propaganda of his ideology, but there can be no crack in the realm itself caused by the evaporation of the spirit. The realm of Calvin had the Institutes and discipline for its pillars; the realm of liberal tradition has substituted the pillars of popular consent and of individual rights; but still it is the realm that advances in partnership with its God. Oswald Spengler, in his Decline of the West, has expressed the opinion that in the present crisis those peoples and institutions will survive ultimately that can draw on the strongest reserves of creative piety, a piety that “adheres only to forms that are older than the Revolution

23. Ibid., 13.
24. Ibid., 9.
and Napoleon”; and he suspects these reserves may be greater in America than elsewhere, for he mentions expressly the American Constitution, and the reverence in which it is held by the people, as one of these strongholds of piety.\textsuperscript{25} In Professor McGovern’s position we sense this piety adhering to the ideas and institutions of the \textit{ancien régime}, which is aware of the symptoms of the crisis but is impermeable to the “war of the spirits”—a block of strength that promises survival.

IV

The war of 1914–1918 has occasioned one interpretation of Nietzsche that must be counted among the great, the interpretation by George Santayana in his \textit{Egotism in German Philosophy}.\textsuperscript{26} The book bears the mark of the war insofar as certain peculiarities of German philosophy are its topic, and as it contains pages suggesting a causal relation between German philosophy and the war,\textsuperscript{27} but we can discount such lapses due to circumstances.\textsuperscript{28} Santayana’s critique does not enter the fight between political ideologies; it is conducted on the level of a \textit{philosophia perennis},\textsuperscript{29} and on this level it becomes clear that \textit{egotism}—defined in a preliminary fashion as subjectivity in thought and willfulness in morals\textsuperscript{30}—is a phenomenon that can appear anywhere, and not only in Germany; and that, furthermore, it is not characteristic of German philosophy at large, but rather of a trend in the nineteenth century. Pre-Reformation German thought is not touched by it, and it is not to be found either in the later Catholic and orthodox Lutheran traditions, or in German materialistic and skeptical thought. A premonition of it can be sensed in the monadology of Leibniz, hints are perceptible in Kant, seeds in Goethe, but it becomes dominant only in Fichte and Hegel and reaches a climax in Nietzsche. Egotism has its definite historical limitations and conditions.

\textsuperscript{25} Oswald Spengler, \textit{The Decline of the West}, 2 vols. [New York: A. A. Knopf, 1939], 2:430 n. 3.
\textsuperscript{26} George Santayana, \textit{Egotism in German Philosophy}. The first edition appeared in 1916. The book was republished in 1940, with a new preface and a postscript: “The Nature of Egotism and of the Moral Conflicts That Disturb the World.” All quotations refer to this second edition [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1940].
\textsuperscript{27} See for instance p. 69.
\textsuperscript{28} Cf. the remarks concerning such lapses on p. vii.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., v.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., ix.
Santayana’s conception of what constitutes a crisis does not differ in substance from the Christian idea, though it differs in the metaphysical formula. The Augustinian ordinates for the orientation of life, the *amor Dei* and the *amor sui*, are translated, in his language, into spirit, as the harmonizer of the psyche with its position in the world, and egotism, as the delusion that the psyche is a substance that has the power and the moral right to impress itself on the world. Egotism is a defection from the wisdom of the spirit, whose function it is to adapt human nature to the facts “so that in living in harmony with them, it can live in harmony with itself.” The spirit that has become egotistical mistakes its thoughts about the world for the world itself, and it reverts from rational morality to the pre-rational dictate of passion. The criterion of the crisis in general, as well as of the German crisis in particular, is the loss of experience and wisdom embodied in Christianity and the resurgence, in its place, of “heathenism.” This crisis is a social phenomenon, not necessarily an individual crisis for everybody. The fountains of wisdom and self-knowledge remain, and we may still drink at them in solitude: “Perhaps the day may return when mankind will drink at them again in society,” is the prayer, concluding Santayana’s work on the Realms of Being.

Assuming egotism as the criterion, Santayana can concur with Nietzsche in the diagnosis of the crisis to a certain extent. He recognizes that Western society has disintegrated spiritually to the point where the life of spirit has become a life of solitude. A good deal of the phenomena that Santayana classifies as egotistical fall, for Nietzsche, under the category of nihilism. He can even concur with Nietzsche in the critique of Christianity as a source of the crisis, for Santayana has an *anima naturaliter Christiana*, but he does not accept the dogma. His metaphysics is materialistic; the life of the spirit is an outgrowth of matter; it can rationalize and moralize nature; but the spirit is not an authority that can legitimately turn against nature. The Christian *contemptus mundi* is tempered in Santayana’s spirit to a disillusionment that is willing to accept courageously the obligations of natural existence without attributing to the life in the world a higher value than it can have.

to a spiritually well-ordered soul. As a naturalist, Santayana is in sympathy with Nietzsche’s naturalistic ethics as well as with his critique of the Christian devaluation of nature. Spirit that turns against nature is disloyal to its origins. “When Christianity posited a supernatural world containing the secret powers and solving the moral problems of this life, was it not raising the interests of the human soul, and of that soul in a transitory historical phase, to supremacy over the universe? And what is this but the special egotism of repentance, taking an imaginary revenge on a too cruel world?”

The questions of Santayana formulate, with greater philosophic precision and much greater courtesy, Nietzsche’s attack on the “backworlds” (Hinterwelten) behind this world, his stigmatization of Christian morality as a slave morality, and the suspicion that spiritual absolutism expresses the ressentiment of those who cannot master life. This naturalism of Nietzsche is not his invention, but embodies a great tradition stemming from Aristotle; it is not quite as revolutionary as he supposed it to be; and within the transvaluations of Western history, it continues the work of the Reformation with its reversion from asceticism to the disciplined life of the world, with its values of marriage, thrift, science, and the nation.

Up to this point Santayana can concur with Nietzsche. The crisis of the spirit is real, egotism or nihilism is its criterion, the decay of Christianity is an important element in it, and the transvaluation of values is all to the good insofar as it results in a new naturalism. But from here on, there is a parting of the ways. Santayana’s matter, as the basis of human existence, is not the matter of physics but a metamorphosis of the First Person of the Trinity; and creation has to be completed by the revelation of the Logos and the grace of the Spirit. Nietzsche’s nature is the nucleus of existence that remains when the civilizational order has lost its meaning, it is not the nature of physics any more than Santayana’s matter; it is not inorganic force devoid of spirit and morality; but it is nature unredeemed, having no guidance but itself. It has the virtues of honesty and a fierce loyalty toward itself; it is full of anguish and a deep love; but it is concentrated in itself. Its will to help is stronger.

34. Santayana, *Egotism in German Philosophy*, 162.
35. Ibid., 107.
36. Ibid., 162.
than the intellectual powers that would be necessary to order its own forces internally as well as in their relations to the world; and, hence, it inclines toward a belief in the magic power of the will to overcome obstacles. The tragedy and the danger of this nature have been described by Nietzsche himself in the symbol of Empedocles: “In his divinity he wants to help. As a man full of pity he wants to destroy. As a demon he destroys himself.”

This nature can experience the crisis in its full impact; it can overcome it by coming to itself and harkening faithfully to its own immediate experiences; by this metanoia, it can raise a new standard of spiritual integrity that we cannot relinquish again with good conscience; but the new table of values created by it will be very imperfect. “The superman is not a possibility, it is only a protest. Our society is outworn, but hard to renew; the emancipated individual needs to master himself. In what spirit or to what end he will do so, we do not know, and Nietzsche cannot tell us.”

The failure of the attempt to create a new order should not blind one, however, to the important fact that the attempt was made. A society has to be deeply undermined to make meaningful the existence of a Nietzsche. “What he said may be nothing, but the fact that he said it is all-important. Out of such wild intuitions, because the heart of the child was in them, the man of the future may have to build his philosophy.”

The nature of the subterranean forces grumbling in Nietzsche has been sensed rightly by Santayana as pre-Christian, but some precaution is necessary in using this label. The appearance of Nietzsche is primarily a phenomenon in German intellectual history, and the temptation is great to interpret the spirit of Nietzsche as a revolt of Germanic instincts against a tradition that is felt to be foreign. The temptation is all the greater because certain religious experiences of Nietzsche show distinct traces of what may be called “Wotanism.” The God of his immediate experiences was not the Dionysos who figures in his philosophy of culture. He was a mysterious hunter whom he met in his dreams, a storm that raged through his soul and bent it to its service, a cruel hunter behind clouds who pierced him with the flashes from his eyes, a

39. Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy, 124.
40. Ibid., 117.
41. Santayana seems to incline toward this interpretation, and, of course, National Socialists make the best of this possibility. Cf. ibid., 131, 162.
torturer and hangman. If the term Wotanism is used to designate this complex of experiences, it should be done with great care lest experiences that have the character of the immediate are flattened out to literary reminiscences or national traditions. Experiences of this type can rise anywhere and at any time in history; for Stefan George, there was a strong resemblance between “Wotanistic” and “Yahwistic” experiences.

Santayana’s category of egotism is an excellent instrument for the interpretation of the crisis, German and general, as well as of Nietzsche, up to a certain point. It can reveal, as it does in his hands, the fallacy of a transcendentalism that identifies the contents of the world with the movement of the idea; it reveals the fallacy of the Hebraistic egotism of the chosen people, that is continued in Fichte and in National Socialism, and of the eschatological expectation of a promised land; and it reveals the fallacy in Nietzsche’s idea of “overcoming” or “superseding” a crisis historically by a new table of values, instead of superseding nature and will by ennobling it through the spirit. But all is not egotism in Nietzsche’s attempt at a transvaluation, and the will to be historically effective through the creation of a new image of man is not entirely to be condemned, even if in the specific case the attempt should fail. We are faced by the Platonic problem of creating an image of man and society that will serve, or is supposed to serve, as an ordering principle in the historical situation. Santayana is not blind to the Platonic

42. The reflection of these experiences can be found in Nietzsche’s diary entry for August 27, 1859, recording the dream of the hunter; Nietzsche was fifteen years old at the time. *Der Werdende Nietzsche. Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen*, ed. Elisabeth Foerster-Nietzsche (Munich: Musarion Verlag, 1924), 84–86. A further document is the poem *Dem Unbekannten Gott*, dated “Fall, 1864”; Nietzsche was twenty years old. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Jugendschriften* (Munich: Musarion Verlag, 1923), 209. In the Zarathustra, the most important document is the “Lamentation of the Sorcerer,” *Werke*, 6:366–70. “The Lamentation” reappears, with significant changes, as the *Klage der Ariadne* in the *Dionysos-Dithyramben* of 1888, *Werke*, 8:429 ff.; one should note also the variants given on p. 461. The change of title and function of the *Klage der Ariadne* deserves more attention than it has received as yet. On the “Wotanism” of Nietzsche see Carl G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), 33 and 118 ff.

component in Nietzsche’s personality and work, but he is not too much in love with the Politeia either, and his interpretation breaks off at this point. We must consider briefly this Platonic will of Nietzsche and the reasons for its failure.

Platonism in politics is the attempt, perhaps hopeless and futile, to regenerate a disintegrating society spiritually by creating the model of a true order of values, and by realistically using as the material for the model the elements present in the substance of the society. The Politeia as well as the Nomoi have their superb richness because Plato built them out of the best materials of Hellenic society, of the mythical law-givers and the enlightened tyrants, of the martial virtues of Sparta and the civilizational refinements of Athens, of the humble Attic peasants and the craftsmen and traders of the cities—all wrought together in an order glowing with the spiritual light that pervades it from the mystical source in the idea of the Good. If not man, the Politeia at least is Hellenic man written large. The position of Santayana implies the resignation, probably quite justified, that such an attempt at the present juncture would be vain. But resignation cannot be achieved by everybody; the man with the Platonic temper will try the impossible. In Nietzsche’s life we have to distinguish two phases of his Platonism: the periods before and after 1876. Before 1876 he assumed the Platonic position in the sense just described, hoping that out of the German social materials some model could be created that would overcome the state of civilizational disintegration. It is the time of the Untimely Meditations, of his concern about the educational institutions, of his ephemeral plans for the foundation of a cloistered society of likeminded friends, of his association with Richard Wagner and the hopes he set on Bayreuth. After 1876 he considered the state of disintegration hopeless and turned to the analysis of the crisis. His position was comparable to that which the Cynic and Stoic cosmopolitans assumed with regard to the dying polis; and, with the qualifications imposed by the differences of the historical situation, this is the position of Santayana. Nietzsche in this position, however, continued his Platonic endeavors with results that could not be anything but questionable since the materials at hand seemed contemptible and the image had to be concocted out of heterogeneous fragments. Santayana has assembled the “superman” in a splendidly ironical page, summarizing the picture: “Nietzsche jumbled together the ferocity of solitary beasts, the indifference
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and *hauteur* of patricians, and the antics of revelers, and out of that mixture he hoped to evoke the rulers of the coming age."  

In this insistence we encounter an ultimate trait of Nietzsche’s character, which he described himself in the *Zarathustra*, stressing the importance of the self-portrait by its resumption in the *Ecce Homo*: “Even in my knowledge I feel only the lust of my Will to generate. . . . This Will has lured me away from God and from Gods: what would there be to create if there were Gods? . . . But this Will drives me always toward Man . . . like the hammer toward the stone. In the stone, oh ye men, there sleeps to me an image, the image of images . . . And now my hammer rages cruelly against its prison. . . . I want to finish it, for a shadow visited me. . . . The beauty of the superman came to me like a shadow; what am I concerned any more about the Gods?”

The implications of this confession offer an excellent opportunity for ridicule—and the opportunity has been taken more than once. Nietzsche who cannot believe in God because the belief would have frustrated his generative lust; Nietzsche whom the laurels of the Almighty would not let sleep and who wants to do some divine creating himself. But the ways of the Lord are inscrutable. The spirit of Santayana could achieve its disillusionsment and its harmony with the world because it was permitted to traverse the *Dark Night* described by Saint John of the Cross. Nietzsche yearned for this night but he was denied the passage. In the context of the *Ecce Homo* from which we have taken the confession, Nietzsche also resumes the *Song of the Night* from *Zarathustra*: “Night is now: and now awaken the songs of the lovers. . . . There is a desire for love in me. . . . But I am Light; oh, that I could be Night! But this is my solitude that I am girded with light. . . . I do not know the happiness of him who receives. This is my poverty that my hand cannot rest from giving. . . . It is you, the dark ones, who create warmth out of light. . . . But ice is around me, and my hand burns with the touch of ice! . . . Night it is now: oh, that I have to be Light.”

There is nothing here of “Wotanistic” experiences; this is the voice of the Christian spiritual who suffers deeply in the consciousness of his demonic hardening against transcendental reality, the mystic

44. Santayana, *Egotism*, 120.
night is denied to him, he is imprisoned in the icy light of his finite existence, and from this prison rise the plaint and the prayer: "And my soul, too, is the song of a lover."

VI

We have analyzed four positions that can be assumed toward the crisis and the challenge of Nietzsche: (1) The position of the Last Man who lives totally in the crisis and meets the challenge with derision; (2) the suppression of the consciousness of crisis through the projection of evil into the German character; (3) the recognition of the crisis and the undaunted faith in the survival value of the liberal tradition; and (4) the profound understanding of the Nietzschean problem and the resignation in spiritual solitude. The last of these positions, the position of Santayana, is ultimate in the sense that it reflects an immediate mystical experience beyond the crisis. It is not ultimate, however, in the sense that no other fundamental position is possible. Man has to die alone, and the experiences of intellectual mysticisms have their truth in that they anticipate the last solitude of existence. But man has to live in society, and the spiritualization of the life in society has inevitably to grapple with the spirit of the institutions; in this condition of our finite existence originate the experiences that lead to the Platonic attitude. The Platonicism of Nietzsche, however, was both broken and vitiated. It was broken by the despair to find the human substance for a spiritual order of society; and it was vitiated through the unique structure of Nietzsche’s spiritual life; his soul was closed to transcendental experiences and suffered in the vivid consciousness of this demonic limitation. If we formulate Nietzsche’s problem in this manner, the outline of a possible further development becomes visible; the Platonic attitude of Nietzsche can be resumed if a new hope should awaken that the human substance is present that would make possible an overcoming of the crisis “in society,” to use the formula of Santayana, and if the soul of the man who makes the attempt would not be his prison. This man appeared in the person of Stefan George. It is necessary to analyze his judgment on the most violent symptom of the crisis, the Great War of 1914–1918.48

48. For the resumption of Nietzsche’s position on the new level, indicated in the text, see the poem Nietzsche in Der Siebente Ring (1907), Werke, 6–7:12 ff.; and the poem on the “warner” in Der Stern des Bundes (1913), Werke, 8:34. For
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In 1917 George published his poem on The War.9 He felt pressed to do so because people questioned what this respected voice would have to say in the critical hour of the nation. His answer was given in the spirit of Nietzsche: What is now shaking the people with physical violence was long known to him; he suffered when he saw what was coming; the external impact of the catastrophe that is now pressing the others is a symptom of the crisis, not the crisis itself; he is unable to participate, therefore, in the emotions of the people who find out that something is wrong only when they have at last a world war to convince them. What should physical slaughter be to him who has seen the spirit slaughtered? The crying mother and the good, frightened citizen are more responsible for the butchery of their sons than the bullet of the enemy. There is no sense in celebrating victories, for there will be no triumph, only much perishing without dignity. There is no honor in this mechanical destruction, and sacred only is the death of the young manhood. Should he feel exalted by the sacrifices of the nation? But he can see this sacrificial will also on the other side. The true horror is a mankind that oozes welfare and humanity one day and glides into atrocious slaughter the next. And should he expect a spiritual revival from the experience of the war? But there is no greater mistake than to believe that they will come home with a new spirit who left with the old. “Children and fools” call the other man guilty; “rascals and fools” raise the hope of a realm of peace. “In both camps no Idea”—no sensitiveness for what is at stake. On the one side, the German, the envy to share the prosperity of the other, and the burning wish to become themselves thoroughly what they blame the others for being; on the other side, the Allied, the pride of civilizational rank and a great past while the present generation wants nothing but to enjoy the favorable position in comfort. No inkling anywhere that now is breaking down what is ripe to fall; no inkling that perhaps another odium

generis humani will have to rise from the Outcasts to bring again salvation.

The attitude of George and its influence are important in themselves, but in this context we have to confine the analysis to its relation to Nietzsche. The crisis is understood, not as a German, but as a general Western phenomenon; the war is a symptom, and because it is a symptom it is a “war of the spirits.” In George’s prediction of the war we find the lines:

Ten thousand must be struck by holy madness
Ten thousand must be reft by holy plague
Ten thousand by the holy war.

The war is “holy,” not because any intrinsic value attaches to warlike events, but because the war is the execution of a judgment passed on a guilty mankind, because mankind is expiating through it a common guilt. The symbols of George are not Christian, but there is alive in him the sense of the sacramental unit of Western mankind. The German national substance has a function in this conception of the crisis only insofar—and that is the point where George goes beyond Nietzsche—as he sees, hidden under the spiritual disintegration and the horrors of the age, healthy forces that hold a promise for the future.

VII

George is the only great figure of the last generation who can be said to have entered into the spirit of Nietzsche, not in contemplative understanding, but as the continuator of his task. Hence a knowledge of George’s position is invaluable as a safeguard against, and a measure for, the gross misuse of Nietzsche’s work that is implied in the interpretation as Nietzschean of precisely those attitudes which he condemned. The principal lines of such misuses have been drawn by Jaspers: Nietzschean ideas serve the ressentiment

51. For the conception of such forces, see Der Krieg, last two stanzas, Das Neue Reich, Werke, 9:33 ff. For the interpretation of Christ, see Gespräch des Herrn mit dem Römischen Hauptman, ibid., 77 ff.; the Gespräch resumes the symbolism of Nietzsche (der Christ im Tanz). For the mystical experience in which the Platonism of George has its roots, see Geheimes Deutschland, Werke, 9:59 ff., particularly stanzas VI and VII: “Einst lag ich am südmeer / Tief-vergrämt wie der Vorfahr . . .,” which marks the departure from the despair of Nietzsche (der Vorfahr).
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which, by denigrating others, gives relief to its impotence; they serve the violence, which uses the idea of the will to power for the justification of brutality; the antispirtualism, which glorifies vitality; and the hypocrisy which uses Nietzsche’s conception of truth in illusion as a permission to lie.\(^5\) The question of the misuse has become of more than ordinary importance because Nietzsche is today interpreted generously as a Founding Father of National Socialism, by the critics who wish to stigmatize him by this relation as well as by National Socialists who wish to acquire a dignified intellectual ancestry for their movement. The motives of the critics have been discussed in the earlier sections of this article; the motives of the National Socialists are obvious.\(^5\) What deserves some attention, however, is the fact that Nietzsche’s work lends itself easily to such misinterpretations. This fact should not be denied. There is no sense in pretending that the horror passages, which are quoted with equal delight by the critics and by the National Socialist admirers, are not to be found in the work. Their existence should not be an incentive either to whitewash or to condemn Nietzsche, but rather to explore the structure of thought that produced them. The examination of a sample passage will perhaps serve best the elucidation of this problem. In the *Will to Power* we find the following aphorism: \(^5\)

A question keeps coming back to us, a tempting and evil question perhaps. . . . Would not the time have come, now that the type “herd-animal” is developing ever more in Europe, to try and begin with a clear-principled, artificial and conscious *breeding* of the opposite type and its virtues? And would it not even be for the democratic movement itself a kind of goal, salvation and justification, if someone appeared who would put it to his *service*—if at last its new and sublime perfection of slavery (for that is what European democracy will be in the end) would be complemented by that higher species of ruling and Caesarian spirits who would place itself on top of it, who would take hold of it, who would elevate itself by means of it? Toward new, hitherto impossible, to *their* visions? To *their* tasks?

Here is a rich source that can be drawn upon by the democrat in search of indignation as well as by the National Socialist in search

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53. An excellent survey of Nietzsche’s “influence,” particularly on National Socialism, is given by Professor Crane Brinton in *Nietzsche* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941); see especially the chapter on “Nietzsche and the Nazis,” 200–231.


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of ancestry. The background of this passage is formed through the analysis of nihilism and of a despiritualized society. But the great qualities of this empirical analysis are vitiated by the entirely superfluous choice of the term slavery for the designation of the democratic movement. The application of the Greek term to the modern situation is inappropriate because it overlooks the fact that Western civilization and the democratic movement, in particular, contain as a positive force—however diluted and weak it may have become—the Christian idea of the singularity and spiritual dignity of the human soul. Nietzsche is unrestrained in the use of such inappropriate deprecatory language when he speaks of certain evils of the age, because he is not touched in his sentiments by the transcendental experiences that are the foundation of the Christian conception of man. If we consider that Nietzsche’s work abounds in crudities, shrillness, and misnomers of this kind, we can understand that the critic who wishes to evade the issues raised by Nietzsche can easily extract from the sixteen volumes the materials for a caricature that makes him forget the sound analysis of the crisis.\footnote{Even a critic like Professor Brinton, who is quite aware that Nietzsche is not the crude figure he must appear if one concentrates attention on choice morsels torn out of the context of the whole work, seems to have been impressed by this potentiality. In his treatise on Nietzsche he arrives at the verdict: “Nietzsche, like the Nazi leaders, was never really housebroken” (231).}

The prognostication of “ruling and Caesarian spirits” who will complement the democratic movement, on the other hand, is the result of Nietzsche’s vitiated Platonism, of his insistence on creating an image out of his ordering will, though the two indispensable ingredients, the light of the transcendental idea and the faith in the social substance, are missing. Hence, the image of the ruling type becomes a weird concoction of danger, hardness, violence, street fights, inequality of rights, temptations, and deviltry, for which Nietzsche can give no better reason than that it is “the opposite of all herd-wishes \(\text{Heerden-Wünschbarkeiten}\).”\footnote{For the catalogue of elements see \textit{Wille zur Macht}, \textit{Werke}, 16:338.} It would ask too much of a National Socialist to recognize the purely oppositional character and the substantial emptiness of the type and to investigate why such a curious image should appear in Nietzsche’s work at all. He will avail himself rather of the opportunity to refer the prediction to himself and, besides, he will overlook that for the production of the new type Nietzsche reckons with a period of such length—and here again we have to take him more seriously—that
in proportion to it “the duration of one human life means almost nothing” — so that, by this calculation, he cannot very well be the type that Nietzsche had in mind.

VIII

The interpretations of Nietzsche’s political conceptions are chiefly concerned with his so-called “influence” and with the relation of his ideas to later political events. Interpretation in retrospect is quite legitimate in itself, but it becomes unrealistic if we forget that Nietzsche was concerned not so much with our actual present, about which he knew nothing, but rather with a perspective of the future as it revealed itself to him in his own present. The preoccupation with the wars of the twentieth century has led to a serious neglect of Nietzsche’s concern about the wars of his own age and their results. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 was decisive for the hope for a cultural regeneration of Germany, which Nietzsche held in the early 1870s; and the disappointment caused by the development of German society after the war and by the politics of Bismarck was equally decisive for his change of attitude after 1876 and for his fanatical hatred of the chancellor. We must now consider briefly the main aspects of the German situation that entered into the political conceptions of Nietzsche.

The consolidation of the Atlantic powers in the seventeenth century and the rise of Russia since Peter the Great had produced by the middle of the eighteenth century a political situation for the German territories that seemed to remove the German center of Europe forever from the scene of great-power politics. Let us recall some of the historical events determining the atmosphere in

57. Ibid., 338 ff.
58. A new and unexpected source of misinterpretation has been opened through the English translation of Nietzsche’s works, The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche, ed. Oscar Levy, 18 vols. (Edinburgh: T. N. Foulis, 1909–1914). The translators have taken some liberties with the text. The above quoted Aphorism 954 from Will to Power, for instance, closes in the translation of the Collected Works with the sentence: “This new race would climb aloft to new and hitherto impossible things, to a broader vision, and to its task on earth.” Professor Brinton, who uses this translation, has built on this sentence the conjecture: “ ‘Race’ suggests [to Nazi leaders] that they [the ruling spirits] are fairly numerous, and that all Germans may ‘climb aloft’ over the inferior peoples without the Gospel” [Nietzsche, 213]. Unfortunately race is an addition of the translators, it does not appear in Nietzsche’s text. Loose translation of this sort is all too frequent in the Collected Works; it should be clear that they are not usable for scholarly purposes.
which the problems of Nietzsche were shaped. The new pattern of politics became discernible in the Third Silesian War (1756–1763): a war between England and France that gave Prussia a moderate freedom of movement; a speculation on the part of Frederick II that the effective organization of the Russian offensive power would come too late; then the Russian danger, which took the form of an agreement between Austria and Russia (1757) for the partition of the Prussian monarchy; the burning of Berlin by the Russians in 1760; a desperate situation that was solved by a change of regime in Russia in 1762. The next generation witnessed the integration of the German territories into the Napoleonic empire and the French spheres of influence, followed by a rescue through Napoleon’s disaster in Russia. The post-Napoleonic period disappointed the hopes of liberalization and national unification, and at decisive junctures of national politics we again find foreign interventions. The Schleswig-Holstein question, which arose in 1848, could not be solved satisfactorily from the point of view of German national interests because England and Russia wished to prevent a Prussian expansion to the North Sea and to the entrance of the Baltic; and the status of the two predominantly German provinces was temporarily settled by the London Conference of 1852, in which France, England, and Russia participated. The attempt to form a Prussian Union in 1849 was ultimately frustrated by the threat of Russia to side with Austria in the clash over Hesse in 1850; and the adventure ended in the so-called Humiliation of Olmütz. The three wars of Bismarck, finally, were conducted in the shadow of a Russian neutrality, which the minister-president had secured through his support of Russia in the Polish Insurrection of 1863. By the middle of the nineteenth century an anxiety and bitterness seems to have gripped some of the best German minds, which we can sense in a diary note of Friedrich Hebbel, of 1860: “It is possible that the German will disappear some day from the world-scene, for he has all qualities to gain heaven but not a single one to hold his own on earth; and all nations hate him like the wicked the good. If, however, they should really succeed in removing him, a situation will arise where they would like to scratch him out of his grave with their nails.”

The expression of such anxiety is not confined to occasional notes. In 1853, Bruno Bauer, the neo-Hegelian theologian, published his book, *Russia and the Germanic World*, in which he developed in systematic form the problem of Western politics that had been created by the rise of Russia, anticipating some ideas of Dostoevsky.\(^6\) Bauer recognized that the Hegelian philosophy of history and of the state marked an epoch. Hegel was the last philosopher who could interpret politics from an exclusively Western orientation. A relation of the Germanic world to Russia did not yet exist for the German national idealists, though Catherine had established even by the time of Kant a continental dictatorship that surpassed in power and influence the dominating positions of Charles V of Spain and Louis XIV of France. The new question is whether the Germanic world will survive the decline of the old civilization,\(^6\) whether the new age will be called the Russian only, or the Germanic-Russian. The Germanic question is secondary in this pattern because Russia is already so powerful that she can determine the hour of decision. The symptom of the Western decline is to be seen in the exhaustion of its metaphysical powers; with Hegel the supremacy of the metaphysician over the sciences has come to its end. It is no mere coincidence that the end of Western metaphysics occurs at the moment when the entirely unmetaphysical, practical Russian dictatorship rises to power. Intellectual and economic “pauperism” has dissolved the interest in metaphysics; peoples who are concerned with the conquest of nature need the engineer and industrial establishments. Standing armies have become the philosophic schools of modern governments. Imperialistic dictatorships will decide the question, Russia or Europe. The illusion that the time has come when the members of a historic family of nations will peacefully coexist under the principles of equal rights and of self-determination, which manifests itself in the idea of international peace congresses, will soon learn by experience that the individualistic conceptions of the revolutionary age have their inevitable complement in the


\(^{61}\) “Der Untergang der alten Civilisation.” The conception is somewhat older than Spengler’s.
iron discipline of new dictatorships. The destruction of the old associations and estates has liberated the individual for nothing but a new and more comprehensive centralization. In the interlude between the dissolution of the old and the establishment of a new order, the contemporaries are individuals without orientation, living in the erroneous belief that discontent with the present is a power pregnant with a future. The proper philosophical position in this historic moment of the crisis is abstention from the politics of the day. Like the early Christians who withdrew from the empire and waited for their future, so will all those who are the bearers of an idea beyond the moment estrange themselves from the powers that be.

Nietzsche does not seem to have known Bauer's book, but the two men were in substantial agreement. In a publication of 1880, on Bismarck's Era, Bauer praised Nietzsche and recommended his works to Treitschke, who, by studying them, might elevate himself “beyond the limitations of his particularistic ecstasies.” When Bauer wrote the leading article for the first issue of Schweitzer's Internationale Monatsschrift, in 1882, Nietzsche suggested in a letter to Peter Gast that Bauer’s conception of “Europeanism” (Europäertum) “with the perspective of an annihilation of the nationalities” might be his. While there is substantial agreement between the earlier position of Bauer and that of Nietzsche, the accents of politics have shifted somewhat after the Franco-Prussian War. Bauer had thought that the national power politics of Europe had reached its end; that the real political problem was common to Europe (or, in his terminology, to the Germanic world); and that the change had been effected through the rise of Russia. To this extent Nietzsche agrees with Bauer. The unification of Germany had, however, introduced a new element of hope for Europe into the atmosphere; while Bauer could see only the alternatives of a Russian age or a Germanic-Russian at best, Nietzsche’s first idea is that of a European age beyond nationalism; second, the possibility of a German-Slavic alliance; and third only, the idea of a Russian supremacy over Europe.

63. Briefe an Peter Gast, February 5, 1882, p. 80.
Under the title of a European Age, Nietzsche envisages the possibility that out of the agony of the national states will arise a new type of European who has overcome the allegiance to a particular fatherland. The development toward this type is understood on the spiritual level, not as an event in power politics. Nietzsche makes his sarcastic remarks about people who call the union of German governments in one state a “big idea”; they are the same people who would call the United States of Europe a still “bigger idea.”

Equally senseless would be the forceful unification through one of the great powers. But the idea of a spiritually united Europe has to be seen in its relation to Russia. It would be conceivable that the “disease of the will” has progressed in the Western nations already so far that a spiritual regeneration is out of the question. Worst in this respect is probably France, while England can play her present role hardly even fifty years longer. The failure of the Atlantic powers would imply the end of Europe and leave Germany alone to face the Russian question. That France would be finished in this event not only spiritually but also as a power, Nietzsche seems to take for granted. For England the failure would mean that she would cease to have a function as a member of the historic European family of nations, once the family is disbanded under the Russian pressure; England would pass into the category of the “Anglo-Saxon powers”; for power, not any more in the sense of great-power politics of the past, but of the future order, “is divided between the Slavs and the Anglo-Saxons.” The failure of England would not destroy her, but it would spell the doom of the European idea. The fate of Germany would be sealed, too; the question can only be whether Russia will dominate Europe completely, or whether a German-Slavic alliance in domination is possible. Sometimes Nietzsche gives way to the gloomier view: “Russia must become the master of Europe and Asia. . . . Europe as a Hellas under the rule of Rome.” For the position of the “small states” of Europe, including Germany, is untenable, if for no other reason than that

65. Ibid., 139.
67. Unveröffentlichtes aus der Umwerthungszeit I, Werke, 13:358, written in the middle 1880s; fifty years later would carry us into the 1930s.
68. Ibid., 360.
69. Ibid., 359.
in our time they are too small as economic units. Russia, on the other hand, is rich in potentialities. Here is a people still close to barbarism, with the generosity of youth, a fantastical madness, and real willpower. It is a people with a long breath, “the advantage of the Church, as of Russia, is: both can wait.” If an alliance could be achieved, the inexhaustible willpower of the Slavs would presage a German-Slavic power of global importance; “what we need, is the unconditional cooperation with Russia.” But this is the second choice. It would be more desirable if the Russian menace became so strong that it would cause a change of sentiment in Europe and produce the European unification in spirit and will. Much more regrettable would be the removal of the Russian menace so that the European misery would be permitted to linger on indefinitely. But the disappearance of the Russian power would require a coincidence of events that is not to be expected: that Russia would be involved in troubles in Asia, and at the same time internal revolutions would occur that would result in a disintegration of the empire into independent states, that in addition parliamentarism would be introduced and everybody would be compelled to read a newspaper with his breakfast.

The passages cited all belong to the period after 1876. The effect of the unification of Germany can still be felt in them insofar as the general outlook is not quite so pessimistic as that of Bruno Bauer; but the first hopes raised by the Franco-Prussian War have disappeared. Nietzsche had seen in the military qualities, displayed by Germany in 1870, the symptoms of forces that would promise a regeneration of German civilization. These hopes were frustrated. The evolution of German society went in the direction of the

70. Ibid., 357.
73. Ibid., 356.
74. Ibid., 355.
76. Ibid., 155. A good survey of the variants of Nietzsche’s political speculation is to be found in Jaspers, Nietzsche, 235 ff.
77. It would be worthwhile to inquire monographically into the influence of more recent wars on the hopes of political thinkers for civilizational regeneration. I can point here only to the impression that the Franco-Prussian War made on Albert Sorel, suggesting his conception of “factory discipline” as a force, equivalent to the Prussian military discipline, which promises success for the labor movement, and to the influence of the Japanese discipline in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 on the Italian nationalism of Corradini.
vainglorious nationalism of the liberal middle-class type, with an exuberance of vulgarity that made the 1870s and 1880s a low point of German civilizational history. The horror of, and wrath at, this evolution, and the increasing hatred of Bismarck who did not resist it, mark the second phase of Nietzsche’s work. We shall select a few passages, in chronological order, that illustrate the development of Nietzsche’s sentiments.

In the *Joyful Science*, of 1882, we find Aphorism 377, entitled “We Men without a Country.” The men without a country are those Europeans who cannot accept the ideals of “this breakable, broken transitional period” and who, at the same time, cannot believe in the durability of the new “realities.” Neither do they consider desirable a realm of justice and peace on this earth as it appears in the dreams of the “liberals,” for it would imply an abject mediocrity and “Chinaism”; nor can they accept the *Realpolitik* of German nationalism, for that would imply the enjoyment of “the nationalistic heart-scabies and blood poisoning” that induces the European peoples to erect quarantine barriers against each other. The men without a country have to seek the solitude of the mountains in order to escape the silent wrath they would experience if they would have to see at too-close quarters the type of politics that makes the German spirit barren by making it vain. On this occasion Nietzsche calls the new *Realpolitik* deliberately “little politics” in order to tear up the abyss that separates it from the *Grosse Politik* (Great Politics) that it pretends to be; he prepares at the same time to appropriate the term *Great Politics* for his own conception of spiritual politics.

*Beyond Good and Evil*, of 1886, brings the direct attack on Bismarck in Aphorism 241.79

He thinks and knows as much of philosophy as a peasant or a fraternity-student [Corpsstudent], he is still innocent. But what does it matter! This is the age of the masses: they lie on their stomachs before everything that is massy. And just so in politics. A statesman who builds them some new Tower of Babel, some monster of empire and power, they call “great”: what does it matter that we, the more cautious and restrained, have not yet relinquished the old belief that it is only the great idea that lends greatness to a deed or cause.

To see the German people occupied with “Great Politics” and with nationalism is a perversion of the best German tradition; why

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should a statesman be called great who has inflicted this misfortune on his people? The posthumous fragments of this period balance the judgment somewhat insofar as Nietzsche recognizes the conservatism, sturdiness, shrewdness, ruthlessness, and cunning of Bismarck also as positive qualities, at least to the extent that he considers them superior to the flat, despiritualized liberalism of his surroundings. Nevertheless, the ultimate judgment seems to be even in the unpublished fragments: “Let us hope that Europe will soon produce a great statesman, and that he who is celebrated as the ‘great realist’ in this petty age of plebeian shortsightedness will be revealed as small.”

With the aggressive outbreak of 1888, finally, Nietzsche enters the political scene himself. The writings from the Fall Wagner to the Ecce Homo are no longer on the level of a critique of the age; they are a supreme act of self-presentation by which Nietzsche places himself on the world-scene as the antagonist of Wagner and Bismarck, as the dominating figure of the age to whom the honors and the following are due which incongruously are accorded to the false apostles: “I am a bringer of good tidings as there never has been one; I know tasks of a loftiness that the very idea of them has been missing as yet; only from me onward, there are hopes again.”

This passage in which he announces himself as the bearer of the new Gospel after Christ, is followed by the earlier quoted formulation of the “war of the spirits” and by the prediction of wars as there never have been wars. The Aphorism closes with the sentence: “Only from me onward is there on earth Great Politics.” The conception of Great Politics is transferred in this operation, which has the touch of a magical murder, from the sphere of Bismarck to the sphere of Nietzsche; Nietzsche has replaced Bismarck as the master of Great Politics.

In speaking of the general history of political ideas, we have in mind the field that is represented with distinction by such treatises as that of Dunning, or McIlwain, or Sabine, or Cook. The problems of this field and their further development are of specific importance for American scholars. For while the monographic literature on the various phases of this history is international in scope, the general history as such is almost an American monopoly from its beginnings. When Dunning published the first volume of his *History of Political Theory* in 1901, Janet’s *Histoire de la science politique dans ses rapports avec la morale* was the only noteworthy competitor. Janet’s *Histoire*, however, as Dunning rightly remarked, stresses primarily the development of ethical doctrine; and that was precisely the field that Dunning wished to avoid in order to isolate clearly the development of political, as distinguished from ethical, theory. A science, however, that may be said to have begun with Dunning’s work is a young science; and as happens with young sciences, a field is staked out, while the details are far from being settled. They are even less settled today than at the time of Dunning, because the last two generations have witnessed a prodigious enlargement of our knowledge of historical materials and, at the same time, there has occurred a serious revision of our views concerning the structure of history. It will be advisable, therefore, to begin with a few remarks on the ways in which the development

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of historical science has affected the more special problems of a general history of political ideas.

The historians of political ideas have followed, on the whole, the “straight-line” pattern of history, according to which the history of mankind moves in continuity through the ancient, modern, and medieval phases. The idea that human history moves along a straight line is by origin a theological conception, deriving its strength from the Christian belief that mankind moves through a sequence of meaningful phases according to a providential plan of salvation. The pattern was established by the early Christian philosophy of history, in the period from the letters of Saint Paul to the *Civitas Dei* of Saint Augustine. Its empirical usefulness in the postmedieval period was largely dependent on the chance that the medieval spiritual and intellectual contraction of the historical horizon to the Western world would be continued; the belief in the straight line could be maintained as long as the independent parallel histories of non-Western mankind were simply overlooked and the pre-classic civilizations were practically unknown.

By naming the conditions for the maintenance of the linear pattern, we have indicated the sources of its disturbance. The disturbances are connected with the successive breaches made in the closed medieval horizon. The first, and hitherto most important, irruption of new materials—that of classic antiquity—was digested with comparative ease. The straight-line pattern was simply shifted from sacred history in the Augustinian sense to a new profane history. In the practice of writing history, this meant that the Israelitic history as the Western prehistory was relegated to a second plane and replaced by Hellenic history, and that, furthermore, the Middle Ages slipped into the category of the “Dark Ages.” But the ease was comparative only. It is forgotten today that not all humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries swallowed without resistance Greco-Roman antiquity as the linear prehistory of the Renaissance. The contemporary Near Eastern events were sufficiently impressive to suggest a construction of profane history on the pattern of parallel streams. We have letters of Poggio in which he shows himself sick and tired of the glory that was Greece and Rome and ranks the military and political achievements of Tamerlane higher than those of Caesar; and Louis LeRoy understood the conquests of Tamerlane as the decisive event that opened the new period.
of the Renaissance politically and civilizationally. The impression of Asiatic politics, as the model of what politics might be on a grand scale, was considerable at the time; but this tendency to give meaning to the structure of Western history by orienting it toward the parallel Asiatic events was superseded by the shift of the center of politics to the Atlantic, with the discovery of the sea routes and of America. The linear pattern remained afterward fairly intact to the time of Hegel.

The generation after Hegel had to grapple again with the problem of parallel, non-Western developments. The first decisive document of the new situation is Bruno Bauer’s treatise on Russland und das Germanentum, in 1853; the rise of Russia began to influence our picture of European history as one of several parallel streams. The revisionary movement was accelerated by the gradually increasing knowledge of the Near Eastern pre-classic and of the Far Eastern civilizations. The integration of the new knowledge in a work that gained wide popularity, in Spengler’s Decline of the West, did not meet with complete approval, because Spengler, setting aside the dilettantisms in detail, was so eager to demonstrate the plurality of civilizational histories that he overreached the mark and neglected the fact that some of these civilizations are not isolated from each other but are related by the transmission of a considerable civilizational heritage. The linear pattern had to be qualified by insight into the internal cyclical structure of civilizational histories, but it still was empirically applicable to a stream of meaning running in continuity through Greco-Roman antiquity and the Middle Ages into the modern West; and that stream of meaning was revealed as originating even farther back in the pre-classic Near Eastern civilizations. The revised pattern of history is today used in Toynbee’s A Study of History, of which six volumes have been published [by 1944].

In what manner do these changes in the pattern of political history affect the history of political ideas? The answer will depend on our definition of the political ideas of which we intend to write a history and of their relation to the political environment in which they grow. A first answer to these questions could be the assumption that the history of political ideas does not show an internal structure of meaning at all, and that, as a consequence, the historian can do nothing but record ideas concerning political problems in their chronological order. The result would not be a history, if by
history we understand the unfolding of a pattern of meaning in
time, but a chronological encyclopedia. This assumption has hardly
ever been made on principle, but in practice we sometimes find
an approximation to it when a historian’s desire to be complete
becomes stronger than his power to organize a structure of meaning.

Of greater practical importance has been the assumption that
only highly integrated systems of thought, like the Platonic, the
Aristotelian, the Thomistic, are of real historical significance be-
cause only in instances of this type do political thinkers approach a
treatment of their topic that can be called scientific. We can make
the degree of scientific achievement the standard by which to mea-
sure the relevance of a system of thought. If we make this assump-
tion, the pattern of political history would have little bearing on the
pattern of a history of political ideas. A tendency in this direction
is discernible in Janet’s Histoire. It originated in a study comparing
the moral and political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle with that
of modern publicists. The result was the conception of a “true”
system of political thought, holding the middle between Platonic
moral absolutism and Machiavellian amoral, political technicism.
The true middle is represented by the ideas of the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which considers it the function
of the state to provide the framework in which man can develop
his moral destiny as a free agent. The history of politics since 1500
shows progress in the desired direction. A consistent application of
this principle would have required the elimination of all materials
that cannot be integrated in a line of progress toward the ideal aim.
But such consistency is not to be found in Janet any more than
in other historians who make similar assumptions of an absolute
standard of political thought. Janet plods conscientiously through
history from ancient times to the French Revolution, giving thereby
to his work rather the touch of the chronological encyclopedia. The
encyclopedic character is particularly marked because the part on
classic antiquity, which opens the treatise proper, is preceded by a
“preliminary chapter” on China and India, for no other good reason
than that the Chinese and Hindus exist; an integration of the Far
Eastern body of thought into a general pattern of history is not
attempted.

The work of Dunning marks a tremendous advance of methodo-
logical consciousness over Janet. Dunning uses the term political
theory in order to distinguish his principle of selection from Janet’s
"political science." Political theory is every scrap of idea, whether integrated into a scientific system or not, that tends to explain the origin, nature, and scope of the authority of rulership. This wide definition could cover the ideas concerning authority among primitive tribes as well as those produced in the vast stretches of history between the great systematic thinkers. Dunning restricts, however, this liberal definition by confining the meaning of political theory more narrowly to those theories that presuppose the idea of a "state," as distinguished from the family and the clan. By this restriction he is enabled to eliminate from the field the ideas of primitives, while retaining all nonsystematized theories that deal with the phenomenon of political authority, as for instance, mentioned specifically, the theories of Burke and American political theory. The substitution of "theory" for "science" has, moreover, the advantage of breaking with the prejudice "that formal political science is more a cause than a result of objective political history." A theory is important, not because of the scientific insight that it embodies, but because it is in touch with "the current of institutional development." Hence, the historian of theory will have to depart on occasion entirely from the literary expressions of theory and to interpret the theoretical content of institutions themselves if no other source is available. The history of theory thus is subordinated for its pattern to the structure of political history—with an exception, however, which we have to discuss presently. The pattern of history will be decisive, therefore, for the historians who follow the principles inaugurated by Dunning.

The weak point of Dunning's History is the Middle Ages. The weakness is due to Dunning's conception of "progress" in political history. By progress in politics, he understands the differentiation of an autonomous sphere of politics and the disentanglement of political conceptions proper from ethical, theological, legal, and other contexts. Such differentiation was achieved by the Greeks (in Dunning's opinion); and it was again achieved in modern history. Political theory is largely an account of this progress; when such progress ceases, the history of political theory ceases. On these grounds, Dunning can eliminate Far Eastern theory from the field, which does little damage to the project of a history of Western political theory because the connections, if any, are thin; but he also eliminates the Near Eastern pre-classic history, which does considerable damage, because a good deal of Western political thought
The worst, however, was that he eliminated the Middle Ages. His assumption compelled him to declare: “The Middle Age was unpolitic.” Medieval theory is political only insofar as it is concerned with the separation of church and state. “Medieval political philosophy is in fact exhausted when it has propounded a theory as to the relation of secular to ecclesiastical authority.” This sweeping statement that the Middle Age was devoid of political history, except insofar as the state was separated from the church, was hardly tenable in 1901, when it was made; it certainly is not acceptable today. The definition of politics has to be revised in such a manner that we can deal adequately, not only with the later phases of civilizations that show the differentiation of spheres, considered progressive by Dunning, but also with the equally important early phase of a civilizational cycle, in which the temporal power, as in the Middle Ages, is considered one order in the embracing mystical body of Western Christian mankind. The elimination as irrelevant of a phase of history that is in direct and broad continuity with our own, because its structure of political ideas differs from ours, cannot be justified by any standards of scientific method.

The weakness of Dunning’s History has been corrected, on principle, by Professor Sabine’s History of Political Theory, published in 1937. Professor Sabine adopts Dunning’s principle that political theory is a function of politics and that, therefore, the pattern of a history of theory has to follow the pattern of political history. He does not adopt, however, the principle of “progress.” “The substitution of the belief that there is a determinate order of evolution or historical progress for the belief in rational self-evidence displaced an unverifiable idea with one still less verifiable.” Neither the conception of an ethically right order, like Janet’s, is admissible as a standard of selection from this position, nor an arbitrarily restrictive conception of politics like Dunning’s. The historian has to follow with impartial loyalty the structure of theory as it reveals itself in history, whether it reflects the problems of a differentiated sphere of politics, or whether it reflects an undifferentiated complex of community order including “morals, economics, government, religion, and law.” Applying these principles to the historical materials, Professor Sabine has organized them into three great parts: the Theory of the City-State; the Theory of the Universal Community (from Alexander to the end of the Middle Ages); and the Theory of
the National State. With the elaboration of this methodological position, the problem of principles has come to a rest. The structure of a history of political theory is unconditionally subordinated to the structure of political history. From the acceptance of this principle follow the problems that today are the main concern of the historian of political theory: He has to be clear, first of all, about the pattern of history he wishes to adopt as the basis for the organization of his materials (Toynbee’s pattern, or perhaps another one); and, second, he is faced by the never-ending concrete task of classifying and adequately integrating the richly flowing stream of new materials.

II

If we accept the principle elaborated in the preceding section, a number of problems will arise from the necessity of harmonizing the history of theory with political history. The following remarks will suggest some points at which such harmony is not yet achieved. The pattern of history presupposed in these suggestions is principally determined by Toynbee’s *A Study of History* and by the studies contained in the *Cambridge Ancient* and *Cambridge Medieval Histories*. The reader should be warned again, however, not to mistake these modest, casual remarks for a presumptuous list of desiderata for a general history of theory; they simply draw attention to the more or less obvious fact that we possess on the one hand a wealth of monographic studies on special phases of political theory, that we possess on the other hand a knowledge of political history far surpassing the knowledge of a generation ago, and that the historian of political theory, as a consequence, has the fascinating opportunity of trying his hand at bringing the two complexes of knowledge together. This is hardly a feat to be achieved by one man at one stroke; the cooperative efforts of a great number of scholars will be necessary to produce an adequate solution. But we can at least approach the task by pointing to some problems that are typical of the wide field that is opening. The following enumeration of such problems, in chronological order, should not be taken for anything but a list of examples.

1. Our knowledge of the Near Eastern pre-classic civilizations and of the Hellenistic period is now sufficiently advanced to make it clear that a history of theory can no longer legitimately begin with Hellenic theory. It is duly recognized that the theory of the *polis*
ends with Aristotle, and that with Alexander and the Stoa a new type of theory makes its appearance. But there is still some hesitation in recognizing the continuity of the imperial Hellenistic period with non-Hellenic Near Eastern imperial history. Such recognition would entail a resolute break with the linear pattern of history and the construction of the Hellenistic period as an amalgamation of the Near Eastern and Hellenic streams of history. The Mesopotamian, Persian, and Egyptian theory would have to be accepted as a body of thought on an equal footing with the Hellenic, and it would have to be treated with equal thoroughness. The break with the linear pattern of history, however, is not the only reason that would cause some hesitation. The recognition of ancient Near Eastern history would also require a break with the widely accepted conception of political theory as a theory concerned with the explanation of governmental authority. The problems of governmental authority dominate the scene only in those phases of civilization in which the political communities themselves are established and taken for granted. In the initial phases of civilizational cycles, the problems of the community substance, of its creation, its delimitation, and its articulation are of equal importance with the problems of source and scope of governmental authority; and the same is true for the periods of political crisis, as for instance the present, when the problems of spiritual disintegration and regeneration, and of the community-creating political myth, come to the fore. The adaptation of the history of political theory to the process of politics would require a well-elaborated theory of the ideas concerned with the mythical creation of communities, and of the far-reaching theological ramifications of these ideas. The task is formidable, but not hopeless. We are well equipped today with easily accessible sources, like the translations of Babylonian, Assyrian, and Egyptian sources, published by the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago; and we possess a wealth of monographic literature, within which should be mentioned, as of particular usefulness to the historian of theory, the great study on the Ancient Orient by Alfred Jeremias.

[2] The formulation of a concept of political theory that will permit us to subsume the phenomena of rising communities, as well as those of the established ones, is perhaps the most important general task. It is indispensable for a more realistic treatment even of systems of thought that seem to be well understood by now, like
the late Hellenic. Again, the problem as such is fully recognized. We know that Plato marks, not the beginning, but the end, of Hellenic theory; and we know that his political philosophy is a theory, not of the *polis*, but of the lethal crisis of the *polis*. Nevertheless, the understanding of Plato’s philosophy as an attempt at a spiritual reform of Hellas and as an attempt to create a new community substance leaves much to be desired, because the theoretical apparatus that would be necessary for a thoroughgoing analysis of this question is insufficiently developed. Help can be found again in the monographic literature, particularly in the works of Friedemann and Hildebrandt which accentuate this aspect of Platonic theory.

(3) The treatment of the Roman imperial period will have to undergo a complete revision. The later volumes of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, published in the 1930s, have for the first time put at the disposition of the scholar who is not a specialist in Roman history a digest of the otherwise almost inaccessible materials for a history of Roman imperial theory. In addition, there should be mentioned the great monograph on the principate by von Premerstein, which gives new insights into the sacramental coherence of the early empire through the oath to the *princeps*.

(4) The appearance of Christianity raises again the question of the conceptual apparatus for its treatment. The cautious evasion of religious problems and of the creation of the mystical body of Christ is untenable. If we dodge the question of the *pneuma* of Christ and of its function as the substance of the Christian community, nothing is left of Christianity but the reception of Stoic ethical and legal theory, a few remarks concerning the recognition of temporal authority, and the hierarchy of functions. The substance has disappeared. As a consequence, the struggle between Christianity and the counterreligion of paganism in the late Roman empire becomes quite as unintelligible as the community problem of the Middle Ages. It will not do to eliminate from the field of political theory the theory of the community within which the structural political problems arise by classifying it as religious. Precisely the so-called nonpolitical ideas, as for instance the eschatological sentiments and ideas, are the great source of political fermentation and revolution throughout Western history to this day.

(5) Great difficulties have to be overcome in the treatment of the Middle Ages. Let us first isolate one of the more manageable problems, that of the migration period. Dunning was still of the
opinion that we did not know anything about the political theory of the Teutonic tribes which were the active nucleus in the formation of the Western empire and of the later national states. The assertion was hardly true in Dunning’s own time; it is still less true today. We have the histories of the migration period (Jordanis, Isidorus, Paulus Diaconus, etc.) and a wealth of other sources, as well as a rich modern monographic literature. As a result, we can draw today a solid picture of the Teutonic political ideas that have entered as an integral part into the conception of Western kingship. The gap that mars most histories of medieval political theory, as for instance that of the Carlyles, can be closed.

[6] The great problem, however, is a satisfactory organization of medieval materials beginning with the ninth century. We have today two major treatises on the subject, the History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West by the Carlyles and the Sacrum Imperium by Alois Dempf. The two works complement each other admirably; and thanks to them we can see today at least the outlines of a problem and its solution that were rather dark even twenty years ago. The History of the Carlyles is an indispensable, encyclopedic mine of information on a vast body of materials; but it is incomplete insofar as the principles on which it is built did not permit the authors to include the body of literature that concerns the vicissitudes of the medieval community-idea. The most serious gap is probably the omission of the Joachitic and Franciscan spiritual literature, which marks the beginning of the ideas of a Third Realm and of possible new mystical bodies replacing the mystical body of Christ. Dempf’s Sacrum Imperium stresses precisely these aspects of medieval problems, but it is incomplete as a medieval history because it concentrates on the fate of the sacrum imperium and, therefore, cannot give sufficient attention to the growth of the institutions and ideas that resulted in the formation of the national states. Both treatises fail to include the body of literature connected with the sectarian movements. These movements constitute one of the important “parallel” streams of history; it merges with the main Western stream in the Reformation and gives to postmedieval politics one of those supposedly “modern” touches due to the elevation to the main level of civilizational development of political habits and thoughts which in the Middle Ages remained subinstitutional. For these gaps we possess, however, a rich monographic literature, amidst which should be mentioned two great American
contributions: the studies on medieval institutions by Professor McIlwain and the studies on mystical religion by Rufus M. Jones.

This enumeration of examples has not touched upon the great complexes of the Byzantine, Islamic, and Jewish medieval “parallel” histories and their contacts with Western history; nor has it touched upon the problems of harmonization between the histories of theory and of politics that arise for the modern period. But it is hoped that the list has brought out the methodological principle that must guide us in the formulation of our task. The field for research is wide open; there is no lack of problems, only a lack of strength to deal with them all at once.
By *scientism* we shall understand an intellectual movement of which the beginnings could be discerned as early as the second half of the sixteenth century. It is a movement that accompanied the rise of modern mathematics and physics. The splendid advance of the “new science” became the cause of an elation with far-reaching consequences, which, through the centuries, have had a wide range.¹ They began in a fascination with the new science to the point of underrating and neglecting the concern for experiences of the spirit; they developed into the assumption that the new science could create a world view that would substitute for the religious order of the soul;² and they culminated, in the nineteenth century, in the dictatorial prohibition, on the part of scientistic thinkers, against asking questions of a metaphysical nature.³ The results of this development lie before us today in the form of the scientistic creed, which is characterized by three principal dogmas: [1] the assumption that the mathematized science of natural phenomena is a model science to which all other sciences ought to conform; [2] that all realms of being are accessible to the methods

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¹ The term *nuova scienzia* occurs as early as 1537 as the title of a treatise on gunnery by the Italian mathematician Niccolò Tartaglia.
² This phase was reached as early as the middle of the seventeenth century; see Pascal’s reaction against it in *Pensées*, no. 72, Brunschvicg ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1904).
³ The prohibition of metaphysical questions was pronounced by Comte in 1830 in the *Cours de philosophie positive*, vol. 1, First Lecture. Marx issued the same prohibition in *Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte* (1844), in *Marx-Engels historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe*, 1st. ser. (Frankfurt, 1932), 3:124 ff.; Marx’s prohibition is followed by his definition of “socialistic man” as the man who does not ask metaphysical questions (125).
of the sciences of phenomena, and (3) that all reality that is not accessible to sciences of phenomena is either irrelevant or, in the more radical form of the dogma, illusionary. The creed implies two great denials: It denies the dignity of science to the quest for substance in nature, in man and society, as well as in transcendental reality; and, in the more radical form, it denies the reality of substance.

We have sharpened the issue to the antithesis of sciences of phenomena and sciences of substance. On this point we follow the example of Giordano Bruno, who first formulated the issue. In his reaction against undue preoccupation with the mathematizing sciences, he wrote: “Substance and being are separate and independent of quantity; and consequently measure and number are not substance but incidental to substance, not essence but incidental to essence.” “That which is multitude in things is not their essence, not the thing itself but only the appearance presented to the senses, and only at the surface of things.” “He who tries to know the infinite by his sense is like a man who wants to see substance and essence with his eyes; he who would deny everything that is not perceptible to the senses would have to deny in the end his own being and substance.” “The truth starts from the senses, but only as from a weak and very small starting point; it is not in the senses. . . . In the object of the senses it is as in a mirror, in reason it is in the form of argument and discourse, in the intellect in the form of principle and conclusion, and in the spirit it is in its proper and living form.” “Thus differs the vision of the eye from the vision of the spirit, like a seeing mirror from a mirror which does not see; for the spirit is an illuminated and informed mirror, it is both the light and the mirror, and in the spirit the object and the subject of perception are one.”

The core of the problem as discerned by Bruno, that is, the issue of science of phenomena versus science of substance, is still the core of the scientistic problem today. Scientism, defined as the attempt to treat substance (including man in society and history) as if it were phenomenon, is a decisive ingredient in modern intellectual

movements like positivism and neopositivism, and, in particular, in modern political mass movements like Communism and National Socialism. If we read, for instance, a sentence like Lenin’s to the effect that the meaning of history consists in the dialectical transformation of “the thing-in-itself into the thing-for-us, of the essence of things into phenomena,” we have almost to the letter the scientistic inversion of Bruno’s restorative distinction between phenomena and spiritual substance.7

I have thus defined the theoretical issue of scientism. I can now turn to our special problem—the social relevance of scientism as an intellectual attitude, which, first, draws for its social effectiveness on the prestige of mathematized science and, second, uses this effectiveness in the service of antispiritual revolt and for the purpose of civilizational destruction. The importance of scientism in this light has not gone unnoticed.8 But we are still far from a full comprehension of the social and political disaster that scientism has worked and still is working, and we are equally far from a full understanding of the sources from which the movement draws its strength. I intend to explore in the following pages one of the most important sources of scientistic effectiveness, that is, the prestige that has accrued to the scientistic position through the Newtonian system. I shall discuss the scientistic implications of Newton’s concept of absolute space and the philosophical reaction of Berkeley and Leibniz against it. In particular, I shall discuss the debate between Leibniz and Clarke because it had the prototypical result of a theoretical victory for the philosopher and a social victory for the scientist. And finally, I shall apply the result of our analysis to an interpretation of the later course of scientism.

In order to prevent misunderstandings let me stress that I am studying only one of the theoretical sources of scientistic effectiveness, though it may well be the most important one. I am concentrating on the problem of absolute and relative space. The same type of analysis, obviously, would have to be pursued with regard to the categories of time and substance.

The origins of scientism

Relativity from Copernicus to Leibniz

The problem of absolute and relative space did not begin with Newton. As a matter of fact, it has been a perennial problem of philosophy since Hellenic antiquity. For our analysis of the Newtonian problem of absolute space, however, we need not go further back than to the Copernican assumption of the sun as the center of our planetary system. In the theory of Copernicus we can discern the tendency to assume an absolute space of which the sun is the ontologically real center; but this tendency is secondary to the predominant motivation of simplifying the mathematical description of planetary movements. The problems of scientific description and of ontology were clearly distinguished. The issue was well understood in the sixteenth century, and it was carried to its systematic solution before the century’s end. Copernicus justified the revolutionary shift of his system of coordinates from the earth to the sun by explaining the relativity of movement; he made it clear that the “real” movement of two bodies that move relatively to each other is in no way affected by the assumption of one or the other as the origin of the coordinates used for the description of the movement. From the counterposition of a philosophy of politics, Jean Bodin took up this problem in his late work. He saw the point with equal clearness and drew the conclusion that one might as well shift the coordinates back to the earth. Astronomers might prefer the sun as a center because the assumption allowed for a simpler mathematical description; he, as a philosopher of politics and nature, preferred the earth as a center for systematic reasons of his own. Relativity must be taken seriously; if the theory of space as an absolute extension around the earth is a fallacy, the theory of space as an absolute extension around the sun is no less a fallacy. The problem, finally, received its systematic elaboration


10. Bodin, Apologie de René Herpin pour la république de Jean Bodin [s.l. 1608]. We have used this edition; the first edition, however, is dated 1581. The argument is specifically directed against Copernicus, ibid., I, 6, fol. 6 ro. Bodin resumed the discussion in Universae naturae theatrum (Lyons: Apud Iocabum Roussin, typographum regium, 1596), 633.
through Giordano Bruno. Space was for Bruno phenomenally infinite because this infinity is a projection of the form of the human mind; ontologically, in the mind of God, the universe is one and the celestial worlds are not embraced by this oneness, as by a space, for they in their turn embrace oneness as every part of the soul embraces the soul.\footnote{Bruno, \textit{De la causa}, 281.} Bruno’s theory distinguishes between an empirical analysis of space and the infinite form of space that is due to the form of the human mind (the later Kantian transcendental analysis); neither empirical nor transcendental analysis, however, exhausts the problem of space; both must be supplemented by cosmological speculation as the theoretical instrument for its complete formulation. Bruno’s solution needs elaboration and reformulation, but it can hardly be improved on in principle. On the level of empirical science, it has been carried out and confirmed by the theory of relativity with Einstein’s assumption of an unbounded, curved space that runs back into itself.\footnote{Albert Einstein, \textit{Über die spezielle und allgemeine Relativitätstheorie}, 3d and enlarged ed. [Braunschweig: F. Vieweg, 1918], §§ 30–32.} As far as the Copernican problem was concerned, Bruno drew the conclusion that an infinitely closed space has no absolute center; its center is everywhere and nowhere; the choice of the place for the origin of coordinates is arbitrary.\footnote{Bruno, \textit{De la causa}, 281.}

The correctness of the relativistic position still impressed itself on the contemporaries of Newton. Leibniz developed the problem perhaps furthest in the course of his phoronomic studies. Geometry as the logic of mathematics should be supplemented by phoronomy, a general theory of motion, as the logic of physics. The first principle of motion, however, is that the movement of a body can be observed in relation to another body that is assumed to be resting. Movement is a mutual and invertible shift of position of material parts. In any system of bodies that are in relative movement toward each other we can choose one of the bodies as being at rest and refer the movement of the other to the coordinates originating in the “resting” body. Such choice of a resting body for the purpose of description Leibniz calls a “hypothesis”; one of these hypotheses may render a simpler description than the other, but its simplicity does not make the hypothesis “truer.” On principle, all such hypotheses are “equivalent.” The “general law of equivalence” is
Leibniz's formulation of the problem of relativity. The meaning that Leibniz attached to this principle may be gathered from the fact that he wrote a memorandum with the intention of inducing the Curia to admit the Copernican system. He argued that from the point of view of logic there is no opposition between the Copernican and the Ptolemaic systems; the choice of heliocentric or geocentric coordinates is equivalent; the greater descriptive simplicity of the Copernican system does not imply the proposition that the movements as described by it are real in an ontological sense.

Newton's Assumption of Absolute Space

The trend toward a theory of relativity, however, could not unfold at the time because the various aspects of the problem were not yet sufficiently clarified by philosophical analysis. These various aspects are (1) the objectivity of science, its "truth," which is rooted in its method; (2) the empirical view of the world, which results from the application of the method to the partial phenomena of the external world; and (3) the speculative interpretation of the cosmos, which expresses the relation of man to the totality of his world experience. In the physics of the seventeenth century these elements still formed an undifferentiated compound; the speculative element was not yet completely eliminated from method, and as a consequence, the empirical results carried implications that properly belonged to the speculative sphere.

These problems were formidable. Nevertheless, they might have been cleared up quickly; and they were cleared up in principle by Leibniz. The obstacle to a rapid advance toward a theory of relativity in physics arose from the internal problems of the new science. This obstacle was already present in Galileo's theory of motion, but it became fully visible only with Newton's formulation of the general law of gravitation and the consequent elaboration of a general theory of physics in the *Philosophiae naturalis principia*


Newton found it necessary to assume the existence of absolute space and of absolute motion. In the scholium to Definition VIII he stated: “Absolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. . . . Relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses determine by its position to bodies; and which is commonly taken for immovable space.” A bit further on in the scholium he explains the reason for his assumption:

Because the parts of space cannot be seen, or distinguished from one another by our senses, therefore in their stead we use sensible measures of them. For from the positions and distances of things from any body considered as immovable, we define all places; and then with respect to such places, we estimate all motions, considering bodies as transferred from some of those places into others. And so, instead of absolute places and motions, we use relative ones; and that without any inconvenience in common affairs; but in philosophical disquisitions we ought to abstract from our senses, and consider things themselves, distinct from what are only sensible measures of them. For it may be that there is no body really at rest, to which the places and motions of others may be referred.

Newton envisages absolute space as an absolute order of “places”; this order of places is a “primary” system to which motion ultimately can be referred; only “translations out of those places” are truly absolute motions. Since, however, these absolute places cannot be observed by the senses, the question arises to what purpose we should assume their existence? This delicate question Newton covers by his vague reference to “philosophical disquisitions” that make such deeds necessary.

Embarking on such philosophical disquisition, Newton finds that rest and motion, absolute and relative, can be distinguished by their properties, causes, and effects. “It is a property of rest, that bodies really at rest do rest in respect to one another.” This definition of rest holds good in spite of the fact that such absolutely resting bodies, if they exist at all, may only be found in the region of the fixed stars, or even beyond that region, while absolute rest cannot be determined “from the positions of bodies in our region.” While empirical observation does not show any bodies at absolute

16. The following quotations from Newton’s *Principia* are taken from *Sir Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, ed. Florian Cajori (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946).
rest, Newton nevertheless introduces this concept. Here we have tracked down the first serious reason that would induce a physicist to make the assumption of absolute space: He needs the assumption for the purpose of defining rest, and he needs this concept in order to maintain the first law of motion that “every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.” Without the assumption of absolute space no meaning can be given to the notion of absolute rest; and absolute rest was for Newton, as it was for Galileo, a fundamental experience that could not be dispensed with in the formulation of the first law of motion.

The second reason for Newton’s assumption of absolute places was his belief that he could observe cases of motion without change of place. Absolute motion in this sense had to be distinguished from relative motion. The criterion for this distinction is given through observations with regard to centrifugal forces. “The effects which distinguish absolute from relative motion are, [sic] the forces receding from the axis of circular motion. For there are no such forces in a circular motion purely relative, but in a true and absolute circular motion, they are greater or less, according to the quantity of the motion.” An important instance of such effects is the polar flattening of the earth due to centrifugal forces.

**Newton’s Religious Motivation**

In the face of such difficulties the theoretically indicated course would have been to revise the fundamental definitions and to drop the concepts of absolute rest and absolute motion. This is the course actually followed by Mach in the second half of the nineteenth century. Newton, however, did not contemplate this possibility. His insistence on absolute space seems to have been fortified by motives that appear more clearly in the additions to the Latin edition of his *Optics* (1706), as well as in the “Scholium generale” he attached to the second edition of the *Principia* (1713). Newton’s considerations take account of a problem that had been raised in the debate between Descartes and Henry More, Newton’s older friend. Descartes had identified space with matter, as a consequence, the universe was ontologically materialized to the exclusion of a spiritual substance in the cosmos. This outcome had induced More to develop his theory of spatial extension as an infinity that has
existed from eternity, and will exist into eternity, independent of our thought. Since extension is a “real attribute,” a subject for this attribute must exist. This real subject of absolute space, as well as of absolute time, can only be the divine substance that manifests its own infinity in the double infinity of absolute space and time. More was explicit on the religious motivation of his assumption; his intention was to bring God back into the world by the same gate through which Cartesian philosophy tried to shut Him out from it.\textsuperscript{17}

In the \textit{Optics}, Newton gave the most concise formulation of his own position. From the phenomena of nature it follows that “there exists an incorporeal Being, living, intelligent and omnipresent.” This Being uses space “as it were as its sensorium”; and by this sensorium it “sees all things intimately in themselves and perceives them throughout, and in its presence embraces all things present in it.” The sentient and thinking principle within us, on the other hand, can perceive only the images of things by means of its \textit{sensorium}, its little sensorium.\textsuperscript{18} The position of the second edition of the \textit{Principia} does not differ from that in the \textit{Optics}. Let us quote only one passage that communicates the pathos of Newton:

\begin{quote}
As a blind man has no ideas of colors, so have we no idea of the manner by which the all-wise God perceives and understands all things. He is utterly void of all body and bodily figure, and can therefore neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched; nor ought he to be worshipped under the representation of any corporeal thing. . . . We know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final causes; we admire him for his perfections; but we reverence and adore him on account of his dominion; for we adore him as his servants; and a god without dominion, providence and final causes, is nothing else but Fate and Nature. Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could produce no variety of things. All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing. . . . And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearance of things, does certainly belong to Natural Philosophy.\textsuperscript{19}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{18} Newton, \textit{Optics}, Latin ed. [1740], Quaestio XVIII, quoted in Cassirer, \textit{Das Erkenntnisproblem}, 447.

\textsuperscript{19} Newton’s \textit{Mathematical Principles}, ed. Cajori, 545 ff.
The speculations of More and Newton reveal the connection between the new science and the problems of freethinking. The Cartesian materialisation of extension would fill the infinity of space in the universe with matter and its mechanism. There would be no mystery left in the existence of the cosmos: into its remotest recesses the universe would be known as a configuration of matter; God, indeed, would be shut out from His creation. If the nature revealed by the new science was the nature of the cosmos, there was, indeed, no use for the “hypothesis” of God. More’s device for counteracting this tendency through positing the divine substance as the fundamentum of spatial extension was ingenious but fraught with dangers. For a short while the device was able to serve as an argument against atheists and materialists in the literature that tried to prove the existence of God. The very science that at first seemed a danger to religion now furnished the most convincing proof of God. The most important treatise to use this argument was written by Newton’s friend, Samuel Clarke.20

As could be expected the joy did not last long. The attempt to save God by science soon ran into pantheistic difficulties. An omnipresent God who was the spiritual substance underlying phenomenal extension was a bit too present in the world to retain at the same time his “dominion” as the transcendental Lord of creation. Worse, however, than these difficulties, which dragged on in a long and dreary debate, was the fact that men of a less religious temper simply did not care about the divine substance underlying absolute space. The intellectuals who absorbed the Newtonian system, especially after its popularization by Voltaire, were satisfied with Newton’s recognition of absolute space and could dispense with his religious motivation. The system of the Principia was complete with the first edition; the “Scholium generale” of the second edition added nothing to empirical physics. Here was a system of the world, legitimated by the genius of the man whose name at this time carried more authority in the intellectual world than any other; and this system showed the world as consisting of nothing but matter obeying a uniform law. The theory of absolute space sealed the system ontologically against God; and by virtue of this character, the Newtonian system became socially effective. The

20. Samuel Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God [London 1705–1706].
well-intentioned theory of absolute space resulted in precisely the disorder it had intended to avert.

Berkeley's Psychological Criticism

The genius of Newton lay in the field of mathematics and physics. When he let his thought wander beyond this province, the results were of doubtful quality. The *Principia* was the great cornerstone for the edifice of science that was to be erected in the following centuries; but the definitions and theoretical excursions in the scholia served only to evoke vehement criticism from philosophers. Newton exposed himself to criticism particularly through his proud declaration of autonomy for the new science. Physics could go its course, as it actually did, without regard for the debates of metaphysicians, conscientiously applying the well-established methods to observed phenomena. The “Scholium generale” had announced the *hypotheses non fingo*: “whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.” The assumption of absolute space was a glaring contradiction to this declaration; certainly this fundamental “hypothesis” was not deduced from phenomena. We should not be surprised, therefore, on turning to Berkeley and his criticism of Newton’s theory, to find some pungent remarks concerning the boundaries between physics and metaphysics. In his *De Motu* (1721) Berkeley wrote: “For the rest, it would be convenient, setting aside that it is a well established custom, to distinguish between sciences in such a manner that each is well circumscribed by its proper boundaries. The philosopher of nature should remain entirely with his experiments, his laws of motion, his mechanical principles and the conclusions derived therefrom; if he has something to say on other matters, he should relate what is accepted in the respective higher science.”

Berkeley’s criticism of Newton’s theory moves on two planes. With regard to the method of physics he returns to the principle of relativity. A body can be recognized as moving only in relation to

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another body that is relatively at rest. The idea of absolute motion is incompatible with the conditions of experience. Motion can be measured only by things given to the senses. Since absolute space is not given to the senses, it cannot be used for the distinction of different types of motion. The conception of an absolute motion is impossible. Moreover, in empirical science we do not need such a conception; all that we need is a system of reference that permits us to distinguish between bodies which are relatively at rest or in motion. And such a system we have given in the heaven of the fixed stars. We do not need the assumption of an absolute space for the formulation of the laws of motion because they are valid if we use the fixed stars as the system at rest instead of absolute space. The laws of motion are generalizations from observations and no more. We must “distinguish between mathematical hypotheses and the nature of things.” Motion belongs to the world of senses, and we must be satisfied with relative measurements.

Berkeley’s second approach to the problem is in the nature of a psychological analysis of the illusions that lead to the assumption of absolute space. The idea of a space without a content is empty; it is a *merum nihil*. We are deceived, however, into the assumption because in speculating on the problem of space we subtract all bodies but forget to subtract our own. If we imagine space emptied of all content we still have an experience of space because we have the experience of our body and of the movements of its members. The experience itself is not deceptive, but what we experience is the relative space defined by the parts of our body, the attribution of absoluteness to this space is a fallacy.

The meaning of the somewhat brief passages in *De Motu* becomes clearer in the more discursive analysis in the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. As far as the observation of moving bodies is concerned, according to this analysis, we can never observe anything but bodies moving relatively to each other; the physicist is such an observer of moving bodies, and hence in physics nothing can be admitted but a concept of relative motion. Nevertheless, we do not only observe

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22. Ibid., § 63.
23. Ibid., § 64.
24. Ibid., § 66.
25. Ibid., §§ 53, 54. The argument of these paragraphs is substantially the same as that of Berkeley’s *Principles of Human Knowledge* (Dublin: Aaron Rhames, etc., 1710), §§ 116, 117, in *Works*, vol. 1.
motion; we can also experience it. “Now, I ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to move, because they change distance with his feet? To me it appears that although motion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it.” Berkeley thus recognizes the experience of absolute motion, but he considers it impermissible to inject this experience into mathematical physics; the laws of science can only describe the observed motions, and observed motions are relative.  

The Deadlock

A psychological analysis of the Berkeleian type can dispose of the concept of absolute space as a merum nihil; it can trace the idea to its origin in the experience of the body; it can show the fallacy of hypostatizing this experience into an objective quality of phenomenal space; and—what is most important for Berkeley—it can by such effective criticism clear the way for the philosophia prima. It cannot, however, persuade a physicist to consider his problem solved. When Galileo discovered the law of motion, he did not consider a body at rest in relation to the fixed stars; he considered it absolutely at rest. The laws of science are meant to be valid absolutely. As a follower of Newton expressed it: “From the observation of nature we all know that there is motion, that a body in motion perseveres in that state, till by the action or influence of some power it be necessitated to change it, that it is not in

28. Knowingly or unknowingly, with this argument Berkeley touched upon one of the actual historical roots of the Newtonian conception of absolute space, for Henry More, in his correspondence with Descartes, had advanced the experience of absolute rest and motion as an argument against Descartes’s radical concept of “reciprocal” movement: “When I am sitting quietly, and another man who moves away, let us say a thousand steps, becomes red in his face and fatigued, it certainly is he who has moved, while I have been at rest during the time” [Henry More, letter to Descartes, March 5, 1649, in *Oeuvres de Descartes*, ed. Adam and Tannery (Paris: L. Cerf, 1903), 5:312 ff.]. The argument is directed against Descartes’s *Principia philosophiae*, pt. 2, art. 29. For Descartes’s answer see his letter to More, April 15, 1649, in *Oeuvres*, 3:45 ff. On More’s argument against Descartes see Henri Bergson, *Matière et mémoire*, 24th ed. (Paris: F. Alcan, 1928), 215, and his *Durée et simultanéité, à propos de la théorie d’Einstein*, 2d and enlarged ed. (Paris: F. Alcan, 1933), 37. For an elaborate analysis of the relation between the experience of motion [in the sense of More and Berkeley] and the experience of space, as well as of the relation between experienced space and the space of geometry, see Henri Poincaré, *La Science et l’hypothèse* [Paris: E. Flammarion, 1908], pt. 2, “L’Espace.”
relative or apparent motion in which it perseveres in consequence of its inertia, but in real and absolute space.” If we assume with Descartes that the place of a body is determined by the relation to the bodies in its neighborhood, the law of motion would have to announce that a body on which no external force is applied cannot change its position with regard to the surrounding bodies.\textsuperscript{29} This law is absurd because obviously the relative position can be changed by applying forces to the surrounding bodies. In brief: The criticism of the philosophers is not constructive. As far as physics is concerned, the only result could be that the physicists would put them in their place, as Berkeley did with Newton. And this is what actually happened in Euler’s \textit{Réflexions sur l’espace et le temps} (Berlin 1748). The philosophers were told that the certainty of the laws of mechanics must be the starting point of the enquiry. Any criticism in conflict with them must be rejected, however conclusive it may be in itself. The metaphysical principles must be chosen in such a manner that they will be compatible with physics.\textsuperscript{30}

The physicists and their philosophical critics had come to a deadlock—a deadlock with rather grave consequences. If we take Euler’s demand seriously and generalize it, we arrive at the rule that every time an empirical scientist makes a mess of his fundamental concepts—which is a rather ordinary occurrence—the philosophers are faced with the alternative of either clearing up the mess for him or talking nonsense from now on in epistemology and metaphysics. The demand has a touch of the burlesque; nevertheless, it was possible to impose it with a measure of success. The graveness of the situation may be gathered from the fact that even a Kant submitted to it, after some vacillation, at least to the extent of recognizing the \textit{Faktum der Wissenschaft} including Newton’s absolute space.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{29} Colin Maclaurin, \textit{An Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries} (London: A. Miller and J. Nourse, 1748), 2, 1, § 9, quoted in Cassirer, \textit{Das Erkenntnisproblem}, 1:478.

\textsuperscript{30} See on this question Cassirer, \textit{Das Erkenntnisproblem}, 2:475 ff.

\textsuperscript{31} Kant had made a very successful attack on the problem of absolute and relative motion in his early work, \textit{M. Immanuel Kants neuer Lehrbegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe und der damit verknüpften Folgerungen in den ersten Gründen der Naturwissenschaft} (1758), in \textit{Werke}, vol. 2 (Leipzig: Inselverlag, 1922). He attacked the crucial point by eliminating the concept of inertia and reformulating the first law of motion. He surrendered, however, this hopeful start and in subsequent work bowed to the authority of Leonhard Euler. After 1770 the problem lost interest for him, because the epistemologically relevant part of the problem could be solved through his critical philosophy. On the position of Kant see Ernst Cassirer, \textit{Zur
we elaborate, however, on this curiosity of our intellectual civiliza-
tion, we must briefly outline the further differentiation of the prob-
lem of absolute space and of the solution toward which it tended.

Leibniz’s Differentiating Analyses

The differentiation of the problem was, in principle, achieved by
Leibniz. We have already reflected on his general relativistic posi-
tion; we have now to add the principal points of his differentiating
analysis.

First of all, he located the crucial point of the difficulties by
differentiating between geometry and phoronomy, on the one side,
and mechanics, on the other. The relativity of position and motion
is indisputable as long as we deal with them as “purely mathem-
atical” problems. Nature, however, does not offer the spectacle
of abstractly shoving bodies that change their relative positions
chaotically; it offers the spectacle of a calculable order in the rela-
tive movements. This order in the movements cannot be explained
within the realm of geometry; for the purpose of its interpretation
we have to go beyond the purely mathematical principles and intro-
duce a “metaphysical” principle. “Whether we call this principle
Form, or Entelechy, or Force, is irrelevant as long as we remember
that only the notion of forces will express it intelligibly.” 32 This step
of clarification impressed even the physicists to a certain extent,
for Euler adopted the relativistic conception of space and motion
at least for the phoronomic part of his last presentation of the
Newtonian system, the Theoria motus of 1765, though in the part
on dynamics he reverted to the Newtonian position. 33 Moreover, by
localizing the difficulty in the theory of dynamics Leibniz correctly
marked the direction in which the solution had to be sought and
was ultimately found—that is, the geometrization of physics. That
the new physics should be constructed as a science of extension
had been Descartes’s great idea; it proved impossible, however, to
carry out the idea in the system; Descartes’s Principia shows the

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32. Leibniz, Specimen dynamicum [1695], in Opera omnia, ed. Dutens (Geneva:
33. See on this episode Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem, 2:482 ff.
famous break between the theory of “reciprocal” motion in the geometrical part of the work and the quiet adoption of the law of motion in its conventional form, with its absolute implications, in the part on mechanics. Leibniz arrived at his own theory of forces through the critique of Descartes’s *Principia*; his new dynamics was supposed to solve the problem left open by the geometrical approach of Descartes. Within empirical physics, the problem of relativity was indeed ultimately solved by transforming the crucial problem of “force” into a geometrical problem.34

The localization of the difficulty is the first step toward a solution; it is not the solution itself. At first sight, the introduction of the “metaphysical” principle of force seems to inject the absolute problem into theory rather than to eliminate it. Let us be clear, therefore, first about the point that in the language of Leibniz the term *metaphysics* is wider in content than in modern usage. Metaphysics was for him the general science of principles, exclusive of mathematics and geometry only.35 The principles of physics as a science of phenomena (such as the category of causation) belong to metaphysics in this sense. Hence the introduction of force is immediately followed by the differentiation between *vis primitiva* and *vis derivativa*, that is, between force in the sense of an inherent quality of substance and force in the phenomenal sense.

34. For the problem that arises in the transition from the mathematical treatment of motion to the physical proper, see Bergson, *Matière et mémoire*, 214 ff. This was written before Einstein, the state of the problem at that time was still substantially the same as at the time of Leibniz. See, for instance, Bergson’s excellent formulation of the problem, ibid., 215: “Descartes traite du mouvement en physicien après l’avoir défini en géomètre. Tout mouvement est relatif pour le géomètre: cela signifie seulement, à notre sens, qu’il n’y a pas de symbole mathématique capable d’exprimer que ce soit le mobile plutôt que les axes ou les points auxquels on le rapporte.” These pages of Bergson practically adopt the position of Leibniz’s *Specimen dynamicum* as far as the differentiation of the problems is concerned; his solution, however, is not the Leibnizian theory of force but a pragmatic theory of motion on the line of Berkeley’s analysis. After Einstein, the problem of physics comes into clearer view for Bergson, on the historical line from the attempted geometrical physics of Descartes to the realized geometrical physics of Einstein, see Bergson, *Durée et simultanéité*, chap. 2, “La relativité complète.” On Einstein’s own position see his *Über die spezielle und allgemeine Relativitätstheorie*. The geometrization of force in Einstein’s theory is succinctly formulated by Sir Arthur Eddington in *The Nature of the Physical World*, Gifford Lectures 1937, Everyman ed., p. 135: “Einstein’s law of gravitation controls a geometrical quantity curvature in contrast to Newton’s law which controls a mechanical quantity force.”

35. See, for the definition of terms in this sense, § 1 of the Third Letter of Leibniz to Clarke, in “Recueil de lettres entre Leibniz et Clarke,” in *Opera omnia*, 2:120. See also Cassirer’s footnote on this question in Leibniz, *Hauptschriften*, 1:133.
Primitive force (whether active or passive) is substantial force and its problems belong to metaphysics in the narrower sense. This primitive force belongs among the “general causes” which “are insufficient for the explanation of phenomena.” Derivative force arises “as it were, from a limitation of primitive force through the interaction [conflictus] of bodies in various ways.”36 The differentiation between primitive and derivative force and particularly the definition of phenomenal force constitute the decisive achievement of Leibniz. The problem of absoluteness is eliminated through the definition of phenomenal force as force in relation to other forces. Phenomenal force is relative force by definition; and only this phenomenal force is the object of physics. Force has no meaning beyond the meaning contained in the differential equations of physics. The laws of nature refer to derivative forces and their phenomena only.37 In order to avoid all misunderstandings Leibniz adds explicitly that the entia mathematica (the meanings contained in an equation) cannot actually be found in nature; “they are only the instruments of abstract and exact calculation.”38

We have now gained a concept of phenomenal nature as a field of relative forces whose actions are described in the differential equations of physics. The ideas of space and time used in science refer to this phenomenal nature. The third step in Leibniz’s analysis is the clarification of the ideas of space and time. His most mature formulation of this problem is to be found in the correspondence with Clarke, which was indirectly a correspondence with Newton, for the latter collaborated with Clarke on the answers. The problem of space runs through the whole correspondence. A first formulation is the following: “I have stressed more than once that I consider space something purely relative, just as time; it is an order of coexistences, just as time is an order of successions. For space signifies, in terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at the same time, insofar as they exist together, without determining their particular way of existing.”39 Again: “One says that space does not depend on the position [situation] of bodies. I answer: this is quite true that it does not depend on this or that position of bodies; nevertheless, it is the order which makes bodies positionable [situables] and by which

36. Leibniz, Specimen dynamicum, 316.
37. Ibid., 317.
38. Ibid., 318.
they have a position among themselves when they exist together; just as time is this order with regard to successive position."\textsuperscript{40} And finally: “I have shown that space is nothing but an order of the existence of things, which is to be noted in their simultaneity.”\textsuperscript{41} Space and time of physics, thus, are not qualities of reality; they are orders that mind applies to the interpretation of phenomena. The problem of absolute space cannot arise if space is understood as an ideal form that constitutes the order of phenomena. This solution not only eliminates the Newtonian problem of absolute space critically; it also gives the positive answer to the question of “objectivity” in science. We do not have to search for the “absolute” validity of propositions in an absolute reality; the objectivity of science has its source in the order of the mind.

This is the solution further developed by Kant’s transcendental critique into the theory of the \textit{noetic function} as an autonomous source of knowledge. At the time, however, its significance and finality were hardly understood. To the formulations of Leibniz came the pained answer of Clarke (and, behind him, of Newton): “I do not understand the meaning of the words: An order, or a position, which makes the bodies positionable. To me this seems to say that the position is the cause of the position.”\textsuperscript{42} This complaint carries us beyond the theoretical discussion into the human situation. The complaint was sincere: Clarke and Newton did not understand. As far as the physicists are concerned, this ended the debate for the next century and a half.

\textbf{The Problem of the Rotating Star}

As we have seen, the several aspects of the problem had been differentiated by Leibniz. Since the concepts of absolute space and absolute motion were inadmissible in physics, the next task was the reformulation of the Newtonian definitions and of the first law of motion in such a manner that they would become compatible

\textsuperscript{40} Leibniz, Fourth Letter, § 41, in “Recueil de lettres,” 132 ff.
\textsuperscript{41} Leibniz, Fifth Letter, § 29, in “Recueil de lettres,” 148. The position of Leibniz at the time of his correspondence with Clarke does not differ materially from his earlier position. For variant formulations see the \textit{Bemerkungen zum allgemeinen Teil der Kartesischen Principien} (1692), in particular the remarks on Descartes’s \textit{Principia}, 2, 8–19, in \textit{Hauptschriften}, ed. Cassirer, 1:327 ff.; see also \textit{Gegen Descartes} (1702), ibid., 330–33.
\textsuperscript{42} Clarke, Fourth Replic [Réplique], § 41, in “Recueil de lettres,” 140.
with the logics of science. This reforming work, however, did not get under way for more than a century. The principal cause of the stagnation was the fact that the deficiencies of the theoretical structure did not impair the advancement of science. An indigenous incentive for the revision of fundamental concepts arose only in the second half of the nineteenth century with empirical observations like those of the Michelson-Morley experiment.

But besides indifference there was a certain amount of positive resistance to a revision. The motive of this resistance was formulated by Clarke in his Fifth Letter to Leibniz: “One maintains that motion implies of necessity a relative change of position in one body with regard to other bodies; but one does not show how one could avoid the absurd consequence of this assumption: that the movability of a body depends on the existence of other bodies, or that a body which exists alone would be incapable of movement, or that the parts of a rotating body [as for instance the sun] would lose their centrifugal force if all external, surrounding matter were annihilated.”43 We do not know Leibniz’s answer to this argument, for the death of the philosopher put an end to the correspondence; but, as we shall see presently, we can form a fairly good idea of what it would have been. In any case, at the time this argument remained unanswered and it continued to be one of the great factors in the resistance to a revision of the Newtonian theory.

The argument was still alive in 1870 in Carl Neumann’s treatise on the Newtonian theory. In almost the same words as Clarke’s, Neumann put the case of the rotating star that has assumed the shape of an ellipsoid. If we imagine all other bodies removed from the universe, then the rotating star would have to be at rest according to the relativistic theory; its centrifugal forces would disappear and its body would become spherical in shape. “This insufferable contradiction can be avoided only if we drop the definition of motion as relative, and if we conceive the motion of a material point as something absolute.”44 To this argument came an answer at last from a physicist, Ernst Mach. There is no profit in making a senseless assumption for the purpose of avoiding a contradiction; moreover, in a mental experiment only nonessential circumstances may be modified; that the existence of the surrounding material

world is without influence, however, must not be assumed a priori; if the hypothetical elimination of the material world leads to contradictions, then we have to consider this result as proving the importance of the relativity of motion.45

The answer is excellent in its firmness and intention, but it is lacking somewhat in theoretical precision. There is a serious uncleanness in Mach's reply in that it does not define the criteria for the “essentiality” or “nonessentiality” of circumstances that may or may not be modified in a mental experiment. But we can repair this lack of precision of 1901 by returning to the theoretical culture of 1715. As we have said above, we can construct the answer that Leibniz could have given to Clarke’s argument, had not their correspondence been terminated by the former’s death. For Leibniz the relativity in physics was not a relativity of space and time only; the relativity extends also to the vis derivativa, that is, to phenomenal force; force is not exempted from phenomenality and relativity. Hence, the physical phenomenon as a whole, in all of its aspects, must be conceived as part of a field of phenomenal relations. Relativity is not an appurtenance of objects that exist in themselves; it is part of the logical structure of a science of phenomena. Hence it is impermissible to isolate a phenomenon and to ask what properties, for instance, a rotating star would have “in itself” after the relational field in which it is a phenomenon is abolished. An experiment can and must abstract from concrete physical circumstances in order to isolate that part of the total phenomenon that can be mathematized and expressed in a law of science; it cannot, however, abstract from the logic of science and still retain an object of science. The argument from the body that rotates in absolute motion makes precisely this epistemological mistake; with the clarification of this error the problem of absolute motion disappears.46

Science, Power, and Magic

The further development of the problem of relativity from Mach to Einstein belongs to the history of science; it is not our concern in a

46. In this construction of Leibniz’s answer I am reproducing substantially Cassirer’s construction in his note 158 to the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, see Leibniz, *Hauptschriften*, ed. Cassirer, 1:319–21. I have only toned down the neo-Kantian terminology of Cassirer that somewhat veils the original strength of Leibniz’s position.
study of politics. We can proceed now to an appraisal of the results of our analysis; and we shall begin this appraisal with a few reflections on the relations between power and the advance of science. These general reflections will then be followed by a description of the pattern of ideas that emerges from our analysis of the problem.

The advance of the science of which Newton is the great representative genius has profoundly affected the political and economic structure of the Western world. Let us list the principal features of this change: the ramification of science into technology; the industrialization of production; the increase of population; the higher population capacity of an industrialized economy; the transformation of an agricultural into an urban society; the rise of the new social groups—the industrial proletariat, the white-collar employees, and an intellectual proletariat; the concentration of wealth and the rise of the managerial class; the ever-increasing numbers of men who depend for their economic existence on decisions beyond their influence; the dependence of national power on a highly developed industrial apparatus; the dependence of the industrial apparatus on the political accessibility of markets and raw materials; the power premium on industrialization; the political decline of nations that do not possess the raw materials, or the population figure, or the territorial expansion necessary for the effective utilization of industrial technology; the corresponding political ascendancy of nations that possess these factors; the helplessness of agricultural, especially Oriental, civilizations against economic and political penetration by industrialized civilizations; the rise in the standard of living due to industrialization; the political tensions in the Western world due to the differences in the degree of industrialization possible in the various national states; the further increase in the standard of living in some of the industrialized societies through the ruthless exploitation of the industrial power premium in foreign relations, and so forth. This enumeration is far from exhaustive but it is sufficiently long to make it clear that the advance of science after 1700 is the most important single factor in changing the structure of power and wealth on the global scene.

In order fully to understand the interrelation of power and science we must also consider that science is not simply the cause of the enumerated effects; we must rather speak of an interaction between science and the environmental changes. The “usefulness” of science for the increase of power and wealth was quickly seen
and became a strong incentive for putting the means of power and wealth at the disposition of scientists for their further pursuit of knowledge; and, more subtly, the advance of science itself is today unthinkable without laboratory equipment that presupposes a technology of production, which, in its turn, is unthinkable without previous advances of science. This interrelation between science and power has become so decisive in international politics that, in the wake of modern wars, the conqueror resorts to such measures as prohibition of research, destruction of laboratory equipment, the wholesale abduction of scientists into a more or less gilded slavery, and the deindustrialization of the conquered nation. The strict rationality of the procedure, without regard for human or civilizational values, closely resembles the procedure of the most rational of conquerors, Genghis Khan: When the Mongols conquered a country they took the skilled craftsmen and the shapely women for their personal use and let the rest of the people perish. The advancement of science and the rationality of politics are interwoven in a social process that, in the perspective of a more distant future, will probably appear as the greatest power orgy in the history of mankind.

We must recognize this atmosphere of power in which science advances, for there are certain peculiarities incidental to the process that otherwise would appear as sheer lunacy. The source of these apparent lunacies is the utilitarian rationality of science. The idea of power through science has a rational core: If we have knowledge of causal relations we can form means-end relations; if we have the means we can achieve the end; hence knowledge in this sense is eminently useful. This rational, utilitarian core in itself is of necessity present in all human existence, both personal and social; utilitarian rationality determines a segment of life in primitive as well as in advanced civilizations; in itself it is not the specific determinant of any particular society. Under the impact of the modern advance of science, however, this core has acquired the characteristics of a cancerous growth. The rational-utilitarian segment is expanding so strongly in our civilization that the social realization of other values is noticeably weakened. This expansion is carried by the mass creed that the utilitarian dominion over nature through science should and will become the exclusive preoccupation of man, as well as the exclusive determinant for the structure of society. In the nineteenth century this idea of utilitarian exclusiveness crystallized in the
belief that the dominion of man over man would ultimately be replaced by the dominion of man over nature, and that the government of men would be replaced by the administration of things. At this point we have to guard against the error into which critics of the totalitarian movements have fallen so frequently—the belief that an idea is politically unimportant because philosophically it is stark nonsense. The idea that structure and problems of human existence can be superseded in historical society by the utilitarian segment of existence is certainly plain nonsense; it is equivalent to the idea that the nature of man can be abolished without abolishing man, or that the spiritual order can be taken out of existence without disordering existence. Any attempt at its realization can lead only to the self-destruction of a society. Nevertheless, the fact that the idea is nonsensical has in no way prevented it from becoming the inspiration of the strongest political movement of our age. Here we can see in the raw the fascination of power that exudes from the new science: It is so overwhelming that it blunts one’s awareness of the elementary problems of human existence; science becomes an idol that will magically cure the evils of existence and transform the nature of man.

This humanly destructive obsession is found not only in the totalitarian movements in the narrower sense. It occurs, too, in the so-called liberal or progressive movements, where it assumes the form of the belief that the rather obvious calamities which accompany the age of science must be cured by more science. We have gained dominion over nature through science; in order to avoid the misuse of this power, runs the argument, we must now gain control over our social environment through a corresponding advancement of social science. Scientists of more social prestige than human wisdom stand up before large audiences and tell them in all seriousness that social scientists will have to emulate the natural scientists and do their share in order to realize the perfect society. There seems to be no suspicion that the effects of natural science, both beneficial and destructive, are not due to the genius of scientists but to the objective structure of the realm of phenomena that permits the introduction of human action into the chain of cause and effect once the law of the chain has been discovered; no suspicion that this objective structure does not prevail in the realm of substance, that no wisdom of a Plato could prevent the suicide of Athens and no climactic synthesis of a Saint Thomas the end
of imperial Christianity. The knowledge of phenomena is certainly the key to their utilitarian mastery, but the understanding of human substance is not the key to the mastery of society and history.

The expansion of the will to power from the realm of phenomena to that of substance, or the attempt to operate in the realm of substance pragmatically as if it were the realm of phenomena—that is the definition of magic. The interrelation of science and power, and the consequent cancerous growth of the utilitarian segment of existence, have injected a strong element of magic culture into modern civilization. The tendency to narrow the field of human experience to the area of reason, science, and pragmatic action, the tendency to overvalue this area in relation to the bios theoreтикос and the life of the spirit, the tendency to make it the exclusive preoccupation of man, the tendency to make it socially preponderant through economic pressure in the so-called free societies and through violence in totalitarian communities—all these are part of a cultural process dominated by a flight of magic imagination, that is, by the idea of operating on the substance of man through the instrument of pragmatically planning will. We have ventured the suggestion that in retrospect the age of science will appear as the greatest power orgy in the history of mankind; we now venture the suggestion that at the bottom of this orgy the historian will find a gigantic outburst of magic imagination after the breakdown of the intellectual and spiritual form of medieval high-civilization. The climax of this outburst is the magic dream of creating the superman, the man-made being that will succeed the sorry creature of God's making; this is the great dream that first appeared imaginatively in the works of Condorcet, Comte, Marx, and Nietzsche, and later pragmatically in the Communist and National Socialist movements.

The Pathos of Science and the Spiritual Eunuchs

We have spoken metaphorically of the cancerous growth of the rational-utilitarian segment in modern civilization. We must now go beyond the metaphor and indicate the concrete sentiments and ideas that determine this growth in its formative stage.

The sudden and disproportionate expansion of one single element in a total structure at the expense of other elements presupposes a serious disturbance of a previously existing balance. About the
nature of the disturbance there is no doubt: It is the disorientation of existence through the weakening and loss of faith. The atrophy of Christianity on a socially relevant scale causes a primitivization of intellectual and spiritual culture—the quite normal consequence of the breakdown of a spiritual order. The sentiments and attitudes that appear in connection with the problem of absolute space are symptoms of primitivization in the wake of a general spiritual disorientation. The absolutism of a Galileo or Newton cannot be labeled and shelved as a theoretical mistake to be corrected in the future; the attribution of "absoluteness" to the new science expresses the will of finding an absolute orientation of human existence through intramundane experience; and the correlate to this new will is the unwillingness to orient existence through openness toward transcendental reality. The new science assumes the function of a new order of existence. In his "Ode to Newton" (printed in the first edition of the *Principia*) Edmund Halley celebrated the achievement of his hero by placing it higher than the civilizing work of the sages and founders of antiquity. What is an ancient lawgiver (presumably a Moses or Lycurgus) who orders nothing more important than human society beside the man who discovers the order of the heavenly polity? Even if we make due allowance for conventions and clichés, and if we discount the generally hyperbolic tone of the ode, there still remains the sentiment that a discovery concerning the order of phenomena is an event of the same rank, if not a higher one, than a new spiritual insight.

Intimately related to the sentiment of absoluteness is the pathos of autonomy and self-reliance that animates the advance of science. Exactness of mathematical form and verification through experiment become self-sufficient standards of truth; a scientist need not look left or right in his pursuit of knowledge so long as he abides by his standards; no extraneous speculation can affect the truth of a proposition in science. The Newtonian *hypotheses non fingo* has become the proud expression of this pathos. At this point we touch on one of the most important sources of the modern existential disorder. If this pathos expressed nothing but the peculiar methodological situation of the exact sciences it would be perfectly legitimate; unfortunately, however, it has come to express a good deal more. This expansion of meaning is achieved through a process that we may call the transfer of pathos from a special pursuit to the existence of man. Science as an evolving system of knowledge is the
result of an occupation of human beings, if the pathos of science is transferred from the occupation to the existence of the man who is engaged in it, such transfer may result in a serious warping of the individual personality; and if this transfer of pathos from science to the scientist becomes a model imitated on a socially relevant scale, it will result in far-reaching civilizational destruction. As a matter of fact, this transfer and its social imitation have occurred on such a scale in our civilization that the destructive effects defy repair in any visible future. Let us briefly characterize the attitudes and ideas through which this work of destruction is effected:

1. The transfer of pathos from science to existence expresses itself concretely in the growth of the belief that human existence can be oriented in an absolute sense through the truth of science. If this belief is justified, then it becomes unnecessary to cultivate knowledge beyond science. As a consequence of this belief, the occupation with science and the possession of scientific knowledge has come to legitimate ignorance with regard to all problems that lie beyond a science of phenomena. The spreading of the belief has had the result that the magnificent advance of science in Western civilization is paralleled by an unspeakable advance of mass ignorance with regard to the problems that are existentially the important ones.

2. Such mass ignorance would be bad enough in itself; nevertheless, mere ignorance could be repaired by learning. Scientific ignorance becomes a civilizational disaster because the substantial ordering of existence cannot be achieved through the acquisition of knowledge in the phenomenal sense. It requires the formation of personality in an educational process; and this process requires institutions. Once the scientistic pathos has penetrated the educational institutions of a society, it has become a social force that cannot easily be broken, if it can be broken at all. The problem is no longer one of mere ignorance; if the belief in the self-sufficient ordering of existence through science is socially entrenched, it has become a force that actively prevents the cultivation of human substance and corrodes the surviving elements of cultural tradition still further. The spiritual desire, in the Platonic sense, must be very strong in a young man of our time to overcome the obstacles that social pressure puts in the way of its cultivation.

Moreover, with regard to the cultivation of substance men are gifted differently (gifted in the Pauline sense of charisma). The active carriers of the scientistic pathos will be the men who are
deficient in such gifts; and the penetration of society with the scientistic pathos creates an environment that favors the social success of the deficient human types. Hence, the advance of science and the growth of the rational-utilitarian factor is accompanied by a restratification of society which hitherto seems to have escaped attention because it cannot be expressed in terms of social classes. The restratification through the social prestige and success of the deficient types must be expressed in terms of human substance. I suggest the term *spiritual eunuchism* for the designation of personality traits that make a man a likely victim of scientistic pathos, as well as for the designation of the traits that a society acquires when this human type gains social ascendancy. The nineteenth century has hardly a parallel in the history of mankind as a period of rapid transformation of a civilization through the eunuch type, preparing the spiritual anarchy of the twentieth century.

3. A further trait connected with the transfer of pathos is the rise of aggressive dilettantism in philosophical matters. Again, this is not a question of simple ignorance or dilettantism as such, which may occur at any time; the new and dangerous element is the readiness of the dilettante to impose his ignorance as a standard on others. Clarke’s “I do not understand” in answer to Leibniz’s exposition of the problems of time and space is the ominous symptom of the new attitude. He really does not understand—and that settles the argument in his favor. What the scientistic dilettante cannot understand must not be proposed in discussion of a problem; Comte made this postulate one of the formal dogmas of the scientistic creed. Clarke’s correspondence with Leibniz is in general a document of first importance for the understanding of the new atmosphere. There are sections in the letters that move on a technical level of philosophizing that would have made a student in the Academy raise his eyebrows with amused contempt.  

47. In order to measure the technical enormity of the performance the reader should compare, for instance, Clarke’s argument concerning space and time (Third Replic, § 4, in “Recueil de lettres”) with the corresponding treatment of the problem in Plato’s *Timaeus* or Saint Augustine’s *Confessions*. Leibniz’s answer to this section of Clarke’s argument (Fourth Letter, §§ 14–16, in “Recueil de lettres”) is in no way original, but simply represents the tradition of philosophical craftsmanship.
become determinative in the development of materialistic psychology, philosophical anthropology, and political ideas. The theoretical dilettantism of the great scientist is socially effective; the argument of the great philosopher is socially ineffective. What Leibniz had to say in his correspondence with Clarke was socially of no visible importance; it did not even noticeably affect the course of theoretical physics. What Newton had to say in his definitions of space had an immeasurable effect on the formation of political ideas. The social success of Newton’s theory of absolute space is the first great instance of successful dilettante theories, advanced either by scientists themselves or [after the transfer of the pathos of science on a relevant scale] by the great spiritual eunuchs of the nineteenth century. Without the prestige effect of scientism, such major intellectual scandals as the social success of positivism, or Darwinian evolutionism, or Marxism would be unthinkable.

In conclusion, let me mention the pattern of the civilizational schism that began to emerge in the debate on absolute space and resulted in the situation that I described as a deadlock. The clarification of the problems of space and motion did not induce the physicists to revise their fundamental theoretical concepts. Science went on as if nothing had happened; and Euler even demanded that the philosophers adapt their speculation to the confusion of physics. At the time, such a demand could be only partially successful; the spiritual and philosophical tradition of Western civilization did not break down at the first blast of a physicist in the eighteenth century. Instead, a situation developed in which the later schismatic break was preformed, for the philosophers continued their speculation and simply circumvented the problem of physics. We have seen that Berkeley analyzed space and motion critically to the point from which he could safely embark on his own *philosophia prima*; and we have seen that Kant accepted the state of physics and then went off in the direction of his transcendental critique. The schism was already a fact in the eighteenth century, but the fact remained more or less below the threshold of consciousness; that a break between the ascendant scientistic and utilitarian segment of civilization and the spiritual and intellectual tradition had actually occurred became openly apparent only with Schelling, and by that time, the spiritualist was already on the defensive. In the course of the half century after Schelling the conflict was decided in favor
of scientism; the spiritual eunuchs became the socially effective formers of ideas for the masses. With the politically effective organization of these masses in the totalitarian movements, the schism assumed the external forms of social suppression and physical extermination of the continuators of the tradition.

That in the end, through Einstein, the foundations of physics were revised in conformance with the position of Leibniz is an important event in the history of science, but it has, for the moment at least, no visible social or political importance. The damage of scientism is done. As a philosophical friend aptly phrased it, the insane have succeeded in locking the sane in the asylum.\textsuperscript{48} From this asylum no physical escape is possible; as a consequence of the interlocking of science and social power, the political tentacles of scientistic civilization reach into every nook and corner of an industrialized society, and with increasing effectiveness they stretch over the whole globe. There exist only differences, though very important ones, in the various regions of the global asylum with regard to the possibility of personal escape into the freedom of the spirit. What is left is hope—but hope should not obscure the realistic insight that we who are living today shall never experience freedom of the spirit in society.

\textsuperscript{48} The scientistic-utilitarian dream of transforming society into a prison from which no escape was possible began to take shape after the middle of the eighteenth century in the works of Helvétius and Bentham.
Sir Thomas More is distinguished among men for being a saint of the Catholic Church as well as of the Communist movement. Such abundance of historical honors points to complexities, not easy to unravel, in the work to which he owes his lasting fame. The process of unraveling, indeed, is far from being ended; but at least a concerted effort is under way so that today we have a considerably better understanding of the *Utopia* than was possible even twenty years ago. The uncleanness that surrounds the work is in part a consequence of its success; hence, we shall devote a few preliminary remarks to the removal of certain obscurities that originate in its literary fame.

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1. The basis for an interpretation of the *Utopia* is today R. W. Chambers, *Thomas More* (London: J. Cape, 1935). The best recent monograph, continuing the work of Chambers, is H. W. Donner, *Introduction to Utopia* (Uppsala, 1945; London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1945). A valuable essay is Tommaso Fiore’s “Saggio su Tommaso Moro,” which serves as an introduction to Fiore’s Italian translation of the *Utopia*, *Tommaso Moro, L’Utopia* (Bari: G. Laterza & Figli, 1942). The interest in Morean problems has been strongly stirred up by German historians who, after the First World War, interpreted the *Utopia* as a kind of manual for British imperialism and exploitation of colonial peoples. This line of interpretation was started by Hermann Oncken, *Die Utopie des Thomas Morus und das Machtproblem in der Staatslehre*, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Phil.-Hist. Klasse (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1922); its results are contained in Oncken’s Einleitung to Gerhard Ritter’s German translation of the *Utopia* (Berlin 1922). For the further vicissitudes of this interpretation the reader should refer to the notes in Donner’s *Introduction to Utopia*. Oncken’s projection of British “imperialism” and “cant” into More was a gross mistake, and this interlude can be considered as finished as far as the principle of the interpretation is concerned. The mistake, however, had a reason, a revised interpretation of *Utopia*, which takes into account the original problem on which Oncken had stumbled, is contained in Gerhard Ritter, *Machtstaat und Utopie* (Munich: Oldenburg, 1940), esp. chap. 3: “Morus als Ideologe des Englisch-Insularen Wohlfahrtsstaates.” For our analysis we use the critical text
The *Utopia* was translated into all modern languages; and equally in all languages the word *utopia* has become a common noun. The noun has acquired a considerable amplitude of meaning. At the core of this meaning we find the conception of an ideally perfect state of things [*Oxford Dictionary*]. A thinker’s conception of such a perfect state of things may be expressed in fictional form, in the elaborate construction of ideal social institutions. Beyond such formal, fictional expressions, the word *utopian* has come to signify any expression of political ideals; and if the ideals look more or less unrealizable for one reason or another, the word may have a pejorative connotation. The social impact of the word was so strong that it penetrated into political science proper. It seems widely to be taken for granted that there exists such a thing as utopian thought in politics; and we even have general histories of utopian thought.²

Under the title “utopian” are subsumed such variegated ideas as those of the Hebrew prophets, the “utopianism of Jesus,” of Plato’s *Republic*, Saint Augustine’s *Civitas Dei*, More’s *Utopia*, and such socialist thinkers as Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen. As a result of this linguistic success, More’s own work has been treated as a specimen of the genus; More was supposed to have written an “ideal state” as it befits a “utopian thinker”—though it is precisely the question precisely to what extent the institutions of Utopia were considered “ideal” by their author.³

In the face of such confusion, it is necessary to reestablish the historically relevant core of the meaning, that is, of the utopia as a literary device. More’s *Utopia* describes the economic, political, and religious institutions of a society in fictional form. Whatever More’s opinions may have been with regard to the value of the

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3. The climax of the linguistic success is perhaps Karl Mannheim’s *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936); the book was first published as *Ideologie und Utopie* (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1929). In a book that to a great part is devoted to the problem of Utopianism, the author has nothing to say about More’s *Utopia* at all. The reason is that Mannheim gives a meaning to the word *utopian* that hardly applies to More’s work.
institutions, he has created a literary genus for the modern period. This creation was intimately connected with the discovery of America, with the travel reports on the new countries and their peoples, and generally with the opening of the geographical horizon toward hitherto unknown regions. Raphael, the philosophical sailor who tells the story of *Utopia*, was a member of the company of Amerigo Vespucci; and the influence of Vespucci’s *Mundus Novus* (published in 1507 in Waldseemüller’s *Cosmographiae Introductio*) is traceable in the *Utopia*. Also Peter Martyr’s *De Orbe Novo*, of 1511, most probably was not unknown to More. The space had opened in which a political construction could be placed. This peculiar situation had not arisen with the discovery of America for the first time in the history of mankind. Hellenic evocations of polities were dependent on the actual foundation of colonies and the practice of constitution making. Political ideals could be expressed in Hellas through the device of constructing a commonwealth because a background of practice endowed the literary form with verisimilitude. This genus of literature came to its inevitable end with the rise of the Roman empire. There was a moment of revival in the thirteenth century when, in the wake of the Latin crusade, new states were carved out in the Eastern Mediterranean by the Western princes; it was the moment that precipitated Saint Thomas’s *De regimine principum*. With this exception, however, the device was not used between Hellenic antiquity and More’s *Utopia*. With the discovery of America, a background again existed that conferred verisimilitude on the evocation.

If we define the problem in this manner, we have reduced it to the importance it actually has in the history of political ideas, i.e.: The existence of an open horizon of political foundation is an incentive for expressing political ideas through the literary evocation of a commonwealth. In this sense [but only in this restricted sense] it may be considered legitimate if we speak of a Greek utopian literature, and even if we call the Platonic Republic a utopia. Nevertheless, we doubt the wisdom of such usage. There is no necessity for designating this well-circumscribed phenomenon by a name that is fraught with so many implications and variant

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meanings; its use seems to be a concession to the bad habit that has arisen in the nineteenth century of transforming every political symbol that is thrown up by history (such as utopia, ideology, socialism, democracy, communism, fascism, etc.) at all cost into a concept in political science.

While we may accord a restricted legitimacy to the phrase Greek utopian literature, we can find no sense at all in the concept of a “history of utopian thought” at large. Utopian literature, in the limited sense, appears in the well-circumscribed historical areas of the Hellenic polis and of Western civilization after the discovery of America. The two appearances have similar causes; certainly, there were literary influences exerted by the Hellenic on the Western works over the gap of more than a thousand years; but there is no historical continuity between the two appearances.

There has unfolded, however, a genuine history of utopian literature in the wake of More’s work. His island in the South Atlantic is followed, at the distance of a century, by Campanella’s City of the Sun in the Indian Ocean and by Bacon’s New Atlantis in the South Seas. Swift’s Gulliver and Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe depend on the atmosphere created by Utopia; and the South Seas remain the great escape from the West down to the days of Jack London, Joseph Conrad, and Somerset Maugham. In the sphere of political thought proper, the vista of settlement and political construction in the new spaces is still open in Locke’s Treatises of Civil Government—though here we are reaching the limit. His famous sentence, “In the beginning all the world was America, and more so than that is now,” shows that the ideal state of nature can still be placed in America, but that the appeal to imagination is nearing exhaustion because of the actual foundation of governments in the New World. The “noble savage” and the virtues of primitive society exert their influence still in Rousseau; but after Chateaubriand this instrument of social criticism also seems to be used up on the more serious level of political literature. The exhaustion of original substance, however, does not prevent the use of the literary form once it is established. In the nineteenth century, utopian literature fills up with socialistic and scientistic content, and the distance in space tends to be replaced by distance in time. The variety of purposes to which the form can be put may be indicated by Samuel Butler’s Erewhon, H. G. Wells’s Modern Utopia, and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World.
The *Utopia* is a dialogue. Its scene is Antwerp in 1515, when More was in the Lowlands as a member of an English embassy. The interlocutors are More himself; Petrus Aegidius, his friend in Antwerp; and Raphael Hythlodaeus, the “teller of idle tales,” the humanistically educated sailor, the companion of Amerigo Vespucci on his travels to the New World, who has brought with him the tale of Utopia. The dialogue is organized in two books. Book II contains Raphael’s tale of the institutions of Utopia. It was written first, while More was still in Antwerp. Book I, written after his return to England, contains the introductory dialogue on the evils of the time, on the practical impossibility of reform through counsel to rulers, on the atmosphere of courts where the voice of the philosopher and statesman goes unheard, on the root of social iniquities in the institution of private property, leading up to Raphael’s tale of the island where social happiness has been insured through wise institutions.

At the center of meaning lies the autobiographical part of the dialogue. More is in doubt whether there is any sense in taking office in the king’s service; a single man cannot stem the tide of the time; instead of doing any good he will be corrupted himself through inevitable connivance in measures of which he disapproves. The argument, which must have been going on in the soul of More at the time, is distributed in the dialogue on More and Raphael. More is in favor of royal service, “for from the prince, as from a perennial fountain, flows the stream of good and evil down to the people.”7

The man experienced in affairs and of wide education is under the duty (boni viri officium) of benefiting the public by his advice to rulers. More is disturbed, more than Erasmus, by the Platonic theme of the Parable of the Cave, by the philosopher’s duty of participating in the affairs of the polis. And, indeed, More evokes the Platonic formula that a commonwealth would be happy if philosophers were kings, or kings would become philosophers. “How, then, shall a republic ever become happy when the philosophers reject service in the king’s council?”8

That was not quite the idea of Plato, who, even under the conditions of the all-embracing Hellenic polis, knew that times may

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8. Ibid., 79 f.
come when nonparticipation is the duty. Still less is this reflection Christian. The Christian's first duty is the orientation of life toward the *summum bonum*—and that is not at all the happiness of the republic. The question of More implies that the spiritual power had declined as an ordering power in the commonwealth so far that the problem of the happy republic presented itself to him without a doubt as the problem of a joint rule of the prince and the secular philosopher. In his argumentation the spiritual power is a *quantité négligeable*. In More as in Erasmus we can observe the transformation of the spiritual power into the power of the secular intellectual; a development that was foreshadowed already in Dante's idea of the double headship of emperor and philosopher now becomes greatly intensified. The secular intellectual, however, is in a difficult position insofar as he has no place to go. Unless he becomes a political intellectual, and as such an adjunct to the powers that be or will be, what shall he do? The existential answer—to More apparently the only one he could imagine—is Raphael, the man who has divested himself of his property in favor of his family and leads a traveling life as a man without a country. He is, by disposition, a man “who is more concerned about wandering than about the place where he will find his grave; for he used often to say ‘He that has no grave is covered by the sky’ and ‘From all places the way to heaven is equally far.’”9 This secular, traveling monk now answers the question of More; and with ample examples he shows that counsel of the kind he would be obliged to tender had no chance of finding acceptance, considering the state of things in politics.

More agrees; but he can defend his position by drawing a distinction between two types of philosophy, the same distinction his friend Erasmus drew at the same time in the *Institutio*. One must distinguish between school philosophy (*philosophia scholastica*) and polite philosophy (*philosophia civilior*). The first has its place in discussions among friends, not in political relations. How could one seriously expect courtiers to agree with unheard-of propositions (*sermo insolens*) that run counter to their habit of thought? “Polite philosophy” knows its place, does not abstractly hold a truth to be opportune in every situation, does not talk out of turn, and does not, like a bad actor, disturb the play at hand. One cannot root out

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9. Ibid., 28.
bad opinions and traditional vices at a moment’s notice—but that
is no reason for deserting the commonwealth, like a ship in a storm. One
must not pester people with strange notions but use the arts
and tricks of persuasion so that “if you cannot turn things to the
good, at least you can make them less bad.” “For all things cannot
be well, as long as all men are not good—and that I do not expect
to happen for quite a few years.”

The answer is not impressive. It is neither Platonic nor otherwise
profound. It is persuasive common sense for a man who wants to
play a role in politics, who is intelligent and sensitive enough to
feel the responsibilities he may incur, and who needs a little opiate
to overcome his scruples. Today we call it the argument of the
“collaborator.” The skill in dodging the issues is remarkable. An
abstract truth, indeed, is not fit for every situation; but there are
situations where the abstract truth must be pronounced in order to
break out of the morass of moral confusion. One can, indeed, not
root out traditional vices at a moment’s notice; but there is a limit
beyond which delay is impermissible. And that all men are not
good and therefore all things cannot be well is sound admonition
to a perfectionist; but it easily can become a cover for condoning
crimes. What makes this argument so flat is the renunciation of the
spirit as the ultimate authority beyond the temporal order and its
insufficiencies. The commonwealth tends to acquire an ultimacy
that properly belongs to the spirit. The ominous symptom of the
shift of accents is More’s distinction between scholastic and polite
philosophy. The meaning of philosophy as the intellectual dimen-
sion of the life of the spirit, as the intellectual articulation of an
order that culminates in the life of the spirit and the orientation of
the soul toward the realissimum, apparently had been lost for More
quite as much as for Erasmus. The Erasmian princely philosophy,
as well as More’s polite philosophy, is wisdom that draws on classic
and Christian traditions; but it has lost the savageness that cannot
come from the past but only from the eternal presence of the source.

The Utopia is a dialogue. More’s argument represents only one
side of his position; our criticism touches only one aspect of the
tension in which he lived. More knew quite well that there were
counterarguments; he represented them in Raphael; and the debate
remains inconclusive. We must consider the tension as a whole.

10. Ibid., 97–100.
The elements of the problem are already known. The argument of More is disappointing because it is opportunistic and dodges the spiritual issues. At the other pole of the tension we would expect to find the spiritual position. But again we are disappointed, for at this other pole we find the humanistic traveler who has withdrawn in resignation. The tension as a whole occurs in the field of humanistic, political sentiments. The true alternative, the life of the spirit, remains beyond the horizon. This structure of the Morean problem is somewhat surprising because in his earlier years More had hesitated between taking Holy Orders [as a Carthusian or Observant Franciscan] and the study of law. His choice had been a family, the law, and the commonwealth. Nevertheless, setting aside his thorough and comprehensive theological knowledge, one would expect that a man who existentially was on the verge of becoming a monk would understand the problem of the “world” and not attempt to evade it by argument that is an insult to intelligence.

The key to this enigma can perhaps be found in a passage of the Utopia in which Raphael describes the attitude of the islanders toward the members of a strict, sectarian order that has formed among them. The Utopians tolerate this order because they respect every conduct that is motivated by “religion” as long as it does not disturb the more easygoing creed of the others. They themselves, however, are hedonists and rationalists. “Anybody who would prefer celibacy to matrimony, or a hard life to an easy one, as a matter of reason would be laughed at.”  

11 Ratio and religio are opposed as principles of ordering conduct. The utopian commonwealth lives by the order of reason; religion is reduced to a deistic minimum dogma consisting of the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, punishment and reward in the beyond, and the rule of Providence.  

12 And even this minimum dogma is retained only for the utilitarian reason that without it the laws of the commonwealth might not be sufficient to keep the good people on the narrow path.  

13 The construction of More agrees in all essential points with the later

11. Ibid., 282.
12. Ibid., 274.
13. Raphael relates the incident of a Utopian who, like many others, was converted by them to Christianity but took his new creed a bit too seriously. He started arguing about it in public and assured his fellow-citizens that eternal damnation was their lot unless they followed his example. The man was properly arrested and banished as disturber of the peace. The point is that the culprit was removed, not because he cast aspersion on the established religion, but because he stirred up the people (reus excitati in populo tumultus) [responsible for stirring up an uproar
Lockean idea of tolerance and the separation of church and state. The official Deism with its rites, but without a systematic theology that might stir up problems, lets everybody believe what he wants, provided that he does not claim public recognition. Assuming the obvious, that nobody can conceive and with loving care elaborate this idea unless it occupies his imagination intensely, we may say that the idea of the Christianitas as the Mystical Body of Christ, articulated into its spiritual and temporal orders with equal public rank, had lost its hold over the sentiments of More at least to the degree that, at least in this phase of his life, the spiritual order was no longer experienced as a representative public order in the commonwealth. The life of the spirit had become a private affair and, since as a mystic More was not strong enough to stand for himself, the temporal order had become the secular commonwealth, with the monopoly of public representation, retaining of Christian traditions only as much as historical circumstance had left at the moment.

The separation of ratio and religio, of church and state, of the spheres of the natural and the supernatural, the reduction of the temporal order to the secular commonwealth, and the corresponding privatization of “religion” permit us to understand the dilemma of More as well as the peculiar form that it assumes in the tension of the Utopian dialogue. When the natural, rational, secular commonwealth has monopolized public status, when it closes the horizon of human existence in society, then indeed it becomes difficult to find one’s way in times of worldly disorder. The commonwealth is inescapable; the national absolutism of “right or wrong, my country” replaces the Christian relativism of the “world”; and the Christian whose destination is beatitude becomes the Raphael of the dialogue, the homeless chaser of ideals. And where does he find his ideals? On this point More reveals his strength; the symbolism of his answer is unmistakable: Nowhere! In spite of the far-reaching decomposition of his Christianity, More is still too much of a Christian to be an intramundane eschatologist like the later Progressivists, Positivists, and Marxists. He indulges in an “ideal”; but at least he knows that the ideal is nowhere and has no place in the historical somewhere of a commonwealth. With More’s Utopia we are in the transition from Christian to revolutionary intramundane eschatology. The

among the people. The scene foreshadows the problem that later was treated by Dostoevsky in the “Grand Inquisitor” [ibid., 270].

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*ratio humana* has ceased to be an orienting participation in the *ratio divina* and has become a set of rules (normative ideals) in axiological, critical suspense above the historical reality of politics; and the Christian fulfillment through salvation in the beyond has become the teleology of an intramundane perfection of happiness. Thus far goes the disintegration in More, but no further. His ideal remains in the twilight position of its Nowhere; and, as we shall see presently, More was very much aware that his description of the ideal society implied an unrealistic change in the nature of man. He did not indulge in the fallacy of the later activist eschatologists, that is, in the assumption that mysterious revolutionary processes would indeed change the nature of man in such a manner that the problem of evil would disappear from the world.  

The tension of the utopian dialogue accompanied More through his life, to its end. In his last words on the scaffold he protested “that he died the King’s good servant, but God’s first.” His king and

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14. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Apokalypse der deutschen Seele*, vol. 3, *Die Vergöttlichung des Todes* ([The Divinization of Death]) (Salzburg-Leipzig: Anton Pustet, 1937), 409, advances the general thesis that “Alle Utopie glaubt an die phantasistischste aller ‘Brotvermehrungen,’ an die Wesensvermehrung” [“Every Utopia believes in the most fantastic of all ‘multiplications of loaves,’ in the multiplication of being”]. The thesis is generally correct, and in particular in the context in which it appears, that is, in a discussion of Marxist eschatology. Precisely for the case of More, however, we should like to qualify the thesis by stressing the consciously intermediate position of the Nowhere. More was inclined toward the “increase of essence,” but he was still aware of the impossibility of this miracle.

In our analysis of the utopian ideal as a decomposition of Christian eschatology we are following generally the indications given by Balthasar, *Apokalypse der deutschen Seele*, vol. 1, *Der deutsche Idealismus*, 22–29. Again, however, we should like to take exception to a specific reference to More. Balthasar writes: “Erst die Trennung von Staat und Kirche [als ‘Natur’ und ‘Übernatur’] schuf die eigentliche Voraussetzung der Utopie als selbständigen natürlichen, zeitlichen Eschatons. Morus nimmt wirklich eine antike Tradition auf [Plato, Plotin], wenn er seine ‘Utopie’ schreibt” [It was not until the separation of state and church (in terms of “nature” and “supernature”) that there came into being the actual prerequisites of Utopia as of an independently natural, temporal eschaton]. More does actually take up a classic tradition (Plato, Plotinus) in writing his *Utopia* ([ibid., 29 n]). That More resumed a “classic tradition,” and in particular the tradition of Plato, seems to require some qualification. The Platonic polis of the idea is not an “ideal” state. The concern about the meaning of the Idea induced Plato to elaborate his myth of history in *Timaeus* and *Critias*. The Idea is incarnate in reality; and the incarnation, like all “nature,” is under the law of cyclical decline and recurrence. Plato is tending toward an eschatology in the Christian sense while More is tending away from it. These positions before and after Christian eschatology, no doubt, result in certain similarities. Nevertheless, Plato remains within the “classic” form of eschatology, that is, within the myth of the cycle of incarnation. We are inclined to say that the modern political thinkers who revive the idea of the historical cycle, as for instance Machiavelli, are in this respect considerably more Platonic than the avowed Platonists who misunderstand the idea as an “ideal” in the post-Christian sense.
country had been his Somewhere—but in the crucial decision of his life the scale of this Somewhere went down. There is preserved a conversation in the Tower between More and his wife. He tried to reason with the lady, and asked her: “I pray thee, good Mistress Alice, tell me... is not this house as nigh heaven as mine own?” We remember the phrase, put in the mouth of the homeless Raphael twenty years earlier, that from all places the way to heaven is equally far. The phrase, quoted by the wanderer to Nowhere, has become the word experienced by the wanderer to Somewhere—for we cannot escape emigration.

And what did Mistress Alice say? “Bone deus, Bone deus, man, will this gear never be left?”

III

The “ideal” of More, thus, is an instrument of social critique. This instrument has its historical place halfway between Christian spiritualism and the later massive eschatology of social revolution. The “ideal” is meant seriously insofar as it attacks the social evils of the age; it is, on principle, not meant seriously as a program of reform. This ambiguity is the inexhaustible source of misunderstandings; for into his richly elaborated description of Utopia, which as a whole and in its principles is not meant as a project for social reform, More has slipped a wealth of details that are meant as suggestions for concrete improvements. While it is not always possible to distinguish with certainty between the two classes of suggestions (particularly because More gave free reign to his sense of humor and taste for satire), there is no doubt about their existence. On the one hand, we have the concluding passage of the work in which More remarks that he cannot agree with everything Raphael has said but that there are many things in the Utopian commonwealth he would wish to see realized in our societies, though he had little hope for it. On the other hand, there is a much-neglected passage that leaves no doubt about More’s opinion concerning the status of his ideal. Speaking as Raphael, More suggests that everyman’s personal interest, to say nothing of the authority of Christ, would long ago have “converted the whole world to the institutions of this republic unless that one and only beast, the prince and father of all mischief, pride [superbia] did not hinder it.”

this passage the full weight that it gains if we consider it as coming from a man who has the Civitas Dei at his fingertips. The superbia is the fundamental vice, rooted in the amor sui; it is the will and pride of particular existence; it is, by definition, the original sin of man in his revolt against God. This “prince and father of all mischief” can be kept in bounds, with the aid of Grace, in the daily struggle for the sanctification of life, but the wound inflicted to the nature of man cannot be closed for good. The Utopians have achieved the impossible when, through their institutional devices, they have removed “the infernal serpent which creeps into the heart of man.” More knew that he had created an ideal commonwealth by eliminating from the nature of man the fundamental factor that makes impossible the creation of social institutions in which men can “live happily ever after.”

The clearness on this point, however, does not invalidate the ideal as an instrument of critique. On the contrary, the removal of the superbia points to the evil that More wishes to stigmatize. Certainly, no institutions can change the nature of man; the superbia is with us; but that does not mean that it has to run amuck. The commonwealth without superbia is the counter-idea to the surrounding historical reality of the decaying feudal age in which More sees superbia working its destruction without restraint. The critical point is sharpened because More endows his islanders with a philosophy of conduct and a system of virtues that is essentially pagan. They are hedonists, going after their pleasure under the guidance of nature and reason. They are restrained in their indulgence by temperance and justice so that they will not damage their neighbors. They recognize the virtues of the intellectual soul and find pleasure in the life of contemplation. They detest technical metaphysics, but they have developed a philosophy of morals, a science of nature and the useful arts. They recognize human nature as social and consider it their duty to aid one’s fellowman individually, as well as to organize social institutions (schools, hospitals, care of the aged and infirm, etc.), which through collective provision make life as agreeable as possible for everybody. They have

16. The Utopians “ea vitae sunt instituta secuti, quibus reipublicae fundamenta iecerunt non modo felicissime, verum etiam, quantum humana praesagiri conjectura contigit, aeternum duratura” [The Utopians “have followed those institutions of life with which they laid the foundations of the commonwealth not only most auspiciously, but which, as far as human conjecture is capable of predicting] is concerned, will be everlasting” [ibid., 307].
a nonhereditary class of learned men into which everybody can rise who shows special gifts. They do not mar this pleasant life by acquisitiveness but hold all property in common; everybody is amply provided from the common warehouses for his simple needs; and their meals are organized collectively through refectories. The point in this peaceful, happy life—ascetic and hedonistic at the same time—is the absence of Christianity. Such individual and social happiness is possible even under the conditions of a primitive, pagan civilization—forgetting about the little vanishing trick with the superbia; and how do our so-called Christian societies compare with this ideal?"  

Superbia without restraint is More's accusation against the society of his time. The problem is fundamentally the same as that of Erasmus, but More's horizon is much wider. He recognizes the evil not only in the pleonexia of the princes but generally among all classes of the people; the lust for power and political aggrandizement is only one manifestation among others. For More's famous description of the state of England and of Western society at large, the reader should refer to the monographic literature, or better to the Utopia itself. Let us only recollect the lords who, after a war, release their retainers who are unfit for regular work and a plague for the country; the landowners who drive away their tenants in order to convert their estates to sheep farming; as a consequence, the propertyless beggars who fill the country and live by charity, robbery, and thievery; the cruel criminal law that punishes petty thefts of hungry people with hanging; the degradation through whoring, drinking, and gambling; the rigging of the law in favor of the upper class; the brutal exploitation of labor, and the dismissal of the aged and sick, leaving them to starvation and death; the corruption of the court society and its loafing hangers-on; the machinations for war; the kings who are not satisfied with tending to the welfare of their own country but want to conquer a second kingdom that they cannot rule anyway; the degradation of the people through excessive taxes, and the king who is not fit to rule over free men; the complete absence of a sense of social obligation and of governmental duty to repair such evils by poor laws, reform of the criminal law, provision for hospitals, building up of a native industry that will give

17. This point of the contrast between pagan happiness and Christian corruption has been finely brought out by Chambers, Thomas More, 125 ff.: "The Meaning of Utopia."
employment to the dispossessed tenant-farmers, and educational institutions.

At the root of all these evils, More finds the institution of private property; if private property were abolished, as it is in Utopia, these evils would disappear along with it. At this point we must beware of running off at a tangent and indulging in the usual fallacy of interpreting More as a forerunner of “socialism.” Property is for More not an isolated problem. He castigates the class society resting on property, and he criticizes the misuse of economic power as well as the social irresponsibility of the propertied class; but he neither believes that property and wealth in themselves are evil nor that a communal, frugal life is anything to wax enthusiastic about. On the contrary, he takes exception to Raphael’s ideal of the common life without the use of money because that “would radically destroy all nobility, magnificence, splendor and majesty which, according to common opinion [opinio publica], are the true graces and ornaments of a commonwealth.” 18 The problem of property arises in connection with the analysis of pride and is inseparable from it. Property should be abolished because it is the principal instrument for the indulgence of superbia. Pride is the real source of the evil, for pride measures its well-being not in terms of wealth but by the misery of others. “Superbia would not want to be a Goddess unless there were wretches left for her to command and insult, by comparison with whose miseries her happiness might shine the brighter, whose poverty she might torment and incense by the display of her riches.” 19 Wants and possessions might have standards and limits, but pride makes property the instrument for satisfying the lust for power and social superiority. More is already on the way to an analysis of pride that was later continued by Hobbes for the case of religious election as the instrument of satisfying pride. And More, like Hobbes, despairs of finding the cure for the diseased souls in a reawakening of the life of the spirit. Hobbes devised the Leviathan as the external power that will repress the proud by force; and More devises the propertyless society as the external, institutional measure that will have to substitute for the cure of the souls. It is perhaps not needless to stress that the conception of this remedy is as un-Platonic as anything can be.

19. Ibid., 306.
Property as the means of satisfying pride is More's target. In this sense must be understood More's characterization of the society of his time as a “conspiracy of the rich” (conspiratio divitum). The rich pretend to represent the interest of the commonwealth, and under this pretext they take care of their own interests. They devise legal tricks for keeping safely what they have gained unjustly, as well as for exploiting the labor of the poor for as little money as possible. Moreover, they add insult to injury by making general rules that operate for their profit, and then calling them the law of the land that is the same for the rich and the poor. In brief: More condemns a state of society and a practice of government that two centuries later, in a more progressive age, found its approval and theoretical sanction through Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government. In contrast with Locke, the less enlightened More believes that the satisfaction of pride through acquisitiveness as a principle of social and political order destroys the idea of the commonwealth. For how can one speak of a commonwealth when everybody is only after his private wealth (res publica, res privata)? The propertyless Utopian society, on the other hand, is truly a commonwealth, for here "where nothing is private, everybody is concerned about the public business."

We have the elements of More's construction in hand and can now appraise its political meaning. First of all, More was not a socialist. He constructed a socialist commonwealth in order to show what a society looks like when the principal instrument for the satisfaction of pride is removed. The elimination of pride was his primary problem, not the elimination of property. The question then arises whether he actually believed that the “wise institutions” of his Utopia would remedy the evil. This question must be answered in the negative. As a conscious Christian and trained theologian, More knew that superbia cannot be abolished by institutional devices. If he knew it, the next question must be, why did he indulge in this game? Here we touch the center of More's problem, that is, his spiritual weakness and pessimism; but here we touch also a fundamental problem of modern politics.

Once More had diagnosed the evils of the time as a rampage of superbia, the Christian answer would have been the restoration of

20. Ibid., 303.
21. Ibid., 303 f.
22. Ibid., 299.
published essays, 1940–1952

spiritual order, for instance through a reform of the church. Like Machiavelli, however, More seems to have had no confidence in this possibility. In this impasse of sentiment we have to look for the origin of the half-serious play with the idea of a society in which the evils of superbia are removed through wise institutions. The goodness of the institutions substitutes for the goodness of man; a technical device solves the problem of the substantive order in the soul. More himself still had enough substance to know that such stuff can lead only to Nowhere. Nevertheless, he indulged in the play; and the results of the play do not differ from the results at which the thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries arrived when the spiritual weakness of More had degenerated into spiritual impotence. The overall result is the renunciation of spiritual order both in the soul and in society. The spiritual order is replaced by the social ideal. The “ideal” gains its supreme importance in modern politics because it seems to open the way toward a stable social order through pragmatic devices instead of through the sanctification of life. It is, on principle, already the situation that T. S. Eliot has castigated as the dream of “an order so perfect that no one will need to be good.” Still, the “ideal” must have a content. And here again, More has pointed the way toward a hedonistic ratio, without spiritual guidance, that will provide the idea of a moderate economic existence for everybody, with a hundred great books thrown in for culture.

But here we reach the parting of the ways between More and the later moderns; for More not only knew that the realization of the ideal presupposed the impossible (that is, the abolition of superbia) but also had enough joy of the world himself in order to see that the ideal existence was a somewhat drab affair. A definite number of independent fallacies follow when the balance in which More kept his dream is disturbed. The political thinker—if by courtesy we may so call him—may understand that ideal institutions will not work unless the superbia is really abolished; hence, he will embark on its abolition as the prelude to the establishment of the perfect realm. This is the way of the activist mystics—from the paracletes of the Reformation to the paracletes of Positivism and Communism, that is, to Comte and Marx. Or he may accept

23. This, by the way, would also have been the Platonic answer. We have warned already against accepting the “Platonism” of constructors of “ideal” commonwealth at its face value.
unlimited *superbia* as an ineradicable part of human nature and devise political institutions that will either suppress its drive by absolute force, as in the Hobbesian Leviathan, or let the individual drives balance each other, as did Locke, Hamilton, and Madison. This latter system has achieved considerable practical importance in politics because it works quite well as long as there are human and natural resources to be exploited so that there is enough to go around for satisfying the “democracy of cupidity”—as this system recently has been characterized. And then, of course, there are the innocents of the Pelagian persuasion who would take an ideal at its face value, who believe that man is good and that with effort and persuasion the perfect state will ultimately be realized. In spite of their futility, their social importance is considerable, for they provide the muddiness that enables the less innocent to catch their fish.

IV

In conclusion, let us consider More’s much-debated ideals with regard to warfare.

On principle, his islanders are peaceable. War they consider a beastly thing, though no species of beasts uses it as much as man; they hold it in abomination; “and, contrary to the custom of almost all other nations, they count nothing as inglorious as glory gained in war.” Nevertheless, they are no lambs; they are excellently equipped for war through strenuous military training as well as by virtue of the vast treasure that accumulates through trade and through land rents that are paid by foreign countries as war indemnities. The Utopians never conduct wars for national aggrandizement; all their wars are just wars in the sense that they are sanctions for violations of law committed by others; and the aims of these wars are strictly limited to obtaining by force what is their legal due, or, if that proves impossible, to inflicting enough terror to dissuade the enemy from trying it a second time.

More, thus, unlike Erasmus, recognizes a *bellum justum*. Hence, the question arises: When is a war just? On this problem, More is elaborate. Wars are just, in the first place, when they serve the purpose of establishing colonies in territories occupied by other

people. Due to their prosperous and healthy life, the islanders have an increasing population; the overflow is settled on the neighboring continent where the natives do not make proper use of their acreage. The indigenous population can live in symbiosis with the colonizers, under their institutions; if they resist, then the justissima causa belli is given for the law of nature (praescriptum naturae) commands that the earth be properly used for the nutrition of those who need it.\footnote{25} Other just causes are not missing. The Utopians defend their own territories as well as those of their friends against any invasion; and they are circumspect enough not to wait for an aggression but to conduct a war of prevention if they notice war preparations anywhere directed against them. Moreover, out of humanitarian sentiment, they aid oppressed peoples to free themselves from the yoke of tyranny and servitude. They aid their friends not only in the defense of their country but also in offensive warfare when they have been consulted on the issue and are convinced that all peaceful means of settlement are exhausted. They aid them in particular when their merchants are oppressed in a foreign country under the pretext of law; for they consider it particularly unjust when people are oppressed under the color of justice. They are more forbearing in commercial matters when they are themselves the victims and answer only with economic sanctions; but when any of their citizens are attacked physically, they send an embassy demanding the surrender of the guilty for punishment (through death or slavery), and if the surrender is denied they declare war.

The conduct of war is strictly rational. The principal purpose is minimization of bloodshed, and in particular avoiding the loss of precious Utopian lives. As soon as they declare war, they secretly affix posters in public places in the enemy country, promising immense rewards for killing the prince and lesser rewards for killing other notables; they double the reward for delivering them alive. Indemnity and rewards are especially promised to the proscribed persons themselves if they betray each other. This measure is most effective because the rewards are so high, and they are offered in safe land investments in other countries, that they are practically irresistible. Others consider these methods base and cruel, but they consider them praiseworthy and prudent; for great slaughter is prevented among the people if only the few guilty are killed.

\footnote{25. Ibid., 155.}
If bribery does not work, they try to foment conspiracies of malcontents who may aspire to the throne. Or when the stirring of domestic troubles fails, they stir up neighbors to engage in war on some trumped-up violation of agreements “which never are wanting to princes.” Such allies they supply with money and let them fight with their own manpower. If greater armies are needed they employ mercenaries; and only as a last resort they employ their own men.

These engaging principles of Morean warfare have become the \textit{causa justa} of an Anglo-German war concerning their meaning. The German historians found that More was a perfidious Englishman who invented all the pretexts for the expansion of the British empire and with characteristic English hypocrisy endowed them with a moral halo. The English snort in contempt because the British overseas expansion was still a century away; and however well the precepts fit the naughty empire and its methods, one cannot charge More with having foreseen or counseled them. The Germans glumly admit defeat on several counts of historical detail but insist that the whole affair still smells, though they are no longer quite certain of what.

As usual in such debates, both sides have made valuable contributions to the understanding of an important problem. The English certainly are right when they reject all connection between More and British imperialism, with equal certainty the Germans are right when they trust their olfactory sense and insist that an explanation is in order.

The explanation, in our opinion, is ready at hand if we continue to apply the principles that have guided our interpretation of \textit{Utopia} up to this point. Because of the fundamental ambiguity of More’s “ideal” we cannot be absolutely sure how much he meant seriously, and how much not. The remark that many consider such methods base and cruel may reflect his own position. Such pages, however, as the loving description of the people’s army in action (when the Utopians resort to the use of their own manpower) sound rather like the dream of a national statesman who wants to get rid of the feudal military, in many respects resembling Machiavelli’s dream of the people’s militia. And generally, one must consider that the enumeration of the just causes of war is perhaps less an ideal than an attempt to list sensible causes of war [in the people’s interest] in opposition to the frivolous causes of the princes.
Nevertheless, with all due allowance for More’s critical intentions and personal reservations, there remains, as in the case of his other institutional devices, the hard fact that he could indulge in such flights of fancy at all. What strikes the reader as loathsome in this relation of the causes and methods of war is the infallibility of the ideal. Those who live by the ideal can do no wrong; the ideal decides on the justice of conduct of those who do not accept it; and, as a consequence, the carriers of the ideal combine in their persons the functions of party, judge, and executor. When through endowment with an absoluteness that properly is the spirit’s, the temporal order acquires the characteristics of an “ideal,” the effect is a peculiar “moralization” of political conduct. This moralization we can define by the following principal characteristics: [1] The possessor of the ideal loses the consciousness of his own superbia and, in particular in political relations, of his own pleonexia. [2] On the level of consciousness, the superbia has been channeled successfully into the formation of the ideal; under this aspect, the ideal is a manifestation of spiritual pride, of the libido dominandi. [3] When this perversion has firmly taken hold of the mind of the idealist, he can pursue his desires without a sense of guilt because the desires are now located in the ideal, and the ideal, by definition, is a moral absolute. [4] The further consequence is a peculiar variant of intentionalist ethics insofar as the ideal now sanctifies the means necessary for its realization—a consequence that becomes particularly visible in More’s principles. [5] Since the carrier of the ideal can only act morally, everybody who is in conflict with him is automatically wrong; the Utopians can only conduct just wars—after having defined the principles of justice in such a manner that their application inevitably results in the preservation and expansion of their own power. [6] As a consequence, the tragedy of existential conflict is eliminated from history; the enemy is not fighting for the manifestation of his existence with the same right as the idealist; anybody who wants to lead his own way of life, unmolested by the idealist, is a criminal. [7] And more generally, the ideal abolishes the meaning of history as the unfolding of human potentiality through the plurality of historical civilizations; for only one civilization realizes the idea of man, and that is the civilization of the idealist. [8] And finally, and most dangerously, the brutal attack on the historical realization of all values that do not happen to be incorporated in the ideal forces everybody else into
more's utopia

a defensive position in which the worst atrocities and crimes may seem justified in order to ward off this insult to human dignity.

V

At the core of More's utopian idealism we find the same pleonexia of the intellectual as at the core of Erasmus's asceticism. Moreover, it is the same demonism of power without the grace of spirit as in Machiavelli, only aggravated by its disguise as an ideal. The conception of More, thus, is of considerably more general importance than any realization of his precepts in British imperialism. More has the dubious historical merit of having expressed for the first time to the full the pleonexia of secular reason, justice, and morality. His expression of the ideal is not the cause of what followed afterward, but it is the first tangible symptom of the great spiritual disease that was to grip Western civilization in the following centuries. And the first systematic elaboration of this idea is not due to the British [as the German critics seem to assume], but to the Spaniards, in particular to Vitoria's Relectiones de Indis—not because of any particular nefariousness of the Spaniards, but because they were the first who had to grapple with the justification of their pleonexia in the Conquest. The Utopia shows the problem of spiritual disintegration at an even more advanced stage than the work of either Machiavelli or Erasmus, insofar as the pleonexia has now spread from the princes to the commonwealth. The work of More is the first evocation of a people who set themselves as the standard of mankind. Again, More is not the cause of the sequel in pragmatic history; but, again, here we get the first glimpse of an international and intercivilizational field of politics on which everybody has an ideal like the Utopians and feels entitled to lay down the principles of justice for everybody else, with the ensuing rationality of warfare in the service of the ideal. Hence, we see the historical importance of More in the fact that in his Utopia we can observe in formation a complex of sentiments and ideas that in the following centuries became a decisive factor in Western history. The actual atrocities of Western colonial imperialism, of National Socialism, and of Communism mark the end of a curve, of which the beginning is marked by the playful atrocity of the humanistic intellectual.
Goethe’s Utopia

Goethe was born in 1749. When the French Revolution broke out in 1789 he was a man of forty; when the star of Napoleon went down in 1814 he was a man of sixty-five; and the year of his death, 1832, was the year of the English Reform Bill. His youth and development to mature manhood thus were concurrent with the last decades of the ancien régime, while the second half of his long life coincided with the overthrow of that order and with the first acts of democratization. The youth grew up and received his education in the stable surroundings of the old urbane society of Frankfurt, Strasbourg, and Leipzig, and in his middle twenties he was projected into the position of princely educator and first minister of a petty principality in central Germany. His career seemed to be secured and his life settled—too settled perhaps, as his escape to Italy in 1786 was to show. Then came the great upheaval of 1789: the mass movement of the revolution with all its terrors; the exuberant, imperialistic French nationalism that carried the revolt beyond the borders of France; the military breakdown and extinction of the old German empire; the growth of German counternationalism, with its climax in the Wars of Liberation; and the fantastic, large-scale moving of armies across Europe, from Paris to Moscow, and back from Moscow to Paris. These political and military mass movements were accompanied by the social and economic changes of the incipient machine age. Industrial workers and specialists were increasing in numbers; the competition of the machine disrupted old communities by breaking down their economy; the first socialist thinkers, Claude Henri de Saint-Simon and Marie Charles

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Fourier, had appeared, and the prophets of the new age propagated their messages of a technocratic, planned mass society.

Upheavals of such magnitude try every man’s soul. What could be the attitude of a Goethe toward the great events of the time? On the whole it was negative. Revolutionary mass movements, with their inevitable detail of greed and lust, of vulgarity and bloody futility, of ludicrousness and baseness, held no appeal for him. And equally loathsome to him was the wave of German nationalism, with the crusading enthusiasm against the Satan Napoleon. In the subsequent quiet of the nineteenth century, Goethe was frequently criticized for his lack of response to the greatness of his age. Again today, when we ourselves are witnesses of momentous historical events, we know that a “great” epoch is a time when the order of tradition, which endows the life of man in society with style and dignity, is crumbling and when the motive power of history is reduced to the intense but shabby passions of lost, little men. The eye of Goethe could be attracted only by the phenomenon that created order in the troubles of the time, that mastered the flux of passions—that is, by the phenomenon of Napoleon. Even during his last years, in his conversations with Eckermann, Goethe returns again and again to the fertility and ordering power of Napoleon’s daemonic nature.

To Goethe, the revolution had revealed the massiveness of the forces that were in motion, as well as the depth to which the old order had been shaken; and the phenomenon of Napoleon had revealed the measure of the man who could meet these forces as a master.

And Goethe was a man of daemonic qualities himself.

To fit his life as a highly respected man of letters and administrator into an aristocratic social order that he in his turn respected—that was a limitation he could impose on the explosive titanism of his forces, hard as this duty was to fulfill. To feel his human qualities as a negligible quantity in the movements of massive social forces he despised—this experience left in his soul a traumatic scar of resignation.

The resignation of which we are speaking was manifested in a peculiar literary production of Goethe’s old age. In form it is a novel, entitled *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre* (*Wilhelm Meister’s Years as a Journeyman*) and bearing the subtitle *Die Entsagenden* (*The Renunciants*). Nevertheless, anybody who approached the *Wanderjahre* with the anticipation of reading a good story told by a great
poet would be disappointed, for as a novel the book is boring. It consists of a loosely knit sequence of episodes, short stories, sententious reflections, letters, and pedagogical digressions designed for the didactic purpose of setting forth the author's ideas on education and on the proper way of organizing social life under the conditions of the new age. It is a utopian tract; and Goethe defines utopia as "a series of ideas, thoughts, suggestions, and intentions, brought together to form an image of reality, although in the ordinary course of things they hardly will ever be found together." Goethe's utopia is his concession to the forces of the age. If circumstances had denied him the role of the man of action, he still could act on society, in the form befitting the sage, by drawing an image of reality as a guide for the bewildered.

A likeness of social reality must have a plot of social action, however thin. As the creative agent of his image, Goethe chose a society of likeminded friends, briefly referred to as the "Bond." They are held together by their common insight into the problems of the age, by their common idea of human dignity to be realized in a free society, by their common will to extract themselves and others from present difficulties and to establish a new society in conformity with their image. Masonic ideas contributed to the plot. Goethe's enterprising friends do not form a revolutionary party for the overthrow of the old order of society: Their adventurous utopianism is satisfied with emigration to America and resettlement in socialist cooperatives. Land and capital are provided by wealthy members of the group.

Of the rich detail of a volume containing more than four hundred pages, we can suggest only a few significant features. With regard to the material motivations of the plan, the advent of the machine is the decisive factor: Goethe accepts the industrial age as inevitable. Regions that have eked out a living by cottage industries such as spinning and weaving will lose their subsistence. A part of the population will be compelled to build a new life elsewhere, and emigrants will be recruited from such regions. On the other hand, there are inventors with new ideas, difficult to introduce in a tradition-bound, settled society; and again, emigration to a more plastic and receptive environment will be the solution. Moreover, nutritional problems are not neglected. A rational fruit and vegetable culture and improved communications will better the defective diet of the lower classes. The idea of a welfare society, mainly consisting
Goethe’s Utopia

of farmers and artisans, improved by a still-moderate industrial productivity, is thus the basis of Goethe’s utopia—distinguished, however, from similar Jeffersonian ideas by the factor of social planning and cooperative production.

A society of this type, particularly if it is to settle on virgin soil in America, needs useful skills. It has no use for intellectuals; it needs plow-hands, carpenters, miners, and physicians. Most revealing for Goethe’s social resignation is the utilitarianism of his work. The new world will be a realm of specialists who make themselves useful for society. There is no room for romantic dreamers or for men who can talk about everything and do nothing or for hotheads with political ideas that will upset the public order.

The utilitarian soberness of such order is exposed to dangers mainly from two sources: from a life of passion and from religious intolerance. Vast complexes of the novel are devoted to these two problems. The whole first book, with its short stories and episodes, is practically a catalogue of situations that illustrate either the ideal, solid family life as the nucleus of the new society, or the entanglements of passion that must be dissolved in order to bring the victims back to the desirable norm of social life. And the description of the “Pedagogical Province” in the second book has as its centerpiece the doctrine of the three forms of respect or of awe: respect for divine powers above, respect for one’s fellow men of equal rank, and respect for the suffering below. The three forms of reverence lie for Goethe at the core of the three historical types of religiousness. The ethnic religions, that is, the religions of the ancient peoples, overcame the baser fears of man by awakening his awe of higher powers whose commands take precedence over the desires and threats of man. The second type of religion, resting on respect for our equals, Goethe calls the religion of the philosophers. Man occupies the middle between subhuman nature and transcendental powers. The insight into the position of man in the world, as the link between the higher and lower, and the understanding that all men share the dignity of this rank as equals—that is what secures the cohesion of a free, egalitarian society. The understanding of the dignity of man, however, might lead to improper pride, to a contempt for the bond by which we are all linked with nature below us, and perhaps even to disrespect for those who suffer more than others from natural disabilities and afflictions. Hence, the third religion, that is, Christianity, has awakened reverence for the divine
order in humbleness and poverty, in suffering and death. Even sin and crime command restraint of judgment and must be met with charity, for possibly they are not obstacles but aids in the progress toward sanctification. None of the three religions holds a truth that excludes the others; they complement each other and unite in the highest reverence, that is, in the respect of man for himself. This self-respect endows man with the courage of striving for the highest of which human nature is capable, and it enables man to rest on his dignity without falling into the vulgarity of pride and selfishness.

In reading and evaluating Goethe's utopia one must use some caution. The *Wanderjahre* is a didactic work, written for a definite audience—not for us of today. It was written for the German generation of the post-Napoleonic era, for the romantics and dreamers, for the malcontents and young men with grandiose ideas, for revolutionaries who knew all about reforming society and could not build their own lives. They were the men who needed curbing; they had to be told about the exigencies of reality, about submission to the discipline of a specialized vocation and the fulfillment of daily duties, and they above all were the men who had to be told that social order rests on respect—for one's fellowmen, for human suffering, and for God. All that is important in itself, but it is not all that a thinker of Goethe's qualities has to say about man, society, and the world. The self-expression of Goethe is not to be found in the *Wanderjahre* but in the poem on which he was working at the same time, in *Faust*, Part II. In his utopia he speaks as an educator, and he is very conscious of the first principle of education: that you must not tell your pupil that which lies beyond his grasp and which he might pervert through misunderstanding. The *Wanderjahre*, therefore, must be read with an eye for the allusions to problems beyond the area of actual discussion, and above all with an ear for Goethe's silences. Much of his image of reality has become the actuality of today, perhaps too much of it for comfort. It is quite probable that if he had to write a utopia for our generation, Goethe would find it necessary to curb utilitarian specialists and young men who are all too willing to submit to routine and social discipline in mass movements. Today, most probably, he would sternly declare that the dignity of man consists in the fulfillment of obligations beyond coasting through one's life on the usefulness that earns a living.
Just as in Rome, besides the Romans, there is another populace of statues, so it is that outside this real world there is another world of madness, well-nigh more powerful, in which most people are living.

—Goethe

I

The Puritan movement of the seventeenth century had a radical wing that understood revolution as the erection of the Kingdom of God on earth. The saints of the Lord, led by the Son and filled with the Spirit, did battle for state power, not to inaugurate a new political era, but to allow a new gnostic eon to succeed the old era that was marked for destruction. This radical wing linguistically expressed its position regarding society and world by means of biblical symbolism. The design had come about through the times (durch die Zeiten war gekommen) that 2 Esdras 6:9 prophesied, and

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1. The designation of the phenomena treated in this essay as “gnostic” must be adequately grounded in a larger context. Here we can only mention that the problem of Gnosis has shifted substantially since Adolf Harnack’s time. For an account of the contemporary state of the research, see Simone Petremont, Le dualisme chez Platon, les Gnostiques et les Manichées [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947]; on the continuity between the Gnosis of antiquity and the medieval sectarian movements, see Hans Söderberg, La Religion des Cathares: Étude sur le Gnosticisme de la Basse Antiquité et du Moyen Âge [Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktr., 1949]; on parallels between modern Gnosis and that of ancient Christian times, see Hans Urs von Balthasar’s introduction to his book, Irenäus: Die Geduld des Reifens [Klosterberg: G. Schwabe, 1943]; on Gnosis in German Idealism, see Hans Urs von Balthasar, Prometheus: Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Idealismus [Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle, 1947]; on the continuity of the problematic in terms of the nexus between politics and eschatology since antiquity, see Jacob Taubes, Abendländische Eschatologie [Bern: A. Francke, 1947].
would come to fulfillment in what Isa. 65:17–19 had announced: “Then see, I shall create new heavens and a new earth, and that which was once thought will no more be taken to heart; instead you will be ever joyous and happy in what I create. Then see, I shall create Jerusalem for delight and its people for pleasure. And I will rejoice in Jerusalem and exult in my people; and no more shall be heard there the voice of weeping or the sound of crying.”

These things are established, well-known facts of history. Less well known even today is their significance as a decisive phase in the evolution of modern politics. Difficulties beset our understanding of this because we are still too deeply caught up in the world view created by the Gnosis of the Puritan revolutionaries and their secularizing successors; we lack critical distance, especially regarding conceptual tools for a critique of public consciousness. This is because the availability of such tools in the world of philosophers and scholars has little weight in a period of mass democracy in which rational discussion has lost its status as a public force. Today we lack these tools even more than was the case in the age of the Puritans with its more acutely Christian consciousness. The oddity of an attempt to establish the Kingdom of God by means of generals upon a field of battle was perceived even then; and the pamphlets of the radical Puritans were for this reason just as defensive toward Christian arguments as they were aggressive in their condemnation of the Kingdom of Darkness that was to be eliminated. Under the pressure of criticism army chaplains and sectarian leaders were compelled to characterize more exactly the peculiarity of this undertaking in opposition to the Christian tradition, and an examination of one or two of these defensive arguments might supply an introduction to our broader investigation.

Vessels of the Spirit armed to the teeth had to come to terms with the statement of Christ: “My Kingdom is not of this world.” The difficulty presented by this statement was partially overcome by the technique usual among literalist believers of the Rabulist stripe, namely, of confronting it with other passages. Of course Christ said his Kingdom is not of this world, but did he say it shouldn’t be established on earth? On the contrary, Rev. 5:10 explicitly assures us: “And [thou] hast made us unto our God kings and priests: and we shall reign on the earth.” World and earth must therefore be distinguished from each other. World means the period of worldly
domination by the human monarchy to which the Puritans have been subjected; and this world will be succeeded on earth by that other of which the Epistle to the Hebrews (2:5) speaks: “the world to come, whereof we speak.”

A sermon preached in 1647 by Thomas Collier in Cromwell’s headquarters leads yet more deeply into this motif of juxtaposing text against text. Collier went from defense to attack. The new heaven and the new earth are the Kingdom of God in virtue of the Spirit in the saints. Heaven as a supernatural locus of grace is a misunderstanding:

We always had and we still have very lowly and carnal images of heaven in so far as we take it to be a place of glory beyond the firmament, invisible, and we are to enjoy its joys only beyond this life. But God himself is the Kingdom of Saints, their pleasure, and their glory. Wherever God is manifest, there is his Kingdom and that of the Saints, and he manifests himself in the Saints. Here is the great and hidden mystery of the Gospel, this new creation in the Saints.

This passage just cited from Collier’s sermon is one of the most remarkable documents of Puritan speculations insofar as it makes explicit what in other places could only be hinted at as a background idea: There is an old and a new world, an old and a new creation. Both worlds are on “earth,” both are in history. Under the term earth we are to understand the constitution of being, and especially of human being in society. Under the term world we are to understand the gnostic constitution of being as unredeemed darkness or redemptive light. The earth, as it exists, can be the world of darkness or the world of light, realm of the devil or Kingdom of God. This is the classical break with Christianity. The Christian world, as God’s creation, is not a realm of darkness; to be sure, it is darkened by the all-too-human factor of the Fall; but it is ennobled again by the Incarnation of God as the locus of fulfilled humanity within the limitations of creaturely being. This Christian tension between created and divine being, between the limits of being and transfiguration by grace in death, gets dissolved into an immanent historical process that embraces world and superworld as temporally unfolding cons. And this immanentization dissolves even the symbol of “heaven” inasmuch as it substitutes a materialist paradise for the mystery of the beatific vision of God in death and then against this “lowly image” calls for the temporal realization of the eternal Kingdom as its spiritual interpretation. In this annihilating attack on Christian
symbolism Collier has indeed gone as far as anyone could possibly go without abandoning it altogether. The enlightened intellectual’s antiphilosophical and anti-Christian propaganda technique of interpreting any symbols of transcendence not according to the analogy of being but of misinterpreting it literally as a direct statement about a finite object in order, then making the literalist nonsense ludicrous, is fully developed here. There is already indicated the historical line along which gnostic politics will shift from Christian symbolic language to the anti-Christian symbolism of Marxism.

II

The nature of a thing is that by which it is this kind of thing and not another in its essence. *Ex definitione* nature is immutable. Nevertheless the gnostic politicians wish to alter nature in a manner that for the time being will not be more closely clarified. To the degree that the intention of realizing the impossible is turned into a goal of political action, the program cannot be carried out; to the degree that this program is grasped, the spiritual condition of the people who apprehend it is betrayed as a pneumopathological one. The essence of gnostic politics must be interpreted as a spiritual sickness, as a *nosos* in Plato’s and Schelling’s sense of the term: a disturbance in the life of the spirit as distinct from mental illness in the sense of a psychopathology.

Without clarity on this point a critical construal of gnostic politics is impossible. The philosophical language of the classical and Christian tradition has been shaped in terms of differentiated tasks for investigation. As ontological language it grows out of theory, of the contemplation of being and its order; as metaphysical language it grows out of the attempt at a speculative extrapolation toward the ground of being; as theological language it grows out of the exegesis of experiences of transcendence. Such philosophical language is the language of the attempt to understand the order of the world and the place of human beings in it. It is not a nonsensical language, and so it cannot enter into conversation with the language of the absurd. It supplies us no tool for assessing gnostic programs as to their value, for taking the measure of gnostic actions by the standards of rational purposiveness, or for discussing the linguistic expressions of the gnostic posture on their own grounds. It can only treat these programs, actions, and linguistic expressions as symptoms
of a sickness inasmuch as it verifies at what point the break with reality or the derailment (as Jaspers named this phenomenon in the case of Nietzsche) occurs. A critical investigation of gnostic phenomena consequently will have to bring into high relief the linguistic confusion regarding reality. Because nature transformed by the spirit—the “reality” of the gnostic—is not the reality of the philosophical knowledge of order, and yet the gnostic politician talks about it and operates within it as if it were reality in the normal sense of the term. Therefore, for the sake of resolving this fundamental difficulty, in the analysis of symptoms that follows, the expression “dream reality” will be used as a shorthand for gnostic “reality.”

III

Of dream reality we neither have experience nor can we bring it about in reality by our action. Yet Gnostics have to speak about it as if they have had experience of it; and they have to act as if they were capable of bringing it about. And they must do both from their vantage point in reality from which they desire to break through into the realm of dream reality. The pathological experience as such needs no further explication by example, since our memory of it is fresh from the “eruption” of the Gnosis of National Socialism. We can turn directly to the two questions that Gnostics need to answer. The first question: How can a picture of dream reality be constructed so that it bears features of reality and stays on “earth” and yet still suggests the transfiguration into the condition of light? The second question: How can a program for action be constructed so that the actions run their course in reality, yet have as their goal not reality but dream reality?

Gnostics are sick in spirit, but they are not stupid; they desire the impossible, but they know what they want. They want to break through to a dream reality that is intended to be a reality, but they know that a dream reality is a reality of a different sort, and that precisely those characteristics that are essential to it cannot emerge from the experience of normal reality. In their awareness of this difficulty they occasionally show a tendency not to respond to the first question at all, if possible. In the Jewish apocalyptic vision of a fissure running through the ages Esdras importunes the Lord with requests for particular things; and he is restrained by God.
with the warning: Do not ask me any more questions, Esdras! The perfect solution is the song of the Hitler Youth: We are marching, we are marching into the future!—because this formula, so laden with eschatological tension, touches the deepest desires of redemption and yet says nothing about the dream reality to be expected within historical time.

Gnostic politicians with some intellectual stature find their personal solutions for this difficulty according to their temperament and conscientiousness. Bakunin was of the opinion that the historical process of transition from the old to the new world would take some time. The first phase of action, which fell to his generation, would consist in radical disruption of the old world; the coercive institutions of the old world—the organized power of the state and the bureaucracy—would have to be eliminated. The process of annihilation itself and the subsequent disorder would require fruitful sacrifices; but these sacrifices must be used so that upon the ruins of the old world an essentially good human nature delivered from the distorting influences can build up its perfect life in free federative action. As to what this perfect life is supposed to look like, nothing at all is said, because we ourselves still belong to the generation of destruction; we can help the world toward perfection by the annihilation of the old world, but the knowledge of the new life is that it is to be created for the generation liberated by our action.

Bakunin lived so profoundly in his faith in redemption through action—through the Einsatz, as the National Socialist Gnostics called the will that does not see—that he did not need any knowledge. Perhaps this is why he could understand more easily than others that this knowledge does not exist. At any rate, this epistemological refinement in dreaming is the outstanding characteristic of Bakunin. Precisely because for him the dream reality of the new world is not to be envisioned, but only to be created in existential solidarity, he could concentrate entirely on the old world; and this relationship to the old was the negative one of disruptive action. By means of his profession of radical nonknowledge of dream reality the will to annihilation directed against the forces of order was clearly isolated as the only component of gnostic politics accessible to experience. In Bakunin’s tension of faith between nothingness and nothingness is revealed in its purest terms the nihilism of modern Gnosis; and to the extent that his life adhered
to this tension, it becomes prototypical for gnostic revolutionary existence.

Not all Gnostics are as restrained as Bakunin. They want to proclaim that of which their hearts are full. And since dream reality cannot be announced in the categories proper to reality, they work out a unique form of communication: the vision or outlook on the future. In the Puritan movement this form gets shaped and named in a pamphlet of 1641 entitled *A Glimpse of Sion’s Glory*. The English *glimpse* has no exact equivalent in German. It means a glancingly snatched look at a thing as if through a divide that is opened for a moment, uncertain in its apprehension, because the radiating glory sweeps away the sketchy outline.

What does the glimpse of Zion’s glory disclose? Above all, the socially revolutionary character of the movement that, as in Bakunin, is aimed against the current forces of order. God makes use of the common people when he proclaims the kingdom of his Son. The voice of Christ “comes first from the multitude, the common people. The voice is heard from them first, before it is heard from any others. God uses the common people and the multitude to proclaim that the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth.” Christ did not come to the wise, the noble, and the rich; he came to the poor. The spirit of Antichrist reigns in the upper classes; hence the Reformation and the uncovering of Antichrist began in the “so contemptible, common multitude.” In the new world, in contrast, the relationships of rule will express the truth of things. The rulers of the old world will not only be convinced of their injustices, but beyond this the people of God will come to the aid of their understanding by causing their degradation. Indeed, Isaiah has prophesied [49:23]:

“Kings shall be thy nursing fathers, and their queens thy nursing mothers: they shall bow down to thee . . . and lick up the dust of thy feet; and thou shalt know that I am the Lord: for they shall not be ashamed that wait for me.” The saints, on the other hand, “shall be all clothed in white linen, which is the righteousness of the Saints, the righteousness which they have through Christ, by which they are righteous before God and holy before men. Holiness will be inscribed upon their heads and upon their bridles; upon all will their graciousness shine forth in excess unto the glory of God.”

The symbolism of these visionaries in Israel has become obsolete today. More recent Gnostics replace the ancient oriental signs of subjection with concentration camps and gas chambers; and instead
of white linen testifying to one’s belonging to the kingdom, brown,
blue, black, or other colors needing to be washed less often are
selected for clothing. But the principle of the thing ought to be clear.

The vision confirms still more. Dream reality’s forms of law
and economics will be different. The presence of Christ in his
kingdom will make legal sanctions superfluous in the future. “It
is questionable whether there shall be need of ordinances, at least
in that way that now there is. . . . The presence of Christ shall be
there and supply all kind of ordinances.” The economic provision
of scarce goods, furthermore, will yield to a condition of abundance
and prosperity. Because Christ has purchased the whole world;
he has purchased it for the saints, and it will be delivered. Most
candidly the author supplies the motive for his conviction: “You
see that the Saints have very little now in this world; now they are
the poorest and meanest of all; but when the adoption of the Sons
of God comes in its fullness, then the world shall be theirs. . . .
Not only heaven shall be your kingdom, but this world bodily.”

In these points as well the vision is significant not because of the
extraordinariness, but because of the typical character of its picture.
Fantasies about paradise are typically a catalogue of negations of
existential needs. A paradise has to be free of poverty, sickness,
death, oppression, and sexual need. The dreams of the Glimpse
are concentrated on the political-economic needs—on poverty and
coercive authority. These are the constants that recur in other
gnostic dreams, as in freedom from want and fear of the Atlantic
Charter, or in the earthly paradise of Communism in which the
state will die off and everyone with their goods will be taken care
of in the measure of their needs.

IV

The visionary (der Blickende) stands in reality and forms a dream
picture (Traumbild) of the future. By means of his anticipatory
vision he wants to mediate to other people remaining in reality an
image of the longed-for condition and to win them over as collabora-
tors who will help him force the dream into the time of history. For
the critical observer the sick aspect of the vision and its motivating
intention consists in a derailment, a break with reality. He knows
that the dream cannot be realized and that the dream operation,
if it is undertaken, leads, after terrible disturbances of the existing
order, to a new condition of reality that has nothing to do with the intended dream reality. But the more intelligent of the Gnostics share the foresight of the philosophers in a remarkable fashion. The Gnostic too fears a derailment, even though the direction of his concern is reversed. Because what the philosopher foresees as necessary, the Gnostic must fear as possible: that the revolutionary saints will be successful in destroying the old order, but that after the deed is accomplished, they will be proven to be people as unholy as the rest and will have brought about the sacrificial destruction for nothing.

The direction in which this unholy derailment unfolds is to be learned all too clearly from the Puritan Glimpse. The dream images are the expression of a wild lust for domination freighted with resentment, just as it was diagnosed with masterful psychological skill as the essence of radical Puritanism by Thomas Hobbes [and by Richard Hooker before him]. Whatever might actually take place in the course of a gnostic revolution, it is certain that the victorious saints will form a new upper class marked by exquisite brutality, and that the members of the previous upper classes will be basically maltreated. The point is not the terrible consequences that inevitably overtake the subjugated people in a violent conflict, but the legitimation of violence as a spiritual penal action against the forces opposed to the light. The situation of those subjugated is horrible because they are not political opponents in the struggle for power; but in the dream fantasy of the Gnostic, they are cosmic opponents in the struggle of light with darkness. What is perpetrated upon the representatives of the old world is a cosmic judgment. From this pathological dream distortion the otherwise unintelligible “dialectical” reversals of which Marx was especially the master become comprehensible. In reality, formulas like “oppressors of the oppressors” or “expropriation of the expropriators” are ethically contradictory as requirements; in dream speculation, on the other hand, they have their good sense because oppression and expropriation, if practiced by Gnostics, is liberation. This negative phase of establishing the kingdom, the battle with the powers of darkness is, as already remarked, the only part of the gnostic program that can be realized. And it will be realized with some degree of certainty, since it puts the premium not only of a good work but of a redemptive work on the satisfaction of the lower instincts—a combination that always has its psychological attractiveness and,
in an age of mass vulgarization by the secularized intellectuals, inspires powerful political movements.

The Gnostic, who sees through this trick of the Acheronta just as well as the philosopher, has to be afraid that his movement will remain stuck in this phase of negation, that his followers will take the overthrow of institutions, the slaughter and plunder of opponents, as the essence of the establishment of the kingdom, and that the millennium will run aground on a piratelike coercive domination by insatiable thieves and killers. Marx saw this danger and so he distinguished between crude and true Communism. Crude Communism is “the generalization of private property.” The crude Communist is so overwhelmed by the domination of possessions that he wants to annihilate everything that cannot be owned as private property by everybody. He considers physical, immediate ownership as the only purpose of life; he does not want to abolish the workers’ form of existence, but to extend it to all people; and hence he desires to extinguish every distinctive talent by violence. The world of possessions leaves the marriage relationship with private property and enters into a relationship of universal prostitution with the community. This crude Communism negates the personhood of the human being. The avarice of private ownership is satisfied in a new manner inasmuch as the envy of the possessions of others is constituted as public power. Competition in capitalist society is envy and a desire to level smaller against greater private property; crude Communism is the fulfillment of this envy by means of a leveling to a general minimum. It destroys civilization by its return to an unnatural simplicity of poor people who are not beyond private ownership but have not yet arrived at it. It is a community of labor and of equality of income paid by the community as the generalized capitalist. In crude Communism is manifest the “vileness of private property which would posit itself as a positive common essence or community.”

This characterization of crude Communism is drawn from an early work of Marx, *The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. It is a subtle analysis of derailment into reality that approaches Hobbes in psychological insight. It has its special value because it elaborates the continuity between the reality the Gnostic wants to discard and the components of reality in his dream. Besides the bitter struggle of our age between gnostic movements and their opponents, and among the differently colored uniforms, it is all
too easily forgotten that these movements do not emerge from nothing but are bound up historically and causally in the stream of reality, that radical Puritanism is the coherent outcome of an already corrupt Christianity, and that Positivism, Communism, and National Socialism are the cannibalistic fruits of a corrupt liberal society.

V

The Gnostic has to be afraid of derailment from the dream. The problem nonetheless gets complicated for him by the fact that the fall into reality is an event in time. The struggle against the old world must be waged within reality; a gnostic altercation between SA [Sturmabteilung: storm troopers or Brownshirts] forces and their opponents is in reality indistinguishable from a nongnostic altercation. The new world begins with the destruction of the old, with the overthrow of institutions. And if it is a Communist new world then psychologically and institutionally it will inevitably look like what Marx called crude Communism. The new eon starts with crudity. But at what point does the transfiguration begin? And if it is not inserted immediately, how long must the crudity last before reaching the verdict that something has gone awry with the transfiguration?

In his youthful years Marx had concerned himself, in *The German Ideology* of 1845–1846, with the generation of the New Man [used synonymously with: total man, socialist man, superman]. The new, transfigured person is to be created in the experience of revolutionary action. For the mass engendering of the Communist consciousness a transmutation of human beings in the mass is necessary, an alteration such as can only be caused by the experience of revolution. Thus revolution is necessary not only for overthrowing the dominant classes but above all for the overthrowing class to reach the point where it “gets rid of the old filth” and so is made capable of a new foundation of society. This peculiar idea of the creation of the superman by a revolutionary blood-intoxication shows how closely the more recent Gnostics are related to each other, even if they battle each other on the historical scene. The Marxian blood-intoxication belongs to the same symbolic type as the National Socialist mystique that permitted the man of the millennium to be formed by the chemistry of blood and soil. And
in a writing of a German professor of constitutional law [Carl Schmitt] we discover on the occasion of his examining the brutality of the regime the identical formula as in Marx: “Out with the filth!”

We must repeat that the Gnostics are not stupid. The Marxian idea of the creation of the superman by the act of revolution can lead to difficulties in political practice: why for example, once the revolution has taken place and the new rulers have power firmly in their grasp, the people are always still the same old human beings? Or why, when there are by chance even precious elitist types who have personally brought a bourgeois, a Jew, or a Communist to ruin, but who now have to be liquidated in turn because the blood-intoxication has not raised them to a superhuman status? Would such observations have a sobering effect upon the Gnostic? Would they rouse him from his dream to reality? By no means! He foresees this possibility and with the cunning of a madman builds it right into his dream. Marx corrected the precipitancy of his youth when in later years, considering this possibility, he worked out an alternative. Under the influence of the Commune of 1871 he gave definitive formulation to an idea he had been refining since the failure of 1848: Following the seizure of power there will again be a government perhaps yet more oppressive than the older one; but the rulers will have been changed. And a government ruled by saints (or confederates, or comrades) is differentiated from all other governments by the fact that it will die out to the degree that the new humanity grows up under it. The government of the saints is a transition period from the old to the new world. The period of transition may last an indeterminately long time, perhaps centuries, so that uncomfortable questions cannot arise about whether its lengthiness may not be construed as a failure. And whoever does not believe that the brutal reality is only a transition to the kingdom of God, that person is a villain, a bourgeois, a Jew, a Communist, or a Fascist, depending upon his century and position. This dream speculation, so sure of its argumentation, is the crowning finale of the gnostic madness as developed by Marx in the Critique of the Gotha Program (1875) and further elaborated by Lenin in State and Revolution (1917). It is the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the transitional phase that the second phase of true Communism is to follow in an indeterminate remoteness of time.
The doctrine of the two phases first attained its explicit formulation in the second half of the nineteenth century. As a more or less clearly understood presupposition of gnostic action in reality, it has surely been present ever since there has been a politics of this type; the great portrait of the Puritans drawn by Richard Hooker at the end of the sixteenth century already shows with all possible clarity that it is contained in the argumentation of his opponents. This inner logic of gnostic action had already altered the idea of revolution in a remarkable manner even before its explicit formulation. In the sense of this doctrine, revolution is no longer the massive, blow-striking, temporally fixed and materially outlined upheaval of society in which one political regime is replaced by another, but a process indeterminately extended in which the seizure of power is only one phase, even if of decisive significance. Decades of revolutionary work might prepare this decisive blow, and centuries might follow it until the actual goal is attained, the dream reality. It is the “permanent revolution.”

The word revolution first came into common usage with the French Revolution of 1789. The phrase “permanent revolution” was coined in the liberal circles of the restored monarchy in France. In Le Censeur after 1815 Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer developed the idea of a politics that was supposed to prevent the violently destructive eruptions and the equally violent despotic restorations of order as demonstrated by the swinging of the great revolution from terror to empire. This was to be accomplished by gradual reforms of evil conditions at the appropriate time by means of a “permanent and wisely regulated revolution.”

This attempt to sell the revolution through social reform to the Gnostics is noteworthy in more than one respect. It shows especially that pathological Gnosis had penetrated far beyond revolutionary activism into modern politics. In the shadow of Gnosis, a “right,” liberal, progressive wing is developed that takes up the idea of revolution but wants to fend off its destructive violence by an evolutionary and ordered procedure. Formation of such a wing can occur inside the activist movements themselves, as shown in Germany’s case of the revisionist Social Democratic Party. Or, as in the case of the liberals of Le Censeur, it can grow out of a politics of compromise on the level of reality; or out of a politics of “peaceful
change,” as it was especially propagated by Americans between
the two world wars. And in the sphere of international politics it
can mount up into the attempt to create an institution, under the
title “League of Nations” or “United Nations,” that would subdue
the gnostic crisis of Western and westernized civilizations by legal
procedures and that desires to build the divine kingdom of peace
on earth at wholesale cost.

The first remarkable thing about this attempt is the halfhearted-
ness of a politics without any formative will that wants to “take
the wind out of the sails” of a dangerously strong will with very
little cunning. The second remarkable thing for the contemporary
context is essentially the mistake that the “wind” of gnostic pol-
itics is a demand for reform and that the derailment into reality
condemned by Marx is the essence of the gnostic dream; and hence
that as a matter of fact the evolutionary partisan or gradualist can
arrive at this apparently “real” success of revolution more cheaply.
This mistake is fraught with grave consequences: In the recent past
it motivated the Western politics of appeasement; and still today it
motivates numerous well-intentioned particular measures geared
toward stopping Communism.

That we are dealing here with an evil mistake becomes clear
as soon as one considers what “permanent revolution” means for
gnostic activists. The phrase comes up in Marx for the first time in
his Address to the Communist League of 1850. The directorate of
the Congress had to make comprehensible to the members why the
failure of 1848 was not the end and how the revolutionary action
was to proceed onward. The solution is simple: There is no failure
of revolution; the revolution goes forward, moved permanently
toward the irrepressible dream goal; there are only obstacles in
reality and they must be overcome incessantly by a style of political
activity for which Marx coined the name of “tactics.”

The gnostic political action, whose idea Marx developed, runs its
course in reality, but it has as its goal dream reality. Since, how-
ever, dream reality cannot be implemented in reality, the question
arises as to how means within reality can be oriented toward a
goal outside reality. And the further question: How may such a
dream orientation be interpreted in the categories of reality? To
be sure, the dream orientation is not a type of rationally purpo-
sive action; and it is questionable whether one can still speak
of it as political action. The designation of this dream action as
“tactics” is the terminological solution discovered by the Gnostics themselves. Behind this linguistic distinction stands the perilous fact that gnostic politics is a pathological phenomenon beyond normal political reckoning. What tactics means concretely may be learned from the Marxian advice given in the situation of 1850. The Communists are to be interested, not in the reconciliation of class oppositions, but in the abolition of classes; not in reform of present society, but in founding a new one. To keep the fight going, a stabilization of the political situation should be prevented at any cost. During a revolutionary conflict as well as afterward the Communists should obviate any attempt to calm the state of excitement. Mob riots should not be prevented or even only tolerated but instigated and organized in order to compromise the democrats. Whenever constitutional order is restored, the Communists would have to top any democratic reform measure with more radical demands. Should the democrats propose the nationalization of railroads and factories in return for adequate compensation, the Communists call for their confiscation; should the democrats demand a moderately progressive tax, the Communists would have to demand one that ruins higher incomes, and so forth. Basically, the demands of the Communists must always be geared to the concessions and measures of the democrats. The principle underlying this advice holds good for all situations, whether of domestic or foreign politics. Tactics are the pathological negation of politics insofar as in principle they do not create order but seek to destroy it.

VII

The transformation of revolution from political overthrow to a tactical struggle without end is rooted in the logic of the dream of the eons. Neither can the eon of light be realized nor can reality be eliminated. Hence, the gnostic action must assume the form of the permanent fight against people, institutions, and ideas that are always concrete tactical obstacles of the moment. A concrete order of reality is impossible because whatever is concretely the content of reality must be overcome. The permanent revolution of Gnosis is a cancerous ulcer in the body of reality; it is the death of a civilization if it is not stopped by stronger formative forces. From the standpoint of reality the problem of Gnosis is therefore not the
advent of the new eon but the struggle of concrete forces in reality against the mortal threat of pathological dreamers.

Even this point has not escaped the Gnostics. A Puritan document, the *Queries to Lord Fairfax* of 1649, is occupied with the details of the seizure of power and with the probable resistance of those who are the prospective sacrificial victims. The seizure of power is prepared by the federative organization of sectarians from local groups—the community of saints—upward. When the organization has reached the level of regional church assemblies or parliaments, “then shall God give them authority and rule over the nations and kingdoms of the world.” Concretely, the “Christian magistrates and parliaments of England” must be replaced by the immediate rule of the Spirit in his vessels, the saints, the “officers of Christ.” It is not enough that the rulers are Christians; they must be saints. “How can the kingdom be the Saints’ when the ungodly are electors, and elected to govern?” No compromise with the old ruling class is permissible, for “how then can it be lawful to patch up the old worldly government?” The only allowable procedure is “suppressing the enemies of godliness for ever.”

The radical attack upon the institutions of England that had matured historically and the uncompromising alienation of the opposition from public life and its suppression (today we would say “liquidation”) take on their peculiar characteristics in the *Queries* from the fact that the “officers of Christ” aim them at Christians. The linguistic expression keeps vacillating. England’s leaders were designated as “Christian magistrates”; but in other passages, when the fighting spirit breaks through, the opposition is spoken of as the Antichrist. Just as in Collier’s sermon, the Christianity of the Puritans in the *Queries* has been pushed to the extreme at which it becomes impossible to distinguish an Antichristian movement from an annihilatory attack on the historical status of a national Christian society.

The authors of the *Queries* were in no doubt that Christians would not clear out for the saints without a fight. The new kingdom was universal in its claim to dominion; it was supposed to extend “to all persons and things universally.” (The seventeenth century’s “universal” would be rendered today as “total.”) The saints expected the universal claim of their federation to call forth an equally universal alliance of the world against them. The saints had to unite “against the Antichristian powers of the world”; and the
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anti-Christian powers in their turn would have to “combine against them universally.” Out of the two worlds that were supposed to follow one another chronologically would come instead two historical and concrete universally armed camps engaged in a death struggle with each other. Already here, in the Puritan mystique of the two worlds, are presaged the universal wars that in fact have broken out in the twentieth century. The universal claim to dominion of the gnostic sectarian produces the universal alliance against him. The real danger of contemporary world wars is not the global extent of the theater of war but their character as wars between worlds in the gnostic sense that can only end with the annihilation of the counterworld.

VIII

The previous considerations have tried to sketch the essential traits of gnostic politics on the basis of selected sources. Such a sketch of its essence still does not exhaust the problems. In order to prevent misunderstandings, I will in closing therefore point out the limitations of our treatment of the subject matter as well as those other questions not yet mentioned expressly.

Any determination of the essence of political Gnosis has to take the gnostic thinkers at their word in relation to their intention. They want to project a true picture of the reality of mankind in society and history; and they legitimate their action by the truth of the picture. The critic must therefore determine what Gnosis in its essential truth is; and he can only do this inasmuch as he measures it by the criteria of his own knowledge of the truth. The result is the determination of its essence as the pathological attempt to realize a kingdom of transcendent perfection historically and immanently. This determination leads to important insights into the decline of rational culture and discipline in our time. But it does not answer a series of questions that press upon us urgently. What are the intellectual and spiritual processes that lead in individual cases to this pathological deviation? What are the historical conditions under which this deviation swells up into mass movements? When and why has this deviation entered upon the scene at all and with such social effectiveness?

Those are great themes that go beyond the framework of this examination of the essence of gnostic politics. But the sources
were selected so that hints as to responses are contained in them. Puritan documents and sources from the more recent past were drawn upon in equal measure for confirmation. The selection was intended to suggest that political Gnosis is a social process of immense historical depth. And the Puritan documents point to further depths that reach back to the heretical sectarian movements in the twelfth and eleventh centuries. The massiveness of this historical depth must be considered if one wants to understand the massiveness of gnostic movements in our age. Its destructive might does not spring from the stupidities of a couple of intellectuals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; instead it is the cumulative effect of unsolved problems and shallow attempts at a solution over a millennium of Western history. And its origins in heretical movements in the high middle ages indicate that we are dealing with an expansive urban and national high culture whose problems institutional Christianity could not resolve.

Finally, recall that political Gnosis is a sick growth within Western civilization, a growth within the classic and Christian tradition. These traditions are suppressed today; they are gravely damaged and discredited by centuries of antiphilosophical and anti-Christian propaganda among intellectuals. But they are not altogether dead. On the contrary, in the retrospective view of history, the last half-century might appear to be the decisive period of renaissance; compared with the days around 1900 we today again have a science of man in society and history that can be called a science without evoking mockery. But the social influence of this recovered intellectual and spiritual discipline is still very negligible, drowned out by the hucksterism of political intellectuals and their hangers-on in well-established positions in academic, party, union, publishing, journalistic, and other social bulwarks. It would take a great deal of time, persuasion, labor, and probably even the use of power to suppress these destructive factors enough to keep them from fomenting yet more unhealth than they have already managed to do. But the task is not hopeless.
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